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"All façade and no filler." That characteristically blunt assessment captures the tone and thrust of Multidomain Operations: The Pursuit of Battlefield Dominance in the 21st Century, an edited volume by Amos Fox and Frantz-Stefan Gady. At a time when "multidomain operations" (MDO) has become the dominant, if ill-defined, concept in Western military thinking, Multidomain Operations sets out to interrogate its intellectual foundations, practical utility, and coherence. The result is a sustained and often damning critique of what many contributors see as a concept full of ambition but short on substance. The volume is structured into four parts. The first explores the origins and lineage of multidomain doctrine, tracing how and where it emerged from. Part two examines the practical considerations, including force design and implementation challenges. Part three looks at tensions with contemporary conflict and tests MDO against the realities of warfare. The final section offers international perspectives that both reinforce and complicate the core critique. At its core, and oversimplifying enormously, the book advances several interlocking arguments about why multidomain operations are not fit for purpose. First, the doctrine's development process was deeply flawed. Contributors argue that MDO is the product of bureaucratic compromise rather than intellectual clarity, resulting in a concept shaped by institutional consensus over operational necessity. The language of MDO, replete with buzzwords such as "convergence," "integration," and "cross-domain synergy, is criticised as vague and imprecise. This lack of definitional clarity, particularly within U.S. military thinking, is not, according to the writers, only an academic concern. It has real implications for how doctrine is interpreted and applied undermining its potential value. Second, the book contends that multidomain operations lack a coherent theory of victory. While MDO promises to deliver battlefield dominance through the integration of capabilities across land, sea, air, cyber, and space, it remains unclear how this integration translates into strategic success. Without a clear theory linking tactical actions to strategic outcomes, MDO risks becoming an exercise in operational abstraction. Third, and perhaps most damagingