The High Court Report

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 27, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026Overview: Federal pesticide law blocks a Missouri cancer patient's failure-to-warn lawsuit against Monsanto after the EPA repeatedly approved Roundup's label without requiring a cancer warning, despite the patient's claims linking Roundup to his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.Question Presented: Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim seeking a cancer warning the EPA declined to require.Posture: Missouri jury awarded Durnell $1.25M; Court of Appeals affirmed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's registration and label approval without a cancer warning creates a binding federal requirement that preempts stricter state demands; (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval processes create preemptive federal requirements; (3) Missouri's failure-to-warn verdict retroactively penalizes Monsanto for complying with the federal label EPA mandated.• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's specific label approval — sets the operative federal labeling requirement, and Missouri's tort mirrors it exactly; (2) FIFRA § 136a(f)(2) bars treating registration as a complete defense, stripping EPA approval of conclusive force; (3) Manufacturers can add a cancer warning through amended registration or minor modification, defeating impossibility preemption.Holding: FIFRA's preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly preempts Durnell's state-law failure-to-warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup's label in addition to or different from the label required under FIFRA. Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: • (1) FIFRA's registration process mandates substantive EPA label review; after approval, manufacturers must use that label and cannot change it without prior agency authorization; • (2) Riegel v. Medtronic establishes that analogous agency approval creates binding federal "requirements" — EPA pesticide registration functions identically and carries the same preemptive force; • (3) Durnell's claim imposes a labeling requirement "in addition to or different from" the EPA-approved label, triggering FIFRA's express preemption clause and its mandate for nationwide uniformity.Separate Opinions:• Justice Thomas (concurring): Joined the majority fully; wrote separately to flag three constitutional concerns: FIFRA may exceed Congress's Commerce Clause authority, violate the non-delegation doctrine, and rely on a form of agency preemption the Supremacy Clause may not support.• Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Gorsuch): FIFRA's misbranding prohibition — not EPA's label approval — constitutes the operative federal requirement. Missouri's failure-to-warn tort mirrors that prohibition, imposing nothing "in addition to or different from" federal law; § 136a(f)(2) confirms registration carries no preemptive force.Implications: • (1) State-law failure-to-warn claims against federally registered pesticides face preemption nationwide, closing state courtrooms to injured consumers seeking damages; • (2) Plaintiffs must petition the EPA directly, then seek judicial review of agency decisions, rather than pursue state tort remedies — a longer, harder road with no individual damages award; • (3) Manufacturers across food, drug, medical device, and consumer product industries gain stronger preemption defenses under analogous federal labeling statutes.The Fine Print:• FIFRA § 136v(b) — "Uniformity": "A State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."• FIFRA § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter. Such registration shall, however, be accepted as prima facie evidence that the pesticide, its labeling and packaging comply with the registration provisions of this subchapter."Primary Cases:• Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn tort claims qualify as labeling "requirements" under FIFRA's preemption clause; courts must assess whether those requirements exceed or differ from FIFRA's own mandates.• Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008): FDA premarket approval of a medical device creates binding federal "requirements" under a nearly identical preemption clause, preempting state tort claims seeking additional or different safety measures.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & MurphyRespondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller PostmanAmicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe, et al. | No. 25-1083 (consolidated with Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot, et al., No. 25-1084) | Docket: Here | Argued: April 29, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026Overview: The TPS statute strips federal courts of all power to review the Secretary of Homeland Security's mandatory procedures when terminating Temporary Protected Status, cutting off legal relief for hundreds of thousands of immigrants from thirteen countries.Question Presented: Whether the TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all court challenges — including claims the Secretary violated mandatory statutory procedures — when terminating TPS designations for Syria and Haiti.Posture: District courts granted emergency relief; appellate courts declined stays; Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment.Main Arguments:• Government (Petitioner): (1) "Determination" in § 1254a(b)(5)(A) covers every step in the TPS termination process — both the final decision and all procedures leading to it — barring all non-constitutional challenges; (2) the Secretary satisfied the consultation requirement by seeking State Department input before each termination; (3) terminating all thirteen TPS countries across racially diverse nations defeats any inference of racial animus against Haiti.• TPS Holders (Respondent): (1) "Determination" covers only the Secretary's factual conclusion about country conditions, not the mandatory procedural steps Congress wrote specifically to constrain executive discretion; (2) the Secretary never consulted agencies about country conditions — the State Department email addressed "foreign policy concerns," not safety; (3) presidential statements about Haitians combined with the across-the-board termination pattern demonstrate racial animus as a motivating factor.Holding: The TPS statute's judicial review bar blocks all non-constitutional challenges to TPS termination decisions, including claims the Secretary failed to follow mandatory procedural requirements; the Haitian TPS holders failed to demonstrate racial animus likely motivated Haiti's termination, making preliminary relief unavailable on their equal protection claim; both District Court orders reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion (all parts except Part III-A) joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Barrett; Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh also joined Part III-A, making that section a four-Justice plurality only. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: • (1) "Determination" — under any ordinary meaning, individual decision or entire process leading to one — covers all non-constitutional TPS challenges, including procedural claims; (2) "with respect to" further broadens the bar to cover everything relating to the termination, citing Patel v. Garland (2022); (3) respondents' own argument that the Secretary terminated all thirteen racially diverse TPS countries supplies the race-neutral explanation defeating the equal protection claim.Separate Opinions:• Justice Thomas (Concurring): Joined the majority in full; argued the judicial review bar also eliminates constitutional claims; further argued that aliens hold no equal protection rights against the federal government because Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) was wrongly decided. (35 words)• Justice Kagan (Dissenting, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson): Argued "determination" refers only to the Secretary's country-conditions conclusions, not mandatory procedural steps preceding them; the State Department email exchange never constituted real consultation; and racial animus tainted Haiti's termination under Arlington Heights. (37 words)Implications: • (1) Federal courts lose all power to enforce TPS mandatory procedures, leaving statutory compliance to political oversight alone; (2) employers of TPS workers from thirteen countries lose the litigation buffer that previously paused terminations; (3) Justice Thomas's concurrence targeting constitutional review creates significant uncertainty for future constitutional challenges to TPS decisions.The Fine Print:• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) (TPS Judicial Review Bar): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state [under this subsection]."• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (Mandatory Consultation Requirement): "[A]t least 60 days before [the] end [of the initial period of designation]... the [Secretary], after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state... and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation under this subsection continue to be met."Primary Cases:• Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977): Government violates equal protection when racial discrimination forms "a motivating factor" in a decision — not the only factor or dominant factor, but any factor among many.• Patel v. Garland (2022): The phrase "with respect to" in a judicial review bar "generally has a broadening effect," ensuring the bar covers not just the core subject but also matters relating to that subject.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (United States): D. John Sauer, United States’ Solicitor GeneralRespondents (Doe): Ahilan T. Arulanantham of UCLA School of LawRespondents (Miot): Geoffrey M. Pipoly of Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP

OVERVIEWThree opinions released June 30th, 2026 — the final day of the October 2025 Term — spanning birthright citizenship, transgender athletes in school sports, and political party campaign spending.Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, anchored by Kavanaugh — in West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Title IX and equal protection) and NRSC v. FEC (First Amendment). A third split 5-4 in Trump v. Barbara, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett crossing coalitions to strike down the President's birthright citizenship order alongside the Court's three liberal justices.Justice Kavanaugh authored two majorities and a pivotal concurrence-in-judgment-and-dissent-in-part in the third — the day's most prolific author. Justice Gorsuch filed three separate writings across two cases — two dissents in Barbara (one joining Thomas, one solo) plus a concurrence in B.P.J. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in Barbara and a concurrence in B.P.J. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all three cases, splitting only in B.P.J. where Sotomayor and Jackson each filed separate partial dissents.Trump v. Barbara spans 194 pages — 30 more than another blockbuster this Term, the Trump Tariff Cases.Trump v. Barbara | Case No. 25-365 | Argued: 04/01/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026Overview: President Trump's executive order strips birthright citizenship from children of unlawfully or temporarily present parents, triggering a constitutional fight over the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.Question Presented: Whether the Citizenship Clause guarantees citizenship to children born here to unlawfully or temporarily present parents.Posture: District Court enjoined the order; Supreme Court granted cert before judgment.Holding: Children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present still fall "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States and thus qualify as citizens at birth under the Citizenship Clause.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Sotomayor as to the introduction and Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion joined by Gorsuch. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a separate dissenting opinion. Affirmed.Majority Reasoning: (1) English common law granted citizenship by birth regardless of parents' momentary presence; (2) The Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark (1898) codify that rule, rejecting Dred Scott; (3) Historical record shows scant evidence Congress intended a domicile requirement.Separate Opinions:Justice Jackson (concurring): Rebuts Thomas's narrower reading, framing the Amendment as a broad anticaste reset rather than a remedy solely for formerly enslaved people.Justice Kavanaugh (concurring in judgment, dissenting in part): Order violates a federal statute, not the Constitution; Congress could legislate new exceptions but hasn't.Justice Thomas (dissenting): Citizenship requires actual domicile, not mere birth; Amendment protected only those with "no other homeland."Justice Alito (dissenting): Citizenship requires sole allegiance; majority's rule extends citizenship to children of "birth tourists."Justice Gorsuch (dissenting): Advances a distinct "settler's view" tying citizenship to parents making America their permanent home.Implications:(1) Executive orders alone cannot narrow birthright citizenship nationwide;(2) Congress gains a roadmap, via Kavanaugh's statutory theory, to legislate new exceptions;(3) Families with undocumented or temporary-status parents retain citizenship certainty for now.The Fine Print:Fourteenth Amendment, Citizenship Clause: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."8 U.S.C. §1401(a): Persons "born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" qualify as "nationals and citizens of the United States at birth."Primary Cases:United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898): Confirms the Fourteenth Amendment extends birthright citizenship broadly, with only narrow exceptions for diplomats and similar categories.Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857): Denied citizenship based on ancestry; the Fourteenth Amendment overturns this ruling entirely.West Virginia v. B.P.J. | Case No. 24-43 (consolidated with Little v. Hecox, No. 24-38) | Argued: 01/13/2026 | Decided: 06/30/2026Overview: West Virginia and Idaho ban transgender girls from girls' school sports, prompting a Title IX and Equal Protection Clause challenge from two transgender athletes.Question Presented: Whether Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause permit schools to limit girls' sports teams to biological females.Posture: Fourth Circuit partially reversed; Ninth Circuit affirmed an injunction against Idaho's law.Holding: Schools may limit girls' and women's sports teams to biological females under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause without violating federal law or the Constitution.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) Title IX's own regulations expressly permit separate-sex teams, so separation doesn't constitute prohibited discrimination; (2) Safety and competitive fairness qualify as important interests satisfying intermediate scrutiny; (3) States need not conduct individualized athlete-by-athlete physical assessments.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Argues transgender status doesn't qualify as a suspect class warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny.Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Title IX never "clearly and unambiguously" warned schools that single-sex teams violate funding conditions.Justice Sotomayor (dissenting in part): Majority resolves an unsettled factual dispute over athletic advantage prematurely, before required fact-finding completes.Justice Jackson (dissenting in part): Majority needlessly narrows Title IX's definition of "sex," risking broader transgender-student protections.Implications:(1) States gain constitutional cover for laws restricting girls' sports to biological females;(2) Transgender athletes lose their strongest federal legal argument for inclusion;(3) Voluntary inclusion policies and male/co-ed team questions remain unresolved.The Fine Print:Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a): "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in...any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."34 CFR §106.41(b): Schools may "sponsor separate teams for members of each sex" based on competitive skill or contact-sport status.Primary Cases:United States v. Virginia (1996): Physical differences between men and women qualify as "enduring," justifying sex-based athletic classifications under intermediate scrutiny.Bostock v. Clayton County (2020): Firing someone for being transgender violates Title VII, but the ruling doesn't address single-sex facilities or sports teams.National Republican Senatorial Committee v. FEC | Case No. 24-621 | Argued: 12/09/2025 | Decided: 06/30/2026Overview: Political committees challenge federal limits on party spending coordinated directly with candidates, asking the Court to overrule its own 2001 precedent upholding those caps.Question Presented: Whether FECA's limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment.Posture: En banc Sixth Circuit upheld the limits, following Colorado II as binding precedent.Holding: FECA's limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures with candidates violate the First Amendment, and Colorado II no longer retains vitality.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) Coordination between parties and candidates forms the essence of the party system, with no documented historical corruption; (2) Modern precedent demands narrower tailoring than Colorado II applied; (3) Earmarking and disclosure rules already guard against circumvention concerns.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (dissenting): Coordinated spending lets donors circumvent base contribution limits entirely, recreating quid pro quo corruption risks Congress...

Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. v. Al Otro Lado, et al. | Case No. 25-5 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-5.html | Argued: March 24, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026Overview: Border-access challenge determining whether federal immigration law requires officers to inspect and process asylum seekers at ports of entry before they cross into U.S. territory, or whether statutory duties attach only upon physical territorial entry.Question Presented: Whether noncitizens blocked at the border before physically crossing "arrive in the United States," triggering mandatory inspection and asylum-processing duties under federal immigration law.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed district court; district court declared metering policy unlawful; Supreme Court reversed.Main Arguments:Government (Petitioner): (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — physical territorial entry; a running back stopped at the 1-yard line has not arrived in the end zone; (2) INA inspection and removal procedures presuppose U.S. presence — officers cannot enforce them against people standing in Mexico; (3) Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and the presumption against extraterritoriality confirm statutory duties apply only inside U.S. territory.Asylum Seekers (Respondent): (1) "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports — otherwise the clause wholly duplicates "physically present," violating the surplusage canon; (2) Congress enacted §§1158 and 1225 to implement non-refoulement obligations barring return of refugees to persecution; (3) Federal regulations for 30 years defined "arriving alien" as anyone "attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry."Holding: An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" by attempting and failing to cross the border. The INA neither entitles such an alien to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect them.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion. Reversed and remanded. 138 F.4th 1102, reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) "Arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning — entering within the limits of a place — not merely approaching its threshold; dictionary definitions and everyday analogies confirm physical entry controls; (2) Other INA provisions expressly cover those who "attempt to enter," but §§1158 and 1225 omit attempt language — Congress acted deliberately; (3) Presumption against extraterritoriality bars reading these statutes to reach people standing on Mexican soil.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas — Concurring: Joined majority fully. Wrote separately to flag two future issues: §1252(f)(1) may bar class-wide declaratory relief in immigration cases; and compelling the President to admit specific aliens would raise serious constitutional questions about inherent executive exclusion authority.Justice Sotomayor — Dissenting (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson): "Arrives in" covers noncitizens in the process of arriving at ports; federal regulations, the anti-surplusage canon, and the present-tense statutory language all demand inspection duties attach before physical crossing. Majority's ruling will cost lives.Justice Jackson — Dissenting: DHS rescinded metering in 2021 with no concrete reinstatement plans; the case approached mootness and the Court effectively issued an advisory opinion in a factual vacuum. Also joined Sotomayor dissent on the merits.Implications: (1) Government can resume metering; asylum and inspection duties attach only after a noncitizen physically crosses the border; (2) Future APA challenges to specific metering policies — applied as subterfuge when ports retain capacity — remain live; (3) Thomas's concurrence signals future challenges to class-wide immigration court orders and expanded presidential exclusion authority.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1): "An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...) shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission."8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1): "Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival...), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title."Primary Cases:Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (1993): Article 33 of the Refugee Convention cannot restrict U.S. actions toward aliens outside U.S. territory; statutory refugee protections apply only within the United States.Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (2010): Courts presume federal statutes apply domestically unless Congress affirmatively and unmistakably directs extraterritorial reach.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Noem, et al.): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeRespondents (Al Otro Lado): Kelsi B. Corkran of the the of Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protectio

OVERVIEWFour opinions released June 29th, 2026 — one day, across digital privacy, presidential removal power at two federal agencies, and absentee ballot receipt deadlines.Two decisions split 6-3 along identical lines — the same conservative majority, the same liberal dissent — in Chatrie (Fourth Amendment) and Slaughter (FTC removal). A third split 5-4 in Cook, with Roberts crossing coalitions to block the President's removal of a Federal Reserve governor. A fourth, Watson, drew Barrett alongside Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson to protect state absentee-ballot rules.Chief Justice Roberts authored two majorities — opposite outcomes in two "Trump v." cases on the same day. Justice Alito dissented three times, authoring a majority only in Slaughter. Justice Gorsuch filed concurrences in two cases — challenging Katz in Chatrie, warning of executive power consolidation in Slaughter. The liberal bloc — Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson — voted together in all four.The Court plans to release opinions tomorrow, June 30th — likely the final batch of the October 2025 Term.

Wolford v. Lopez | Case No. 24-1046 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: January 20, 2026 | Decided: June 25, 2026Overview: After Bruen recognized the right to public carry, Hawaii required licensed gun carriers to obtain express permission before entering any private business open to the public — reversing the common-law presumption of open entry for anyone, including armed citizens.Question Presented: Whether Hawaii may prohibit licensed carry permit holders from entering private commercial property while armed without the property owner's express permission.Posture: District court enjoined the law; Ninth Circuit reversed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Carry Permit Holders):(1) Hawaii's law burdens the daily exercise of Second Amendment rights by effectively banning carry on ninety-six percent of publicly accessible land;(2) No historical tradition justifies flipping the common-law default from implied permission to presumptive prohibition on property open to the public;(3) Hawaii's anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and distinct hunting harms — not concealed carry in commercial establishments.Respondent (Hawaii):(1) The Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without consent — the form of that consent belongs to state property law;(2) Colonial anti-poaching laws and Reconstruction-era statutes support a tradition of requiring affirmative consent for armed carry onto private property;(3) Hawaii's law vindicates property owners' right to exclude by requiring armed visitors to seek express permission before entry.Holding: Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner's express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Part II–B only. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning:(1) Hawaii's law falls within the Second Amendment's plain text — permit holders sought to "bear" "Arms" in public, making the law presumptively unconstitutional;(2) Hawaii's colonial anti-poaching analogues targeted agricultural land and hunting-specific harms vastly different from restricting concealed carry in commercial establishments;(3) Hawaii's 1865 Louisiana Black Code analogue — enacted to disarm newly freed Black Americans — carries no probative value under the Bruen framework.Separate Opinions:Barrett (concurring; Thomas and Gorsuch join as to Part II–B only): Property-law framing doesn't immunize Hawaii's law from Second Amendment scrutiny. States may not use property rules to evade constitutional limits. Anti-poaching laws and Black Codes both fail Bruen's "why" inquiry. Thomas and Gorsuch joined only the Black Code portion.Kagan (dissenting): Anti-poaching laws share sufficient "how" and "why" with Hawaii's rule — both required express consent for armed entry onto private property in response to harms posed by armed individuals on another's land. Kagan dissented solely on the historical analogue question.Jackson (dissenting; Sotomayor joins): This case never implicated the Second Amendment — the dispute concerns only the form of consent required for armed entry onto private property, a question state property law controls. Hawaii's historical analogues satisfy Bruen. The majority invites unconstrained judicial discretion.Implications:(1) Carry permit holders may now enter commercial property in Hawaii, California, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York absent an owner's posted prohibition;(2) Business owners now bear the burden of posting signage to exclude armed visitors;(3) Courts must apply a stricter historical analogue standard to Second Amendment challenges.The Fine Print:Second Amendment, U.S. Const. Amdt. 2: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."Haw. Rev. Stat. § 134-9.5(a) (2023): "A [licensed] person carrying a firearm [may not] intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly enter or remain on private property of another person while carrying a loaded or unloaded firearm, whether the firearm is operable or not, and whether the firearm is concealed or unconcealed, unless the person has been given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property."Primary Cases:New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Established the two-step framework for Second Amendment challenges — requiring States to justify gun regulations through history and tradition, rejecting interest-balancing tests.District of Columbia v. Heller (2008): Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, with self-defense as the core purpose; history governs the right's scope.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Muk Choi Lau | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 22, 2026 | Decided: June 23, 2026Overview: The Court addressed whether border officers must possess clear and convincing evidence that a green card holder committed a crime before stripping that person of already-admitted status and treating the holder as an applicant for admission.Question Presented: Whether the INA requires border officers to possess clear and convincing evidence of a crime before treating a green card holder as seeking admission.Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Main Arguments:• Petitioner (Government):(1) The INA imposes no evidentiary burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification decisions;(2) the two-step framework requires crime commission at step one and conviction at step two, both satisfied here;(3) the government met the clear-and-convincing standard at the removal hearing through Lau's guilty plea.• Respondent (Lau):(1) The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before treating a returning green card holder as seeking admission;(2) the statute's present-perfect tense confirms border officers must make that determination at the moment of reentry, not later;(3) a conviction entered after the parole decision cannot retroactively justify the border officer's classification call.Holding: The INA does not require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Second Circuit judgment vacated and remanded.Majority Reasoning:(1) Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) requires only crime commission — not conviction — at step one to trigger "seeking admission" status; conviction or admission of guilt at step two establishes inadmissibility;(2) the INA nowhere imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers making on-the-spot classification calls;(3) the BIA's clear-and-convincing standard applies at removal hearings — not at the border — and the government satisfied it through Lau's guilty plea.Separate Opinions: • Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan): The INA's "shall not" command required the government to determine whether an exception applied before reclassifying a returning green card holder as seeking admission. The majority permits post hoc justification, gutting the statutory protection Congress built for green card holders.Implications:(1) Green card holders face possible parole at any border crossing if a pending criminal charge appears in federal databases — no evidentiary floor required at the moment of the call;(2) courts must still resolve what standard — if any — governs border officers' parole decisions;(3) the Second Circuit must decide on remand whether Lau's conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title"8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I): "convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude"Primary Cases:Barton v. Barr (2020): Established the two-step framework for removing returning lawful permanent residents — crime commission at step one triggers "seeking admission" status; conviction at step two establishes inadmissibility.Matter of Valenzuela-Felix (BIA 2012): The Board of Immigration Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to removal hearings only, not the border — the distinction the majority adopted and the Second Circuit ignored.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of JusticeRespondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Pung v. Isabella County | Case No. 25-95 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/25/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026Overview: A Michigan family lost their $194,400 home at a tax auction for $76,008 over a disputed $2,241.93 debt. The Court decided whether just compensation under the Takings Clause demands fair market value or only the auction surplus.Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause requires the government to pay fair market value — not just the auction surplus — after a tax foreclosure sale.Posture: District Court awarded surplus only; Sixth Circuit affirmed on circuit precedent; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Pung Family):(1) Just compensation under the Fifth Amendment requires fair market value, not the artificially depressed auction sale price;(2) No court in 250 years held surplus proceeds automatically satisfy just compensation for a home sold far below assessed value;(3) The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause bars the government from consuming the vast majority of a homeowner's equity over a small tax debt.Respondent (Isabella County):(1) Centuries of English and American law establish that surplus auction proceeds satisfy just compensation in tax foreclosure sales;(2) Adopting fair market value as the constitutional baseline would render tax foreclosure sales financially infeasible for governments nationwide;(3) The Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to fairly conducted tax sales with deep historical roots.Holding: The proper baseline for just compensation after a tax foreclosure sale is the auction price — the surplus above the tax debt — not the property's hypothetical fair market value, at least when the sale proceeds fairly in light of the nation's history of tax sales. The Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not require more than the surplus proceeds.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson; Justice Thomas joined except as to Part II-B. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Gorsuch and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch except as to footnote 1. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Centuries of English and American law — codified in founding-era statutes and confirmed in Court precedent — established surplus auction proceeds as the measure of just compensation in tax foreclosure sales;(2) Owners can generally avoid tax foreclosure by refinancing or selling voluntarily, distinguishing tax sales from traditional eminent domain;(3) A fair-market-value rule would render tax sales financially infeasible, forcing governments to pay delinquent taxpayers more than the auction ever generates.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson): Agreed with the result but wrote separately to clarify that the majority's "fairly conducted" language does not define the constitutional floor for a valid tax auction — leaving that standard open for the lower courts on remand.Justice Thomas (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except footnote 1): Declined to join Part II-B; argued historical tax-sale tradition imposed strict limits the County violated — including exhausting personal property before seizing the home and selling only as much as necessary — and called the County's conduct likely unconstitutional.Implications:(1) Homeowners facing tax foreclosure cannot demand fair market value as a constitutional right — only the auction surplus;(2) Governments may conduct tax sales without paying more than the surplus, preserving the system nationwide as a viable debt-collection tool;(3) Lower courts must now define what a "fairly conducted" auction requires, inviting future constitutional challenges on procedural grounds.The Fine Print:Fifth Amendment, Takings Clause: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"Eighth Amendment, Excessive Fines Clause: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"Primary Cases:Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023): The government must return surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale to the former owner; retaining the surplus violates the Takings Clause.BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994): A foreclosure sale price reflects the actual market for foreclosed property; the former owner does not recover fair market value through foreclosure.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC.United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 02/23/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026Overview: Cuba's Communist government confiscated Exxon's oil refinery and service stations in 1960. Congress created a legal remedy in 1996 via the Helms-Burton Act. The Court decided whether that law itself strips Cuban government companies of their immunity shield.Question Presented: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban government agencies and instrumentalities, excusing plaintiffs from satisfying the FSIA's separate exceptions.Posture: District court and divided D.C. Circuit sided with Cuban defendants; Supreme Court granted cert.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Exxon Mobil):(1) Helms-Burton's express cause of action against foreign instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity under Court precedent without a separate waiver provision;(2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action because the simultaneous embargo bars the commercial nexus those exceptions require;(3) The Act routes suits through §1331 — not §1330 — and grants the President exclusive gatekeeping power, confirming FSIA displacement.Respondents (CIMEX/CUPET):(1) Helms-Burton's text never addresses sovereign immunity, failing the unmistakably-clear abrogation standard;(2) Congress considered adding an express FSIA exception and deliberately dropped it after DOJ objected;(3) The FSIA and Helms-Burton can coexist because some suits satisfy FSIA exceptions through lawful Cuba-U.S. commercial activity.Holding: The Helms-Burton Act abrogates the foreign sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not separately satisfy an FSIA exception.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) The Act's cause of action expressly applies against foreign instrumentalities, which under Kirtz (2024) abrogates immunity without a separate waiver provision;(2) Applying the FSIA guts the cause of action — the simultaneous Cuba embargo bars the commercial nexus the FSIA's exceptions require, creating an inescapable trap Congress never intended;(3) The Act routes suits through §1331 not §1330, grants the President exclusive immunity-gatekeeping authority mirroring the pre-FSIA regime, and expressly contemplates judgments against Cuban entities — all confirming FSIA displacement.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan — Dissenting (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson): Helms-Burton's text never addresses immunity; Congress dropped a draft FSIA amendment after DOJ objection; the cause of action retains meaningful work against private defendants without any abrogation.Implications:(1) American claimants with Cuba-confiscated property can now sue Cuban government entities under Helms-Burton, bypassing FSIA exceptions entirely;(2) Dozens of pending suits involving Cuban hotels, ports, and airports advance to the merits;(3) The Court reserved whether the ruling extends to non-Cuban foreign instrumentalities, guaranteeing future litigation.The Fine Print:22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A) (Helms-Burton Act / Title III): "any person that...traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"28 U.S.C. §1604 (FSIA): "a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter"Primary Cases:Dep't of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Congressional creation of a cause of action expressly applying against government agencies or instrumentalities abrogates sovereign immunity without a separate waiver provision.Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo (2023): Congress does not "authorize a suit against a sovereign with one hand, only to bar it with the other" — statutory schemes must afford meaningful remedies to identified defendants.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil.United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Overview:Four opinions released June 25th, 2026 — one day, across environmental tort preemption, immigration enforcement, executive authority over humanitarian protections, and Second Amendment rights.Three of four decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, three consecutive times.The fourth — a Roundup cancer lawsuit and a $1 million-plus Missouri jury verdict — fractured the usual alliances, drawing Sotomayor and Kagan into a 7–2 conservative coalition while pushing Gorsuch into dissent alongside Jackson.Justice Alito authored three majority opinions; Justice Kavanaugh authored one; Chief Justice Roberts joined all four without writing separately.Justice Thomas wrote or joined a separate concurrence in all four cases — each one planting seeds for future constitutional challenges to the administrative state, executive immigration power, and federal equal protection doctrine.Justice Jackson dissented in all four cases — twice as the author — making her the most prolific dissenter of the opinion day.This episode breaks down all four decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, Thomas's concurrence roadmap, and real-world consequences.Monsanto Co. versus Durnell | No. 24–1068Federal preemption law (FIFRA) blocks state failure-to-warn tort claims requiring cancer warnings on Roundup's label beyond what the EPA approved.7–2. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett.Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion flagging three structural concerns: FIFRA likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority; EPA's labeling power raises non-delegation problems; and agency regulations may lack Supremacy Clause status to preempt state law.Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Gorsuch.Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al. versus Al Otro Lado et al. | No. 25–5An alien standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" within the meaning of the INA; inspection and asylum obligations don't attach before physical border crossing.6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing lower courts evaded §1252(f)(1)'s classwide injunction bar through declaratory-relief labeling, and that statutes compelling the President to admit aliens would infringe inherent executive exclusion authority.Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson.Justice Jackson filed a separate dissenting opinion.Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. versus Doe et al. | Nos. 25–1083 & 25–1084The TPS statute bars judicial review of termination decisions; the equal protection race claim challenging Haiti's TPS termination unlikely to succeed on the merits.Justice Alito announced the judgment and delivered the Court's opinion, joined in full by Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh, and except for Part III–A by Gorsuch and Barrett.Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars even constitutional claims, that Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) deserves overruling, and that non-citizen immigrants hold no constitutional equal protection rights against federal immigration decisions.Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson.Second and D.C. Circuits reversed and remanded.Wolford et al. versus Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii | No. 24–1046Hawaii's law prohibiting licensed carry-permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public without the owner's express consent violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.6–3. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion — joined by Thomas and Gorsuch as to Part II–B — rejecting Hawaii's property-law framing and disqualifying both the anti-poaching and Black Code historical analogues as invalid historical support under Bruen.Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Sotomayor.Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

PART 1: SHOW NOTESCisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-856.html | Argued: 04/28/2026 | Decided: 06/23/2026Overview: The Supreme Court ended corporate accountability under two federal human-rights statutes, ruling that courts carry no authority to create new Alien Tort Statute lawsuits and that the Torture Victim Protection Act reaches only direct perpetrators — not their corporate enablers.Question Presented: Whether the ATS and TVPA authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company that allegedly helped a foreign government torture a religious minority.Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.Main Arguments:Cisco (Petitioner):(1) Post-Sosa and Egbert precedents stripped courts of authority to create any new ATS cause of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress;(2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory text;(3) TVPA's "subjects" covers command responsibility only — not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or physical control of victims.Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondents):(1) Aiding-and-abetting violations of the law of nations itself violated international law at the Founding — the First Congress built that liability into the ATS;(2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both statutes support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis;(3) Congress chose the broad verb "subjects" over the narrower "commits" to reach secondary actors — legislative history confirms it.Holding: Federal courts carry no authority to create new causes of action under the ATS, and the TVPA's "subjects" language does not reach those who aided and abetted torture. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V. Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Post-Sosa precedents — especially Egbert v. Boule (2022) — establish that creating causes of action belongs exclusively to Congress, eliminating courts' residual ATS common-law authority Sosa described as "slight";(2) Central Bank of Denver forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express congressional text, and neither the ATS nor the TVPA supplies it;(3) ATS cases categorically raise foreign policy and separation-of-powers concerns that always counsel deference to Congress — no judicial cause of action survives that constraint.Separate Opinions:Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment in part / dissenting in part, joined by Kagan): Agreed TVPA's "subjects" excludes aiding-and-abetting but rejected the majority's deployment of Central Bank as a magic-words test; dissented from the ATS holding alongside Justice Sotomayor.Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V): Accused the majority of covertly overruling Sosa without stare decisis analysis; argued "subjects" covers corporate complicity in torture; flagged the logical contradiction of preserving the Blackstone three while eliminating all other ATS implied claims.Implications:(1) American companies now face near-zero civil exposure in U.S. courts for knowingly helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses;(2) Torture and atrocity victims must pursue accountability through Congress or the political branches — federal courts stepped out;(3) Congress must enact express aiding-and-abetting liability before courts reenter this territory.The Fine Print:Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."Primary Cases:Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain "narrow" authority to recognize new ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step specificity test — authority the majority now declares nonexistent.Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability under a federal statute requires Congress to expressly provide for it; statutory silence implies nothing.Oral Advocates: Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLPRespondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Overview:Five opinions released June 23rd, 2026 — one day, across immigration, international human rights, foreign sovereign immunity, religious freedom, and property rights.Four of five decisions split 6–3: identical conservative majority, identical liberal dissent, four consecutive times.The fifth — a Michigan family's $2,241 tax bill and a home sold at auction for $76,008 — drew near-unanimous agreement across ideological lines.Every conservative Justice authored a majority; Chief Justice Roberts joined all five without writing one.Justice Jackson led all Justices in separate opinion output — three opinions across the five cases.This episode breaks down all five decisions: authors, vote splits, key holdings, separate opinions, and real-world consequences.Blanche, Acting Attorney General versus Lau | No. 25–429Border officers need not hold clear and convincing evidence before treating a returning lawful permanent resident as an admission-seeker based on a crime involving moral turpitude.6–3. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan.Second Circuit vacated and remanded.Cisco Systems, Inc. versus Doe | No. 24–856Courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute; the Torture Victim Protection Act does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability.6–3. Justice Barrett authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Kagan.Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Kagan and Jackson as to Parts I–III and V.Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.Exxon Mobil Corp. versus Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | No. 24–699The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs need not separately satisfy FSIA exceptions.6–3. Justice Kavanaugh authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett.Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson.D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded.Landor versus Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety | No. 23–1197Individual state prison officers may not face personal liability under RLUIPA unless they voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer suits under the statute.6–3. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett.Justice Jackson dissented, joined by Sotomayor and Kagan.Fifth Circuit affirmed.Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Pung versus Isabella County, Michigan | No. 25–95Just compensation following a tax sale equals the auction sale price, not the property's hypothetical fair market value; the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause claim fails.Near-unanimous. Justice Alito authored the majority, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, and by Thomas except as to Part II–B.Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Gorsuch and Jackson.Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Gorsuch except as to footnote 1.Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026Overview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence.Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Main Arguments:Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief.Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it.Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how."Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation.Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification.Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards."Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched.The Fine Print:Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."Primary Cases:New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest.United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:08] United States Opening Statement[00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions[00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions[01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement[01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions[01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions[01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.Separate Opinions:Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.Implications:(1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;(2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;(3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"Primary Cases:United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:00] Oral Advocates[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

United States v. Hemani | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/02/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026Interview with Adeel Bashir: HereOverview: A federal law strips gun rights from regular drug users without proof of danger. This case tests how far the Second Amendment's history-and-tradition standard limits Congress's power to disarm marijuana users.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to a marijuana user with no history of violence.Posture: District court dismissed the indictment; Fifth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted certiorari.Main Arguments:Petitioner (United States): (1) Habitual drunkard laws from the founding era supply a historically analogous tradition for disarming regular drug users; (2) Vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted a similarly dangerous category of people; (3) Section 925(c) offers a constitutional safety valve through individualized relief.Respondent (Hemani): (1) The government's historical analogues fail the why-and-how test since habitual drunkard laws targeted only the incapacitated, not regular users; (2) No genuine circuit split warrants review; (3) Section 925(c)'s recent restoration cannot retroactively cure a violation that predates it.Holding: The government's prosecution of Mr. Hemani under §922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Kagan. Affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) The government's "habitual drunkard" historical analogues targeted only the incapacitated, not regular or even heavy users, undercutting the claimed "why"; (2) Those laws aimed to protect drunkards and the public from idleness or financial ruin, not categorically violent people, further undercutting the "why"; (3) Historical laws required pre-deprivation process, while Section 922(g)(3) disarms automatically with none, failing the "how."Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Thomas joins the majority fully but argues Section 922(g) likely exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power, since prosecutors need only show a firearm once crossed state lines, inviting a future challenge to the statute's constitutional foundation.Justice Jackson (concurring, joined by Justice Sotomayor): Jackson joins the majority fully but renews her call to replace the Bruen history-and-tradition test with means-end scrutiny, arguing the current framework cannot meaningfully assess whether a law's burden fits the government's stated justification.Justice Alito (concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan): Alito agrees Hemani wins but would rest the decision on narrower ground: the government never proved how much marijuana Hemani used or whether it affected his judgment, unlike incapacitated historical "habitual drunkards."Implications: (1) Federal prosecutors need more than admitted regular drug use to bring a 922(g)(3) charge; (2) Marijuana users in legal-marijuana states gain real protection from automatic federal gun prosecution; (3) Defense attorneys gain a roadmap for similar challenges, while bans on addicts, intoxicated possessors, and felons stay untouched.The Fine Print:Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition."Primary Cases:New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022): Gun laws must match the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation, not just serve a strong government interest.United States v. Rahimi (2024): The government need not identify a historical "twin," only a law "relevantly similar" in why and how it operated.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.

Hunter v. United States | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 03/03/2026 | Decided: 06/18/2026Overview: A plea deal's appeal waiver collides with a forced-medication sentence, pushing the Supreme Court to decide when courts can void a waiver — reshaping appellate rights for the ninety-five percent of federal defendants who plead guilty.Question Presented: Whether an appeal waiver remains enforceable when enforcing it would create a miscarriage of justice in sentencing.Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed Hunter's appeal under the waiver; Court granted certiorari to resolve a split.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Hunter): (1) Contract defenses like frustration of purpose render the waiver unenforceable for egregious sentencing errors; (2) the judge's on-record statement granting appeal rights, paired with the prosecutor's silence, voids the waiver; (3) courts must recognize a miscarriage-of-justice exception to prevent egregious, unconstitutional sentencing conditions from escaping all appellate review.Respondent (United States): (1) A knowing and voluntary appeal waiver binds the defendant according to its plain terms; (2) only two narrow exceptions ever excuse a waiver — ineffective assistance and an above-maximum sentence; (3) a broad miscarriage-of-justice exception floods appellate courts and undercuts the value of plea bargaining nationwide.Holding: An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice — meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Alito and Barrett. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Hunter's claim that the judge's statement and prosecutor's silence voided the waiver fails, since the agreement requires written, signed modifications and the government's chance to enforce the waiver arises only after a notice of appeal; (2) courts retain independent authority over plea waivers, since judges must approve every agreement and appellate courts control enforcement; (3) a miscarriage-of-justice standard, requiring an obvious and egregious error, replaces both the government's absolute-enforcement rule and the Fifth Circuit's narrow two-exception rule.Separate Opinions:Justice Gorsuch (concurring): Traces plea bargaining's coercive growth and catalogues a broader set of miscarriage-of-justice examples, including guideline-calculation errors, while questioning whether prospective appeal waivers can ever satisfy the Constitution's knowing-and-voluntary requirement.Justice Kavanaugh (concurring): Joins the majority in full but writes separately to argue Gorsuch's reading sets a lower bar than the majority opinion actually adopts.Justice Barrett (concurring): Grounds the new rule in "procedural common law" rather than the Court's disputed supervisory power, offering a doctrinal source distinct from the majority's framing.Justice Thomas (dissenting): Dissents alone, arguing the majority cites no genuine source of law for its rule and warns the new standard floods appellate courts with new claims.Implications:(1) Defendants nationwide gain a new, though narrow, path to challenge sentencing errors despite signed appeal waivers;(2) defense attorneys and judges must now weigh whether unusual sentencing conditions risk surviving appellate review;(3) the Fifth Circuit must decide on remand whether Hunter's forced-medication condition clears the new bar.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A): "[T]he court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision"Primary Cases:United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Some baseline of fair procedure survives no matter what a defendant agrees to waive in a plea deal.Santobello v. New York (1971): Plea agreements remain subject to judicial oversight and "sound judicial discretion," not just prosecutorial control.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.Main Arguments:T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;(3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review; (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed; (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;(2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;(3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.Implications:(1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;(2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;(3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."Primary Cases:Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:15] Oral Advocates[00:01:27] Argument Begins[00:01:35] T.M. Opening Statement[00:03:51] T.M. Free for All Questions[00:27:56] T.M. Round Robin Questions[00:42:13] UMD Medical Opening Statement[00:44:01] UMD Medical Free for All Questions[00:59:41] UMD Medical Round Robin Questions[00:59:50] T.M. Rebuttal

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation | Case No. 25-197 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 18, 2026Overview: A Maryland woman signed a state-court consent order to secure release from involuntary psychiatric commitment, then challenged that order in federal district court while her state-court appeal remained pending — pushing the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.Question Presented: Whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits challenging state-court judgments that remain subject to further review in state appellate proceedings.Posture: Fourth Circuit affirmed District Court's dismissal of T.M.'s complaint under Rooker-Feldman for lack of jurisdiction.Main Arguments:T.M. (Petitioner): (1) Rooker-Feldman applies only after state proceedings end, per Exxon Mobil's confinement to the procedural circumstances of Rooker and Feldman; (2) Section 1257 cannot support a negative inference extending the doctrine to non-final state-court judgments;(3) preclusion and abstention doctrines adequately address federalism concerns without imposing a blunt jurisdictional bar.UMD Medical System (Respondent): (1) Exxon Mobil's four-element test contains no finality requirement; district courts lack appellate jurisdiction to void state-court judgments regardless of pending state review; (2) T.M. satisfies every Rooker-Feldman element — she asked a federal court to declare void a consent order entered ten days before she filed; (3) T.M.'s rule spawns parallel duplicative litigation, gamesmanship, and federalism harm that abstention and preclusion fail to prevent.Holding: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district court jurisdiction over suits brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and seeking federal review and rejection of those judgments, regardless of whether the state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings. Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. Fourth Circuit affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) T.M.'s finality theory contradicts precedent — Rooker (1923), Feldman (1983), and Exxon Mobil (2005) all rest on a functional distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction, not on section 1257's finality requirement;(2) T.M.'s rule produces arbitrary results and invites gamesmanship — identical plaintiffs with different filing timing reach opposite outcomes;(3) abstention and preclusion doctrines don't substitute where a plaintiff directly attacks a state-court judgment as the source of injury.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas concurred in full, writing separately to ground Rooker in constitutional text and Founding history — the power to revise another court's judgment always constituted appellate jurisdiction, and Congress never granted district courts that revising power over state civil judgments.Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch. The dissent argued Exxon Mobil confined the doctrine to cases filed "after the state proceedings ended," and the majority expanded a doctrinally shaky rule beyond Exxon's mandate.Implications:(1) State-court losers cannot access federal district court while state appeals remain open — they must exhaust state remedies first;(2) The core Rooker-Feldman ambiguity — distinguishing judgment attacks from independent federal claims — survives and drives future litigation;(3) T.M. retains a stayed Maryland state appeal and may yet petition the Supreme Court if constitutional questions survive.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 1257(a): "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question..."28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."Primary Cases:Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (2005): Rooker-Feldman doctrine "confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments" — the central precedent both sides claimed as support.Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923): Federal district courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state-court judgments — such relief constitutes an exercise of appellate jurisdiction that Congress vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (T.M.): Elizabeth B. Prelogar of Cooley LLPRespondents (University of Maryland Medical System Corporation): Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of acOral Advocates:Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley AustinRespondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.Main Arguments:Petitioner (the Funds):(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.Respondent (Saba):(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.Implications:(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.The Fine Print:Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."Primary Cases:Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:12] Argument Begins[00:01:21] Abouammo Opening Statement[00:03:30] Abouammo Free for All Questions[00:26:27] Abouammo Round Robin Questions[00:33:40] United States Opening Statement[00:35:54] United States Free for All Questions[01:04:34] United States Round Robin Questions[01:13:58] Abouammo Rebuttal

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of FS Credit and BlackRock: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeFor Respondent (Saba): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VAQuestion Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.Main Arguments:Petitioner (the Funds):(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.Respondent (Saba):(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.Implications:(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.The Fine Print:Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."Primary Cases:Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:23] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:36] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:40] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:19:29] Petitioner Round Robin Questions[00:30:53] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement[00:32:17] United States Free for All Questions[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions[00:46:27] Respondent Opening Statement[00:48:55] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:16:48] Respondent Round Robin Questions[01:16:58] Petitioner Rebuttal

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme.Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.Main Arguments:Petitioner (the Funds):(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.Respondent (Saba):(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.Implications:(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.The Fine Print:Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."Primary Cases:Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Abouammo): Tobias Loss-Eaton of Sidley AustinRespondent (United States): Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. | Case No. 24-345 | Docket: Here | Argued: 12/10/2025 | Decided: 06/11/2026Overview: The Investment Company Act case addresses whether Section 47(b) grants private parties the right to sue for contract rescission, testing the limits of implied private rights of action against a comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme.Question Presented: Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act impliedly empowers private parties to sue for contract rescission.Posture: District Court granted Saba summary judgment; Second Circuit summarily affirmed; Supreme Court reversed.Main Arguments:Petitioner (the Funds):(1) Section 47(b) directs courts on remedy application, not individuals on rights to sue — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the precise textual basis TAMA relied on — signals changed meaning and eliminates the implied right.Respondent (Saba):(1) Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into Section 47(b) in 1980, language presupposing an affirmative private right for both contract parties;(2) TAMA's unanimous rescission holding survives the 1980 amendments, which refined rather than eliminated the private right;(3) House and Senate Committee Reports expressly called for courts to imply private rights of action under the amended ICA.Holding: Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor, with Justice Kagan joining Parts I and II. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Section 47(b)'s "a court may not deny rescission" language directs courts on remedy — it lacks rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons under Sandoval;(2) The ICA's comprehensive SEC enforcement scheme and two express private rights of action elsewhere in the statute foreclose implied private enforcement;(3) Congress's 1980 deletion of "shall be void" — the TAMA linchpin — signals changed meaning and removes the textual foundation for a private right.Separate Opinions:Justice Kagan (dissenting alone): Agrees with Jackson's text-and-structure analysis that Section 47(b) supports a private right; declines to rely on legislative history, finding the provision not sufficiently ambiguous to require resort to committee reports.Justice Jackson (dissenting, joined by Justice Sotomayor; Justice Kagan joins Parts I and II): Congress inserted "rescission" and "any party" into the 1980 amendments to preserve TAMA's rescission right; post-performance context makes affirmative suit the only practical remedy; Committee Reports expressly called for continued implied rights under the amended ICA.Implications:(1) Activist investors lose the federal right to challenge closed-end fund governance under Section 47(b); the SEC remains the exclusive enforcer;(2) Closed-end funds gain protection from private ICA rescission suits; state control-share adoption receives implicit judicial validation;(3) The Court extends textualist limits on implied private rights of action, tightening Sandoval's framework further into securities law.The Fine Print:Section 47(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §80a-46(b)(2): "a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter."Section 18(i), 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(i): "every share of stock hereafter issued by a registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding voting stock."Primary Cases:Alexander v. Sandoval (2001): Courts infer implied private rights of action only where a statute uses rights-creating language aimed at a particular class of persons; language directing courts or agencies falls short.Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979): The Investment Advisers Act's "shall be void" language created an implied private right of action for rescission; all nine justices agreed on that point.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (FS Credit) and Respondents (BlackRock): Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.For United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of FS Credit and BlackRock: Max E. Schulman, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeFor Respondent (Saba): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, VA

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/24/2026 | Decided: 6/11/2026Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Keathley): Gregory G. Garre of Latham and WatkinsUnited States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur): Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeRespondent (Buddy Ayers Construction): William M. Jay of Goodwin ProctorOverview: A bankruptcy debtor's failure to disclose a personal-injury lawsuit triggered the Fifth Circuit's rigid two-factor estoppel test, splitting federal circuits over whether courts must examine all circumstances or presume bad faith from knowledge and motive alone.Question Presented: Whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances — not just two factors — to determine if a bankruptcy debtor's omission of a lawsuit qualifies as inadvertent.Posture: District court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's personal-injury lawsuit under rigid two-factor judicial estoppel rule.Main Arguments:Petitioner Keathley: (1) Courts must examine all circumstances before concluding a bankruptcy omission reflects intentional concealment; (2) The Fifth Circuit's test conflates theoretical motive with actual bad faith, eliminating any real inadvertence exception; (3) Blocking honest debtors' lawsuits rewards tortfeasors and destroys assets creditors could recover.Respondent Buddy Ayers Construction: (1) Objective inconsistency — not subjective bad intent — supplies the basis for judicial estoppel; (2) The inadvertence exception covers only objectively verifiable errors, not every non-malicious explanation a debtor offers; (3) A multi-factor holistic test eliminates deterrence, invites abuse, and guts the bankruptcy disclosure system.Holding: Courts must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding a debtor's bankruptcy omission to determine whether that omission qualifies as inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel; the Fifth Circuit erred by artificially restricting its inquiry to only two factors.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Judicial estoppel functions as an equitable doctrine, and equity demands case-by-case flexibility — not a mechanical two-factor checklist that blocks courts from considering all available evidence;(2) The Fifth Circuit's test fails both as too rigid — barring courts from looking beyond two factors — and too broad — those two factors apply to virtually every bankruptcy omission, making the exception meaningless;(3) Courts must weigh all circumstances — including prompt correction, absence of actual benefit, counsel's knowledge, and local bankruptcy practice — to determine whether an omission truly resulted from inadvertence.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring, joined by Gorsuch): Joins majority in full but questions whether federal courts hold any authority to apply judicial estoppel at all; the doctrine lacks statutory, procedural, or founding-era support and merits reexamination in a future case.Justice Sotomayor (concurring): Agrees with majority but argues judicial estoppel may never appropriately apply during open bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy courts already hold targeted remedies that serve the doctrine's goals without destroying debtors' claims.Implications:(1) Debtors who forget to disclose post-petition claims now receive a full-facts review before courts bar their lawsuits;(2) Personal-injury defendants lose the automatic kill switch that a bankruptcy filing once supplied in Fifth and Tenth Circuit courts;(3) Thomas and Gorsuch's concurrence opens the door to a future challenge to judicial estoppel's existence in federal courts entirely.The Fine Print:11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1): "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement" of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated claims against third parties.Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33: Debtors must disclose "[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment."Primary Cases:New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Established the modern federal framework for judicial estoppel and left open whether inadvertence or mistake may block the doctrine's application.Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946): Confirmed that equitable doctrines "eschew mechanical rules" and depend on flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis rather than rigid checklists.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:18] Argument Begins[00:01:26] Keathley Opening Statement[00:03:33] Keathley Free for All Questions[00:18:46] Keathley Round Robin Questions[00:33:09] United States Opening Statement[00:34:28] United States Free for All Questions[00:42:11] United States Round Robin Questions[00:47:24] Buddy Ayers Opening Statement[00:49:27] Buddy Ayers Free for All Questions[01:09:04] Buddy Ayers Round Robin Questions[01:09:13] Keathley Rebuttal

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | Case No. 25-6 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 3/24/2026 | Decided: 6/11/2026Overview: A bankruptcy debtor's failure to disclose a personal-injury lawsuit triggered the Fifth Circuit's rigid two-factor estoppel test, splitting federal circuits over whether courts must examine all circumstances or presume bad faith from knowledge and motive alone.Question Presented: Whether courts must examine the totality of circumstances — not just two factors — to determine if a bankruptcy debtor's omission of a lawsuit qualifies as inadvertent.Posture: District court and Fifth Circuit dismissed Keathley's personal-injury lawsuit under rigid two-factor judicial estoppel rule.Main Arguments:Petitioner Keathley: (1) Courts must examine all circumstances before concluding a bankruptcy omission reflects intentional concealment; (2) The Fifth Circuit's test conflates theoretical motive with actual bad faith, eliminating any real inadvertence exception; (3) Blocking honest debtors' lawsuits rewards tortfeasors and destroys assets creditors could recover.Respondent Buddy Ayers Construction: (1) Objective inconsistency — not subjective bad intent — supplies the basis for judicial estoppel; (2) The inadvertence exception covers only objectively verifiable errors, not every non-malicious explanation a debtor offers; (3) A multi-factor holistic test eliminates deterrence, invites abuse, and guts the bankruptcy disclosure system.Holding: Courts must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding a debtor's bankruptcy omission to determine whether that omission qualifies as inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel; the Fifth Circuit erred by artificially restricting its inquiry to only two factors.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Judicial estoppel functions as an equitable doctrine, and equity demands case-by-case flexibility — not a mechanical two-factor checklist that blocks courts from considering all available evidence;(2) The Fifth Circuit's test fails both as too rigid — barring courts from looking beyond two factors — and too broad — those two factors apply to virtually every bankruptcy omission, making the exception meaningless;(3) Courts must weigh all circumstances — including prompt correction, absence of actual benefit, counsel's knowledge, and local bankruptcy practice — to determine whether an omission truly resulted from inadvertence.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring, joined by Gorsuch): Joins majority in full but questions whether federal courts hold any authority to apply judicial estoppel at all; the doctrine lacks statutory, procedural, or founding-era support and merits reexamination in a future case.Justice Sotomayor (concurring): Agrees with majority but argues judicial estoppel may never appropriately apply during open bankruptcy proceedings — bankruptcy courts already hold targeted remedies that serve the doctrine's goals without destroying debtors' claims.Implications:(1) Debtors who forget to disclose post-petition claims now receive a full-facts review before courts bar their lawsuits;(2) Personal-injury defendants lose the automatic kill switch that a bankruptcy filing once supplied in Fifth and Tenth Circuit courts;(3) Thomas and Gorsuch's concurrence opens the door to a future challenge to judicial estoppel's existence in federal courts entirely.The Fine Print:11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1): "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement" of the bankruptcy case, including pending and unliquidated claims against third parties.Official Form 106A/B, Schedule A/B: Property, Pt. 4, Question 33: Debtors must disclose "[c]laims against third parties, whether or not [the debtor] ha[s] filed a lawsuit or made a demand for payment."Primary Cases:New Hampshire v. Maine (2001): Established the modern federal framework for judicial estoppel and left open whether inadvertence or mistake may block the doctrine's application.Holmberg v. Armbrecht (1946): Confirmed that equitable doctrines "eschew mechanical rules" and depend on flexibility, requiring case-by-case analysis rather than rigid checklists.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 04/29/2026 | Decided: 06/04/2026Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of JusticeRespondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLPOverview: Amarin's cardiovascular drug patent faced challenge when generic maker Hikma launched a skinny-label version and marketed it through statements Amarin claimed encouraged doctors to prescribe the generic for the still-patented heart indication.Question Presented: Whether a generic drug maker's marketing statements plausibly constitute "active steps" inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b).Posture: District Court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Hikma):(1) Statements fully consistent with lawful skinny-label marketing cannot constitute active inducement under §271(b);(2) Federal law mandated the label's contents, making legal compliance an obvious alternative explanation that forecloses liability;(3) The Federal Circuit's physician-reading standard would destroy the Hatch-Waxman section viii pathway and expose generics to devastating litigation risk.Respondent (Amarin):(1) Hikma's totality of statements — repeatedly invoking "generic Vascepa," using an overbroad therapeutic category, and touting Vascepa's billion-dollar sales — plausibly encouraged infringing use;(2) Amarin spent $300 million discovering the cardiovascular indication and patent law must protect that investment from free-riders;(3) Seven other generic manufacturers avoided liability by accurately describing only their narrow approved uses, demonstrating Hikma's conduct fell outside normal practice.Holding: Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement in violation of §271(b); none of Hikma's alleged statements — individually or in totality — plausibly constituted active steps encouraging infringement of Amarin's cardiovascular-use patents.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No Justice filed a separate opinion. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage infringement — not merely statements physicians could read as instructions to infringe;(2) Hikma's label reflected legal compliance under the duty of sameness, its "generic Vascepa" description reflected standard industry practice, and omissions alone cannot support active inducement;(3) Website category descriptions, patient leaflet warnings, and investor press release sales figures lacked the clear, affirmative message inducement demands.Separate Opinions: None. The decision was unanimous.Implications:(1) Generic manufacturers may use the Hatch-Waxman skinny-label pathway without automatic inducement liability for routine commercial communications;(2) Brand manufacturers must plead specific affirmative acts of encouragement — not inferences drawn from vague statements or omissions;(3) The active inducement framework now applies with fresh clarity across all patent-holding industries.The Fine Print:35 U.S.C. §271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v): Requires a generic drug application to contain "information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [reference] listed drug . . . except for changes required because of differences approved under [applicable regulations]."Primary Cases:Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Active inducement requires purposeful, culpable expression and conduct designed to stimulate infringement; distributing a product capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses does not, alone, impose liability.Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007): A complaint must plead facts supporting a plausible claim for relief; allegations carrying obvious alternative lawful explanations fail to clear the plausibility bar.

Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc. | Case No. 24-889 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: 04/29/2026 | Decided: 06/04/2026Overview: Amarin's cardiovascular drug patent faced challenge when generic maker Hikma launched a skinny-label version and marketed it through statements Amarin claimed encouraged doctors to prescribe the generic for the still-patented heart indication.Question Presented: Whether a generic drug maker's marketing statements plausibly constitute "active steps" inducing patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(b).Posture: District Court dismissed; Federal Circuit reversed; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Hikma):(1) Statements fully consistent with lawful skinny-label marketing cannot constitute active inducement under §271(b);(2) Federal law mandated the label's contents, making legal compliance an obvious alternative explanation that forecloses liability;(3) The Federal Circuit's physician-reading standard would destroy the Hatch-Waxman section viii pathway and expose generics to devastating litigation risk.Respondent (Amarin):(1) Hikma's totality of statements — repeatedly invoking "generic Vascepa," using an overbroad therapeutic category, and touting Vascepa's billion-dollar sales — plausibly encouraged infringing use;(2) Amarin spent $300 million discovering the cardiovascular indication and patent law must protect that investment from free-riders;(3) Seven other generic manufacturers avoided liability by accurately describing only their narrow approved uses, demonstrating Hikma's conduct fell outside normal practice.Holding: Amarin failed to state a claim for active inducement in violation of §271(b); none of Hikma's alleged statements — individually or in totality — plausibly constituted active steps encouraging infringement of Amarin's cardiovascular-use patents.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No Justice filed a separate opinion. Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Active inducement requires affirmative steps to encourage infringement — not merely statements physicians could read as instructions to infringe;(2) Hikma's label reflected legal compliance under the duty of sameness, its "generic Vascepa" description reflected standard industry practice, and omissions alone cannot support active inducement;(3) Website category descriptions, patient leaflet warnings, and investor press release sales figures lacked the clear, affirmative message inducement demands.Separate Opinions: None. The decision was unanimous.Implications:(1) Generic manufacturers may use the Hatch-Waxman skinny-label pathway without automatic inducement liability for routine commercial communications;(2) Brand manufacturers must plead specific affirmative acts of encouragement — not inferences drawn from vague statements or omissions;(3) The active inducement framework now applies with fresh clarity across all patent-holding industries.The Fine Print:35 U.S.C. §271(b): "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v): Requires a generic drug application to contain "information to show that the labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the [reference] listed drug . . . except for changes required because of differences approved under [applicable regulations]."Primary Cases:Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (2005): Active inducement requires purposeful, culpable expression and conduct designed to stimulate infringement; distributing a product capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses does not, alone, impose liability.Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007): A complaint must plead facts supporting a plausible claim for relief; allegations carrying obvious alternative lawful explanations fail to clear the plausibility bar.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Hikma): Charles B. Klein of Winston & Strawn LLPAmicus Curiae (United States): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of JusticeRespondents (Amarin Pharma): Michael R. Huston of Perkins Coie LLP

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Overview: The Supreme Court resolves a circuit split over whether the SEC must prove investors lost money before ordering disgorgement — preserving billions in annual securities enforcement power.Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Main Arguments:Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.Holding: The SEC may obtain a disgorgement award without proving investors suffered pecuniary loss. Traditional equitable principles tie the remedy to the defendant's wrongful gain from invading legally protected interests — not to any documented financial loss by the victim. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity;(2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss;(3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.Implications:(1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money;(2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement;(3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.The Fine Print:15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."Primary Cases:Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended.SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit required proof of investor pecuniary harm before disgorgement, creating the circuit conflict the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLPRespondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission | Case No. 25-466 | Docket Link: Here | Argued: April 20, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Overview: The Supreme Court resolves a circuit split over whether the SEC must prove investors lost money before ordering disgorgement — preserving billions in annual securities enforcement power.Question Presented: Whether the SEC may seek disgorgement without proving investors suffered pecuniary harm.Posture: Ninth Circuit affirmed disgorgement without pecuniary harm; Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit split.Main Arguments:Sripetch: (1) Disgorgement without pecuniary harm functions as an unlawful penalty, not equitable relief; (2) Congress's 2021 amendments ratified Liu's disgorgement definition, requiring restoration of funds to actual victims; (3) SEC's reading creates statutory anomalies and lets the agency circumvent jury-trial and procedural safeguards attached to civil penalties.SEC: (1) Disgorgement targets the wrongdoer's gain, not the victim's loss — no loss showing required; (2) Congress deliberately omitted the "for the benefit of investors" language from the 2021 statute, eliminating any pecuniary-harm prerequisite; (3) "Unjust enrichment" in the 2021 text carries a common-law meaning that never required proof of monetary loss.Holding: The SEC may obtain a disgorgement award without proving investors suffered pecuniary loss. Traditional equitable principles tie the remedy to the defendant's wrongful gain from invading legally protected interests — not to any documented financial loss by the victim. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch authored the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Ninth Circuit affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Traditional equitable principles — confirmed across centuries of case law and the Restatements — measure disgorgement by the defendant's wrongful gain, not the victim's financial loss; no pecuniary harm requirement ever existed in equity;(2) Liu's "for victims" requirement drew from traditional equitable principles; those principles define a victim as someone whose legally protected interests the wrongdoer invaded, not someone who documented a financial loss;(3) When a defendant enriched himself without leaving the plaintiff financially worse off, equity prefers stripping the wrongdoer of unjust gains over allowing him to benefit from misconduct.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (concurring): Agreed with the outcome but argued Congress's 2021 amendments transformed disgorgement into a legal remedy; urged the Court to recognize, in a future case, that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial for SEC disgorgement actions.Implications:(1) The SEC's multi-billion-dollar disgorgement toolkit survives intact — fraudsters cannot escape profit-stripping by structuring schemes so victims lose no documentable money;(2) The "nobody lost money" defense no longer shields securities violators from disgorgement;(3) Justice Thomas's concurrence invites a future Seventh Amendment jury-trial challenge to SEC disgorgement under the 2021 statute.The Fine Print:15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5): "In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(7): "In any action or proceeding brought by the Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may order, disgorgement."Primary Cases:Liu v. SEC (2020): The Supreme Court held SEC disgorgement must not exceed a wrongdoer's net profits and must go "for victims" — the foundational ruling this decision extended.SEC v. Govil (2d Cir. 2023): The Second Circuit required proof of investor pecuniary harm before disgorgement, creating the circuit conflict the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (Sripetch): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone LLPRespondents (SEC): Malcolm L. Stewart of the Department of Justice

FCC v. AT&T, Inc. / Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here | Argued: April 21, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Oral Advocates:Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLPRespondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of JusticeOverview: The FCC fined AT&T $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million for mishandling customer location data through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil suits at common law.Question Presented: Whether the FCC's administrative forfeiture process violates the Seventh Amendment by imposing civil monetary penalties on regulated carriers without guaranteeing a jury trial.Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second Circuit upheld Verizon's. Court consolidated and granted cert.Main Arguments:FCC/United States (Petitioner): (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — carriers may lawfully decline to pay; (2) the Seventh Amendment right attaches at the Section 504 collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial; (3) Meeker and Hof already upheld this model — a preliminary nonbinding agency determination followed by a jury trial satisfies the Constitution.AT&T and Verizon (Respondents/Carriers): (1) The FCC's orders deploy mandatory statutory language — "determine," "assess," and "impose" — creating a binding present obligation to pay; (2) the back-end Section 504 jury option offers no real path, as no carrier received a jury trial in forty-seven years under this scheme; (3) the scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury rights on defying a nine-figure federal order.Holding: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties' legal obligations, and the FCC's factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. No. 25-406 (Fifth Circuit): reversed and remanded. No. 25-567 (Second Circuit): affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) FCC forfeiture orders create no legally enforceable payment obligation — the agency holds no seizure power, interest does not accrue, and Section 504(c) bars the Commission from using unresolved orders against regulated parties; (2) Section 504(a)'s "trial de novo" requirement renders the Commission's factual findings legally void in any enforcement action — the jury starts from scratch; (3) unlike the SEC in Jarkesy, the FCC holds no administrative collection tools, so a jury makes the ultimate factual determination before the government can collect a dollar.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (Dissenting): Thomas agreed the orders carried no binding force and the carriers deserved de novo jury trials — but dissented because the majority granted no relief to carriers who paid in good faith reliance on orders commanding payment within thirty days.Implications: (1) Regulated carriers may now decline FCC forfeitures without accruing interest or penalties — DOJ must file collection suits within five years or the forfeiture evaporates; (2) AT&T and Verizon's combined hundred-million-dollar refund claims remain unresolved and available for future litigation; (3) agencies without immediate collection tools — unlike the SEC — likely survive Seventh Amendment scrutiny today.The Fine Print:U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be...recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States....any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."Primary Cases:SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment bars the SEC from imposing civil penalties through in-house proceedings where those penalties carry immediate enforceability and no de novo jury review of the underlying violation.Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue nonbinding monetary determinations — enforceable only in subsequent jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.

FCC v. AT&T, Inc. / Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC | Case Nos. 25-406 & 25-567 | Docket Links: Here and Here | Argued: April 21, 2026 | Decided: June 4, 2026Overview: The FCC fined AT&T $57.3 million and Verizon $46.9 million for mishandling customer location data through in-house proceedings offering no jury — raising the question whether those proceedings violated the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil suits at common law.Question Presented: Whether the FCC's administrative forfeiture process violates the Seventh Amendment by imposing civil monetary penalties on regulated carriers without guaranteeing a jury trial.Posture: Fifth Circuit vacated AT&T's penalty; Second Circuit upheld Verizon's. Court consolidated and granted cert.Main Arguments:FCC/United States (Petitioner): (1) FCC forfeiture orders impose no binding legal obligation — carriers may lawfully decline to pay; (2) the Seventh Amendment right attaches at the Section 504 collection suit, where carriers receive a full de novo jury trial; (3) Meeker and Hof already upheld this model — a preliminary nonbinding agency determination followed by a jury trial satisfies the Constitution.AT&T and Verizon (Respondents/Carriers): (1) The FCC's orders deploy mandatory statutory language — "determine," "assess," and "impose" — creating a binding present obligation to pay; (2) the back-end Section 504 jury option offers no real path, as no carrier received a jury trial in forty-seven years under this scheme; (3) the scheme unconstitutionally conditions jury rights on defying a nine-figure federal order.Holding: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve the parties' legal obligations, and the FCC's factual findings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. No. 25-406 (Fifth Circuit): reversed and remanded. No. 25-567 (Second Circuit): affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) FCC forfeiture orders create no legally enforceable payment obligation — the agency holds no seizure power, interest does not accrue, and Section 504(c) bars the Commission from using unresolved orders against regulated parties; (2) Section 504(a)'s "trial de novo" requirement renders the Commission's factual findings legally void in any enforcement action — the jury starts from scratch; (3) unlike the SEC in Jarkesy, the FCC holds no administrative collection tools, so a jury makes the ultimate factual determination before the government can collect a dollar.Separate Opinions:Justice Thomas (Dissenting): Thomas agreed the orders carried no binding force and the carriers deserved de novo jury trials — but dissented because the majority granted no relief to carriers who paid in good faith reliance on orders commanding payment within thirty days.Implications: (1) Regulated carriers may now decline FCC forfeitures without accruing interest or penalties — DOJ must file collection suits within five years or the forfeiture evaporates; (2) AT&T and Verizon's combined hundred-million-dollar refund claims remain unresolved and available for future litigation; (3) agencies without immediate collection tools — unlike the SEC — likely survive Seventh Amendment scrutiny today.The Fine Print:U.S. Const. amend. VII: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."47 U.S.C. § 504(a): "The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be...recoverable...in a civil suit in the name of the United States....any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a trial de novo."Primary Cases:SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024): The Seventh Amendment bars the SEC from imposing civil penalties through in-house proceedings where those penalties carry immediate enforceability and no de novo jury review of the underlying violation.Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915): A statute authorizing an agency to issue nonbinding monetary determinations — enforceable only in subsequent jury trials — does not violate the Seventh Amendment because no question of fact passes from the jury.Oral Advocates:Petitioners (AT&T, Inc. and Verizon Communications Inc.): Jeffrey B. Wall of Sullivan & Cromwell LLPRespondents (FCC): Vivek Suri of the Department of Justice

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Argued: 3/25/26 | Decided: May 28, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that last-mile delivery workers who never cross state lines still qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from mandatory arbitration if their intrastate routes form part of a continuous interstate journey.Question Presented: Whether a worker qualifies for the FAA's Section 1 arbitration exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with interstate vehicles.Posture: District court denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones DayFor Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta WesslerMain Arguments:Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 requires workers to cross state lines or interact with interstate vehicles; (2) Brock's purely intrastate route falls outside Congress's intended scope of the exemption; (3) Extending Section 1 to intrastate-only workers produces an unworkable, open-ended standard.Brock (Respondent): (1) Statutory text "engaged in interstate commerce" covers workers on intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys; (2) Historical Commerce Clause precedent confirms intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce; (3) The Court's own precedent in Saxon already rejected a crossing-state-lines requirement.Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No concurrences. No dissents. Tenth Circuit judgment affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) The 1925-era plain meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" encompasses intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys — nothing in the text requires crossing state lines or tagging interstate vehicles; (2) The Daniel Ball (1871) and a line of Commerce Clause cases confirm that purely intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce when moving goods within a continuous multi-state shipment; (3) Flowers Foods waived alternative arguments — including independent-contractor status and title transfer — by staking its entire case on the rejected cross-or-tag rule.Separate Opinions: None.Implications: Last-mile delivery drivers, food distributors, and local couriers whose routes remain within a single state now hold stronger claims to Section 1 protection — blocking companies from compelling arbitration and reopening access to class action litigation. Companies relying on arbitration clauses in franchisee and distributor agreements face exposure on wage claims. Two questions remain open: whether Section 1 covers workers operating through independently owned business entities, and whether taking title to goods defeats the exemption — issues currently splitting the circuits.The Fine Print:Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) defining "interstate commerce": "[t]raffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state"Primary Cases:Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): An airline cargo loader who never flew or crossed state lines still qualified as a transportation worker "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871): A steamer operating entirely within Michigan still "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for or arriving from other states — multiple intrastate actors can collectively form one interstate transaction.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:02] Argument Begins[00:01:08] Flowers Food Opening Statement[00:03:21] Flowers Food Free for All Questions[00:27:30] Flowers Food Round Robin Questions[00:32:08] Brock Opening Statement[00:34:35] Brock Free for All Questions[01:05:32] Brock Round Robin Questions[01:14:23] Flowers Food Rebuttal

Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock | Case No. 24-935 | Argued: 3/25/26 | Decided: May 28, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that last-mile delivery workers who never cross state lines still qualify for the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption from mandatory arbitration if their intrastate routes form part of a continuous interstate journey.Question Presented: Whether a worker qualifies for the FAA's Section 1 arbitration exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with interstate vehicles.Posture: District court denied arbitration; Tenth Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert.Main Arguments:Flowers Foods (Petitioner): (1) Section 1 requires workers to cross state lines or interact with interstate vehicles; (2) Brock's purely intrastate route falls outside Congress's intended scope of the exemption; (3) Extending Section 1 to intrastate-only workers produces an unworkable, open-ended standard.Brock (Respondent): (1) Statutory text "engaged in interstate commerce" covers workers on intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys; (2) Historical Commerce Clause precedent confirms intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce; (3) The Court's own precedent in Saxon already rejected a crossing-state-lines requirement.Holding: The Federal Arbitration Act’s exemption from compelled arbitration for workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U. S. C. §1, can apply to a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey and who does not cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No concurrences. No dissents. Tenth Circuit judgment affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) The 1925-era plain meaning of "engaged in interstate commerce" encompasses intrastate legs of continuous interstate journeys — nothing in the text requires crossing state lines or tagging interstate vehicles; (2) The Daniel Ball (1871) and a line of Commerce Clause cases confirm that purely intrastate actors participate in interstate commerce when moving goods within a continuous multi-state shipment; (3) Flowers Foods waived alternative arguments — including independent-contractor status and title transfer — by staking its entire case on the rejected cross-or-tag rule.Separate Opinions: None.Implications: Last-mile delivery drivers, food distributors, and local couriers whose routes remain within a single state now hold stronger claims to Section 1 protection — blocking companies from compelling arbitration and reopening access to class action litigation. Companies relying on arbitration clauses in franchisee and distributor agreements face exposure on wage claims. Two questions remain open: whether Section 1 covers workers operating through independently owned business entities, and whether taking title to goods defeats the exemption — issues currently splitting the circuits.The Fine Print:Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933) defining "interstate commerce": "[t]raffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states of the Union, or from or between points in one state and points in another state"Primary Cases:Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon (2022): An airline cargo loader who never flew or crossed state lines still qualified as a transportation worker "engaged in interstate commerce" under FAA Section 1.The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1871): A steamer operating entirely within Michigan still "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for or arriving from other states — multiple intrastate actors can collectively form one interstate transaction.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Flowers Food): Traci L. Lovett of Jones DayFor Respondent (Brock): Jennifer Bennett of Gupta Wessler

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.Separate Opinions:Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.Implications:Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."Primary Cases:Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips BlackRespondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor GeneralUnited States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeTimestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:07] Oral Advocates[00:01:21] Argument Begins[00:01:29] Pitchford Opening Statement[00:03:49] Pitchford Free for All Questions[00:28:09] Pitchford Round Robin Questions[00:54:35] Cain Opening Statement[00:56:46] Cain Free for All Questions[01:15:43] Cain Round Robin Questions[01:34:48] United States Opening Statement[01:35:51] United States Free for All Questions[01:45:22] United States Round Robin Questions[01:48:42] Pitchford Rebuttal

Pitchford v. Cain | Case No. 24-7351 | Argued: 3/31/26 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A Mississippi prosecutor struck four of five eligible Black jurors at a death penalty trial, a trial court skipped the required third step of the racial-discrimination inquiry, and the Mississippi Supreme Court then called it a waiver. The Supreme Court reverses.Question Presented: Whether Mississippi's courts unreasonably declared forfeited a racial jury-selection challenge the trial court itself blocked.Posture: Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief; Supreme Court reversed and remanded.Main Arguments:Pitchford (Petitioner): (1) Three on-the-record Batson objections cannot constitute intentional waiver of a known constitutional right; (2) The trial court blocked step three, making waiver impossible; (3) AEDPA deference does not shield an unreasonable factual determination that contradicts the trial record.Mississippi (Respondent): (1) Mississippi's long-standing preservation rule requires defendants to raise pretext arguments before the trial court or forfeit them; (2) Pitchford's own trial attorney swore under oath she never preserved the pretext argument; (3) The cert grant covers only the AEDPA waiver question, not the underlying Batson merits or form of relief.Holding: In Pitchford’s direct appeal of a capital murder sentence, the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied the clearly established precedents of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, to determine that Pitchford waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett. Reversed and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) The trial court ended its Batson analysis at step two — it declared the prosecutor's reasons race-neutral and pivoted without giving defense counsel any opportunity to challenge them as pretextual;(2) Pitchford did not waive step three because the trial court affirmatively assured defense counsel that the Batson objection already sat on the record;(3) AEDPA deference does not mean abdication — the Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver ruling amounted to an unreasonable application of Batson precedents and an unreasonable factual determination.Separate Opinions:Justice Gorsuch (dissenting, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Barrett): Mississippi exercised its lawful authority under Ford v. Georgia to craft preservation rules; defense counsel never made a step-three comparative juror argument; the record does not compel Pitchford's reading under § 2254(d)(2)'s demanding standard; both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit read the record reasonably.Implications:Pitchford's case heads back to lower courts for the first full step-three Batson examination in over twenty years. Other death row defendants who faced similar procedural breakdowns — trial court skipped step three, state appellate court called it a waiver — gain a stronger federal habeas argument.Trial judges across the country receive a clear signal: Batson enforcement falls first on them, and shortcuts at step three carry constitutional consequences.The Fine Print:28 U.S.C. § 2254(d): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus...shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication...resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law...or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts."U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."Primary Cases:Batson v. Kentucky (1986): The Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from exercising peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based on race; courts must assess purposeful discrimination through a three-step inquiry.Flowers v. Mississippi (2019): Courts must consider a prosecutor's full history of racially discriminatory strikes in assessing a Batson challenge; the same prosecutor Doug Evans removed 41 of 42 Black jurors across six trials before the Court reversed.Oral Advocates:Petitioner (Pitchford): Joseph Perkovich of Phillips BlackRespondent (Cain): Scott Stewart, Mississippi's Solicitor GeneralUnited States (as Amicus Curiae): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Main Arguments:Fernandez (Petitioner):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;(2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;(3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.United States (Respondent):(1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;(2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;(3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;(2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;(3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.Implications: Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments. Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework. The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."Primary Cases:Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Overview[00:00:48] Argument Begins[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:10] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:28:08] Petitioner Round Robin Questions[00:40:01] Respondent Opening Statement[00:42:17] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:10:17] Respondent Round Robin Questions[01:19:07] Petitioner Rebuttal

Fernandez v. United States | Case No. 24-556 | Decided: 5/28/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: A federal prisoner serving a mandatory life sentence sought early release by arguing potential innocence — but the Supreme Court closed that door, ruling compassionate release cannot substitute for the strict habeas process Congress designed.Question Presented: Whether a federal prisoner may use the compassionate release statute to challenge the validity of his conviction when habeas corpus procedures remain unavailable.Posture: Second Circuit reversed compassionate release grant; seven-two circuit split prompted cert.Main Arguments:Fernandez (Petitioner):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling reasons" contains no categorical exclusions barring conviction-related evidence;(2) Congress's explicit rehabilitation exclusion implies no other categorical limits exist;(3) Section 3582 and Section 2255 offer distinct remedies — reduction versus vacatur — and neither forecloses the other.United States (Respondent):(1) Claims challenging conviction validity must travel through Section 2255's reticulated habeas framework, not compassionate release;(2) Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — age, illness, family — not legal-error correction;(3) Permitting conviction challenges under Section 3582 would let prisoners circumvent Section 2255's strict procedural requirements indefinitely.Holding: A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. §2255, not 18 U. S. C. §3582; the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Second Circuit affirmed. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Under Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) and Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005), courts must read Section 3582 in harmony with Section 2255 — claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the habeas statute, not around it;(2) The statute's title, structure, Bureau of Prisons gatekeeping role, and decades of Sentencing Commission guidance confirm Congress designed compassionate release for personal circumstances — not legal-error correction;(3) The mismatch between Fernandez's argument (conviction unsound) and his requested remedy (sentence reduction) confirms Section 3582 cannot carry conviction challenges.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring in judgment only, joined by Kagan): Agreed reversal warranted, but rejected the majority's habeas-based rule as atextual and overbroad. Proposed a narrower ground: compassionate release requires post-sentencing changed circumstances, not re-litigation of arguments courts previously considered.Justice Jackson (dissenting): The majority grafted an atextual habeas-based limitation onto Section 3582's broad "extraordinary and compelling" language — a rule Congress never wrote, never signaled, and the statute's text and history cannot support. Would vacate and remand for the Second Circuit to evaluate the district court's finding without a categorical bar.Implications: Federal prisoners who exhaust or lose under Section 2255 no longer hold compassionate release as an alternative path to raise conviction-related arguments. Courts must now distinguish "personal circumstances" claims (permissible under Section 3582) from "conviction-challenge" claims (channeled exclusively to Section 2255) — a line the majority left imprecisely drawn. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence signals the Court may remain open to post-sentencing new evidence of innocence under a changed-circumstances framework. The Court left unresolved whether freestanding actual innocence claims can succeed under Section 2255.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."28 U.S.C. § 2255(a): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."Primary Cases:Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973): Claims "close to the core of habeas corpus" must travel through the specific habeas statute — not broader civil statutes — or they impermissibly circumvent Congress's design.Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005): Prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to re-argue denied habeas claims on the merits, as doing so circumvents the strict statutory limits on successive habeas petitions.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Fernandez): Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N.Y.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Date Decided: 5/28/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.Main Arguments:Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;(2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;(3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;(2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;(2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."Primary Cases:Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.Main Arguments:Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;(2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;(3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;(2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;(2) Courts must clear

Carter v. United States | Case No. 24-860 | Date Decided: 5/28/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/12/25 | Docket Link: Here (consolidated with Rutherford v. United States | Case No. 24-820 | Docket Link: Here)Overview: Two prisoners serving decades-long gun-crime sentences sought early release after Congress reduced those sentences for future offenders but deliberately left them behind. The Court resolved whether that deliberate legislative gap qualified as a reason for compassionate release.Question Presented: Whether a sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to mandatory gun-crime penalties qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed denial of compassionate release in both cases; Supreme Court consolidated and affirmed.Main Arguments:Rutherford & Carter (Petitioners):(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" invites a flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry that permits courts to consider nonretroactive sentencing changes alongside other factors;(2) Congress's silence — beyond banning rehabilitation alone — left courts free to consider all other relevant information, including sentencing disparities;(3) The Sentencing Commission exercised valid delegated authority when it authorized courts to consider unusually long sentences and gross disparities.United States (Respondent):(1) Nonretroactive sentencing changes represent ordinary congressional practice, not extraordinary circumstances warranting judicial override;(2) Permitting courts to treat such changes as compelling reasons would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave prior sentences intact;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement exceeded its statutory authority by conflicting with the governing statute's plain meaning.Holding: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive—as with the change to 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).Voting Breakdown: 6–3. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Third Circuit judgments affirmed.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) "Extraordinary and compelling" requires reasons that are especially unusual and convincing — nonretroactive sentencing changes represent the norm, not an exception, making them neither extraordinary nor compelling;(2) Courts must clear a threshold gatekeeping requirement — extraordinary and compelling eligibility — before broad sentencing discretion applies;(3) The Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy statement conflicted with the statute and fell as invalid.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (dissenting, joined by Kagan and Jackson): Congress expressly delegated authority to the Sentencing Commission to define "extraordinary and compelling." The Commission acted reasonably within that delegation; the majority improperly substituted its own statutory reading for the Commission's judgment and conjured categorical limits that neither Congress nor the Commission imposed.Implications: Thousands of federal prisoners serving pre–First Step Act stacked gun-crime sentences now face a closed door on compassionate release arguments based on the sentencing gap Congress created in 2018. The ruling also strikes down the Sentencing Commission's 2023 "Unusually Long Sentence" policy category, removing it from district courts nationwide. The Court left open the precise outer boundaries of "extraordinary and compelling" and signaled that only Congress — through retroactivity legislation or a new relief mechanism — can deliver the remedy these prisoners sought. Future litigation will test the Commission's remaining authority and what post-sentencing legal developments beyond personal circumstances can clear the extraordinary-and-compelling bar.The Fine Print:18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): "the court…may reduce the term of imprisonment…after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that…extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction…and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."28 U.S.C. § 994(t): "The Commission…shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason."Primary Cases:Concepcion v. United States (2022): Courts enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying sentences under provisions lacking limiting language — but eligibility for relief must first satisfy any gatekeeping requirement the statute imposes.Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): When Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to give meaning to a statutory term, courts must ensure the agency acts within reasonable bounds of that delegation rather than substituting their own interpretation.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Rutherford): David Frederick, Washington, D.C.For Petitioner (Carter): David O'Neil, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Oral Argument Date: 12/10/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: When someone takes multiple IQ tests to prove intellectual disability in a capital case, do courts look at all the scores together, or can one low score alone save their life?OverviewThe Supreme Court will decide whether courts must evaluate multiple IQ scores collectively or whether a single qualifying score triggers constitutional protection in death penalty cases. This decision affects hundreds of current death row inmates and reshapes capital litigation nationwide.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Hamm): Robert M. Overing, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Montgomery, Alabama argued for Petitioner Hamm.United States as Amicus Curaie in Support of Petitioner: Harry Graver, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.For Respondent (Smith): Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D.C.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:28] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:43] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:58] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:20:43] Petitioner Round Robin Questions[00:44:36] United States as Amicus Curiae Opening Statement[00:45:47] United States Free for All Questions[00:55:27] United States Round Robin Questions[01:21:13] Respondent Opening Statement[01:24:00] Respondent Free for All Questions[01:51:28] Respondent Round Robin Questions[02:01:18] Petitioner Rebuttal

Hamm v. Smith | Case No. 24-872 | Decided: May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Death penalty case examining how courts evaluate multiple IQ scores when determining intellectual disability under Atkins. Court dismissed writ as improvidently granted after oral argument revealed parties never litigated the question below.Question Presented: Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing Atkins claims.Posture: Eleventh Circuit affirmed District Court finding Smith intellectually disabled using holistic approach.Main Arguments:Alabama (Petitioner): (1) Courts must combine multiple IQ scores using statistical methods to determine whether defendant proves IQ of 70 or below by preponderance; (2) Standard error of measurement applies equally in both directions, preventing reliance solely on lowest score's error range; (3) Holistic approaches that consider adaptive functioning alongside IQ scores improperly expand Atkins protection beyond intellectual functioning threshold.Smith (Respondent): (1) Courts must assess multiple scores holistically, considering measurement error, expert testimony, and other evidence of intellectual functioning together; (2) Hall requires courts to account for standard error when scores fall near the threshold; (3) Professional standards recommend clinical judgment considering all available evidence rather than mechanical statistical formulas.Holding: Per curiam opinion dismissed writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Sotomayor wrote concurring opinion joined by Justice Jackson. Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justice Thomas, with Justice Gorsuch joining Parts I–III. No substantive ruling on merits.Majority Reasoning: Per curiam provided no reasoning. Two sentences: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. It is so ordered." Dismissal leaves Eleventh Circuit decision protecting Smith from execution intact without Supreme Court guidance on evaluating multiple IQ scores.Opinion: HereSeparate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Jackson): Case presented poor vehicle because parties never litigated proposed methodologies below; Alabama's own expert used holistic approach Alabama now attacks; no state follows Alabama's proposed rule.Justice Thomas (dissenting): Would overrule Atkins entirely as improper judicial lawmaking lacking foundation in Eighth Amendment text or original understanding.Justice Alito (dissenting, joined by Thomas, with Gorsuch joining Parts I–III): Court should have provided guidance on recurring question; lower courts need direction on evaluating multiple scores; dismissal exacerbates confusion in Atkins doctrine.Implications: Smith remains protected from execution. Courts nationwide lack Supreme Court guidance on multiple IQ scores beyond Hall and Moore principles. Holistic approach validated below remains permissible. Deep division among Justices signals potential vulnerability in Atkins doctrine. Defense attorneys gain validation for flexible methodologies; prosecutors cannot rely on rigid numerical cutoffs.The Fine Print:Eighth Amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."Alabama Intellectual Disability Standard (Ex parte Perkins, 2002): Defendant must prove by preponderance: "(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below); (2) significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior; (3) manifestation during the developmental period (before age 18)."Primary Cases:Atkins v. Virginia (2002): Eighth Amendment categorically bars executing intellectually disabled individuals; states develop appropriate enforcement standards while Supreme Court establishes constitutional floors.Hall v. Florida (2014): Courts must consider standard error of measurement when evaluating IQ scores near 70 threshold; rigid cutoffs ignoring measurement error violate Eighth Amendment protections.

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.Main Arguments:Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptionsRespondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selectionHolding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.The Fine Print:29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"Primary Cases:National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changesConcrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirementsTimestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal

I'll create show notes and five alternative episode title options for this opinion episode.Now I'll create the show notes and title options for the M & K Employee Solutions opinion episode.PART 1: SHOW NOTESM & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Decided May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1209.htmlOverview: ERISA withdrawal liability dispute resolves when pension plan actuaries must select calculation assumptions, affecting billions in retirement obligations across multiemployer pension plans serving unionized workers nationwide.Question Presented: Whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions underlying withdrawal liability calculations get selected on or before the statutory measurement date.Posture: D.C. Circuit affirmed district courts allowing post-measurement-date assumption selection, conflicting with Second Circuit precedent.Main Arguments:Employers (Petitioners): (1) Statute's "as of" language freezes all calculation inputs including assumptions on measurement date; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute factual inputs requiring temporal fixation; (3) Broad anti-retroactivity principle prevents post-measurement assumption adoption.Pension Fund (Respondent): (1) "As of" language sets reference point for hard data only while tools get selected later; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute analytical methods not observable facts; (3) "Best estimate" requirement supports using most current available data when selecting assumptions.Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.The Fine Print:29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)(E)(i): Withdrawal liability calculated based on plan's unfunded vested benefits "as of" the last day of plan year preceding employer's withdrawal29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): Actuaries must use "actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"Primary Cases:Russello v. United States (1983): Where Congress includes particular language in one statutory section but omits it in another section of same Act, courts presume Congress acts intentionally and purposely in disparate inclusion or exclusionRomag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc. (2020): Courts generally decline reading limitations into statutes that do not appear in their textOral Advocates:For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;(2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;(3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.Main Arguments:• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principlesImplications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.The Fine Print:• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"Primary Cases:• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. | Case No. 24-983 | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Decided: 5/21/26 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Supreme Court preserves Title III liability for entities trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuban Government even when plaintiff's underlying time-limited property interest expired before trafficking occurred.Question Presented: Whether cruise lines using Havana docks face liability when plaintiff's concession expired before their alleged trafficking.Posture: District Court granted summary judgment for Havana Docks; Eleventh Circuit reversed applying counterfactual analysis.Main Arguments:Havana Docks (Petitioner):(1) Statute's "owns the claim" language focuses on current claim ownership, not hypothetical property ownership in alternate timelines;(2) Cuba confiscated physical dock structures Havana Docks built, not just abstract concession rights;(3) Congressional purpose requires deterring companies from profiting off stolen property regardless of temporal limitations.Cruise Lines (Respondents):(1) Property law fundamentals require respecting original temporal limits on property rights;(2) Havana Docks' concession excluded passenger services and only covered cargo operations;(3) Congress deliberately balanced deterrence against property law principles without providing universal relief.Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.Opinion: HereMajority Reasoning:(1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;(2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;(3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.Separate Opinions:Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.The Fine Print:22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)(A): "The term 'confiscated' refers to the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property"Primary Cases:Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964): Cuban Government nationalized by forced expropriation property in which American nationals held interests; confiscation can affect both physical property and property interestsTahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002): Property interests defined by both geographic dimensions and temporal aspects; both dimensions must be considered when viewing interest in entirety

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.Main Arguments:Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of courtBalazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsedImplications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.The Fine Print:FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"Primary Cases:Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basisCortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration awardOral Advocates:Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLPTimestamps:[00:01:25] Argument Begins[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal courts retain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate arbitration awards when confirmation motions lack independent federal jurisdiction.Overview: Federal Arbitration Act case resolves circuit split over whether district courts maintaining stayed federal claims during arbitration keep jurisdiction to confirm or vacate resulting arbitral awards.Posture: District Court confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Fourth Circuit created split reading Badgerow broadly.Main Arguments:Jules (Petitioner):(1) Badgerow requires independent jurisdictional basis for all Section 9 and Section 10 motions regardless of pre-existing suits;(2) FAA created comprehensive jurisdictional scheme demanding textual authorization;(3) Service requirements in Sections 9 and 12 establish confirm-or-vacate applications as new federal actions.Balazs Properties (Respondent):(1) Pre-existing federal question jurisdiction over stayed claims extends to confirm-or-vacate motions within same case;(2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding applications without prior federal lawsuits;(3) Section 3 mandatory stay preserves jurisdiction for FAA's supervisory framework.Holding: A federal court that previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims.Voting Breakdown: 9-0 decision affirmed Second Circuit. Justice Sotomayor wrote unanimous opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No separate opinions.Majority Reasoning:(1) Jurisdiction over cases includes jurisdiction over motions within those cases without requiring look-through approach to controversies outside court;(2) Federal question jurisdiction establishing district court authority over original federal claims survived arbitration stay and extended to confirm-or-vacate determinations;(3) FAA's supervisory framework requiring mandatory stays rather than dismissals contemplates courts superintending arbitration through final confirmation or vacatur.Separate Opinions: None.Implications: Federal courts maintain continuous jurisdiction over federal claims throughout arbitration and its aftermath. Streamlines arbitration by consolidating all proceedings—initial stay through final confirmation—in single federal forum when federal claims launched case. Prevents wasteful dual-track litigation where federal courts handle arbitrability appeals while state courts simultaneously handle confirm-or-vacate proceedings. Reinforces FAA's supervisory framework keeping courts engaged from arbitration commencement through final resolution.The Fine Print:Federal Arbitration Act § 3: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement"28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"Primary Cases:Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Freestanding FAA confirm-or-vacate motions cannot use look-through approach to locate federal jurisdiction in underlying disputes not before court absent textual authorizationSmith v. Spizzirri (2024): Section 3 requires mandatory stays rather than dismissals when sending parties to arbitration, preserving supervisory role for courts assisting arbitration and facilitating award recoveryOral Advocates:Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the FAAAA's safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers who arrange shipments with unsafe motor carriers.Overview: Truck crash victim challenges federal preemption of state tort claims against transportation brokers, testing whether states retain authority to impose negligent-hiring liability on brokers who select carriers with poor safety records.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed district court preemption ruling; circuit split over broker liability.Interview with Marc Blubaugh: HereMain Arguments:Montgomery (Petitioner):(1) Negligent-hiring claims concern motor vehicles because they regulate which trucks transport goods on highways;(2) Safety exception preserves traditional state tort law policing dangerous conduct;(3) Brokers selecting unsafe carriers directly threaten highway safety and public welfare.C.H. Robinson (Respondent):(1) Brokers neither own trucks nor hire drivers, making claims unrelated to motor vehicles;(2) Safety exception limited to vehicle-specific regulations like inspections and maintenance standards;(3) Subsection (b) excludes brokers from safety regulation, making subsection (c) identical interpretation required.Holding: The FAAAA does not preempt negligent hiring claims made against transportation brokers because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Alito. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) Claims "with respect to motor vehicles" means claims that "concern" vehicles used in transportation, applying ordinary meaning and Dan's City Used Cars precedent; (2) Requiring brokers to exercise reasonable care when selecting carriers concerns the trucks transporting goods most obviously; (3) Safety exception saves only motor-vehicle-safety-related claims, leaving price and route regulations preempted, avoiding swallow-the-rule problem.Separate Opinions: Kavanaugh concurrence (joined by Alito): Case presents closer questions than majority suggests; contextual considerations point both directions; insurance coverage dichotomy and intrastate-interstate anomaly favor brokers; economic-deregulation structure and federal-regulation absence favor Montgomery; brokers retain defenses through reasonableness standard and proximate cause requirements.Implications: Transportation brokers face potential state tort liability when selecting motor carriers with poor safety records, affecting 28,000 brokers arranging one-third of domestic freight shipments. Courts must develop standards defining reasonable broker due diligence in carrier selection. Ruling creates enforcement asymmetry permitting state safety regulation for interstate but not intrastate broker arrangements, potentially inviting constitutional challenge to subsection (b) preemption authority.The Fine Print:49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1): "A State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property."49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A): The preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."Primary Cases:Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (2013): "With respect to" means "concerns" in FAAAA preemption provision context, establishing ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation of preemption scope.Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (2012): State common-law duties and standards of care constitute "potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy" within state regulatory authority over safety matters.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Montgomery): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Petitioner Montgomery.For Respondents (C.H. Robinson and Caribe Transport): Ted Boutrous of Gibson Dunn.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Caribe): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:53] Oral Advocates[00:01:09] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:17] Montgomery Opening Statement[00:03:15] Montgomery Free for All Questions[00:26:20] Montgomery Round Robin Questions[00:44:00] Caribe and Robinson Opening Statement[00:46:15] Caribe and Robinson Free for All Questions[01:04:17] Caribe and Robinson Round Robin Questions[01:09:37] United States Opening Statement[01:11:07] United States Free for All Questions[01:20:35] United States Round Robin Questions[01:36:19] Montgomery Rebuttal

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Case No. 24-1238 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the FAAAA's safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers who arrange shipments with unsafe motor carriers.Overview: Truck crash victim challenges federal preemption of state tort claims against transportation brokers, testing whether states retain authority to impose negligent-hiring liability on brokers who select carriers with poor safety records.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed district court preemption ruling; circuit split over broker liability.Interview with Marc Blubaugh: HereMain Arguments:Montgomery (Petitioner):(1) Negligent-hiring claims concern motor vehicles because they regulate which trucks transport goods on highways;(2) Safety exception preserves traditional state tort law policing dangerous conduct;(3) Brokers selecting unsafe carriers directly threaten highway safety and public welfare.C.H. Robinson (Respondent):(1) Brokers neither own trucks nor hire drivers, making claims unrelated to motor vehicles;(2) Safety exception limited to vehicle-specific regulations like inspections and maintenance standards;(3) Subsection (b) excludes brokers from safety regulation, making subsection (c) identical interpretation required.Holding: The FAAAA does not preempt negligent hiring claims made against transportation brokers because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Alito. Reversed and remanded.Majority Reasoning: (1) Claims "with respect to motor vehicles" means claims that "concern" vehicles used in transportation, applying ordinary meaning and Dan's City Used Cars precedent; (2) Requiring brokers to exercise reasonable care when selecting carriers concerns the trucks transporting goods most obviously; (3) Safety exception saves only motor-vehicle-safety-related claims, leaving price and route regulations preempted, avoiding swallow-the-rule problem.Separate Opinions: Kavanaugh concurrence (joined by Alito): Case presents closer questions than majority suggests; contextual considerations point both directions; insurance coverage dichotomy and intrastate-interstate anomaly favor brokers; economic-deregulation structure and federal-regulation absence favor Montgomery; brokers retain defenses through reasonableness standard and proximate cause requirements.Implications: Transportation brokers face potential state tort liability when selecting motor carriers with poor safety records, affecting 28,000 brokers arranging one-third of domestic freight shipments. Courts must develop standards defining reasonable broker due diligence in carrier selection. Ruling creates enforcement asymmetry permitting state safety regulation for interstate but not intrastate broker arrangements, potentially inviting constitutional challenge to subsection (b) preemption authority.The Fine Print:49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1): "A State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property."49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A): The preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."Primary Cases:Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (2013): "With respect to" means "concerns" in FAAAA preemption provision context, establishing ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation of preemption scope.Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (2012): State common-law duties and standards of care constitute "potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy" within state regulatory authority over safety matters.

Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Louisiana | Nos. 25A1207, 25A1208 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: HereOverview: The Supreme Court blocked the Fifth Circuit's nationwide order reinstating mifepristone's in-person dispensing requirement, preserving mail-order and telehealth distribution while Louisiana's APA challenge to the FDA's 2023 REMS proceeds.Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit's §705 order suspending the FDA's 2023 mifepristone REMS changes should remain in effect pending appeal.Posture: District court denied preliminary relief; Fifth Circuit reversed, suspending 2023 REMS nationwide under §705.Main Arguments:Mifepristone Manufacturers (Applicants):(1) Louisiana lacks Article III standing — the 2023 REMS does not regulate Louisiana, and its sovereign and Medicaid-cost injuries depend on attenuated third-party choices the Court rejected in Alliance and Texas;(2) The FDA's removal of the in-person requirement rested on 15 studies covering 55,000 patients and consistent adverse-event data showing no safety concerns;(3) The Fifth Circuit's order upends five years of settled distribution infrastructure, inflicting irreparable harm on manufacturers, patients, providers, and 20 states supporting the current REMS.Louisiana (Respondent):(1) Louisiana holds sovereign standing — approximately 1,000 violations of its abortion laws occur monthly, each constituting an injury to its sovereignty under Stevens, reinforced by $92,000 in Medicaid costs and $17,000 in enforcement outlays;(2) The FDA itself refuses to defend the 2023 REMS, conceding it reflected "inadequate consideration," and three separate Fifth Circuit panels found the APA challenge likely meritorious;(3) Neither the public nor the FDA holds any interest in perpetuating an agency action the agency itself admits lacked adequate study, and the manufacturers' desire for higher profits does not constitute irreparable harm.Ruling: 7–2. The Court issued an unsigned (per curiam) order granting the stay applications, blocking the Fifth Circuit's May 1, 2026 order.Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion (unjoined). Justice Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion (unjoined). Stay granted pending disposition of the Fifth Circuit appeal and any timely certiorari petition.Majority Reasoning: (1) The per curiam order provided no reasoning — the Court granted the stay applications without explaining which factors it found satisfied; (2) The order specified only procedural mechanics: what it stayed, conditions for termination, and the timeline; (3) The absence of reasoning left unresolved whether the Court credited the manufacturers' standing arguments, the APA merits defense, or the equities analysis.Separate Opinions:(1) Justice Thomas (dissenting): Mifepristone manufacturers derive their claimed injury from profits earned through a "criminal enterprise" violating the Comstock Act (18 U.S.C. §§1461, 1462). No court should protect revenue flowing from federal felonies.(2) Justice Alito (dissenting): The manufacturers failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. The FDA won't enforce the old rules, the manufacturers devoted only 3 of 80-plus pages to irreparable harm, and lost sales in states banning abortion cannot count as cognizable injury because equity demands surrender of profits from unlawful activity.Implications: This stay preserves nationwide mail-order and telehealth mifepristone distribution while the Fifth Circuit appeal and potential certiorari proceedings unfold. The unresolved standing question — whether states can challenge federal deregulation through sovereign-injury and downstream-cost theories — carries transformative potential for administrative law far beyond mifepristone.Thomas's invocation of the Comstock Act signals at least one Justice views existing federal law as criminalizing mail-order mifepristone distribution regardless of FDA approval. The FDA's silence and its admission of "inadequate consideration" leave the agency's ultimate posture uncertain, giving Louisiana potent ammunition on the merits.The Fine Print:5 U.S.C. §705: "On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court … may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings."18 U.S.C. §1461 (Comstock Act): Bans using "the mails" to ship any "drug … for producing abortion."Primary Cases:FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (2024): Unanimous Court held anti-abortion doctors lacked Article III standing to challenge the mifepristone REMS — the chain of causation from FDA regulation to downstream medical costs stretched too far and too speculatively.United States v. Texas (2023): Court rejected states' claims that federal immigration enforcement policies caused cognizable Article III injuries through indirect effects on state revenues and spending — downstream costs from federal policies do not automatically confer standing.

Scott v. McDougle | Virginia Gerrymandering Case | Docket Link: HereOn May 15th, the Supreme Court blocked Virginia's gerrymandered maps from taking effect. This episode breaks down the main issue and airs the Virginia Supreme Court oral arguments. Case Overview: Virginia Supreme Court struck down partisan gerrymandering amendment because 1.3 million Virginians voted early before legislature's second approval, violating constitutional requirement that valid general election separate two legislative votes.Question Presented: Whether General Assembly complied with Article XII Section 1's intervening-election requirement when approving constitutional amendment twice before referendum.Oral AdvocatesScott (Appellant): Matthew Seligman Commonwealth of Virginia (Appellant): Tillman Breckenridge, Virginia's Solicitor General McDougle (Appellee): Thomas McCarthyPosture: Circuit court invalidated referendum. Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Scott): (1) "Election" means Election Day only, not early voting period; (2) Legislative authority requires deference to General Assembly's constitutional interpretation; (3) Voter approval through 1.6 million ballots demonstrates democratic legitimacy.Respondent (McDougle): (1) "Election" encompasses complete voting process from early voting through Election Day; (2) Strict compliance with amendment procedures protects against legislative overreach; (3) Foster v. Love establishes elections include all voting actions.Holding: 4-3. Majority opinion by Justice D. Arthur Kelsey affirmed circuit court. Chief Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Mann and Fulton. Referendum invalidated despite voter approval.Majority Reasoning: (1) Article XII Section 1 requires valid intervening general election between two legislative approvals; (2) Early voting beginning September 2025 preceded January 2026 second legislative vote, preventing intervening election; (3) "Election" means combined voting actions from early voting through Election Day, citing Foster v. Love.Separate Opinions:Chief Justice Powell (dissenting, joined by Mann and Fulton): Majority improperly broadened "election" definition beyond traditional Election Day meaning. Legislature complied with constitutional text requiring election between approvals.Implications: Prevents 10-1 partisan congressional gerrymander, maintains 6-5 nonpartisan court-drawn maps. Establishes that Virginia constitutional amendment process cannot circumvent procedural requirements through narrow interpretations excluding early voting. Reinforces strict compliance standard for constitutional amendments. SCOTUS denied emergency stay May 16, 2026 without noted dissents.The Fine Print:Virginia Constitution Article XII Section 1: "Any amendment...must be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session held after the next general election of members of the House of Delegates, and again agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house."Virginia Constitution Article II Section 6-A: "Members of the Senate and of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be elected from electoral districts established by the Virginia Redistricting Commission or by a court of competent jurisdiction."Primary Cases:Foster v. Love (1997): Federal law defining "election" encompasses entire voting process including early voting through Election Day, not merely Election Day itself.Coleman v. Pross (1978): Virginia constitutional amendments require strict compliance with all specified prerequisites rather than substantial compliance standard.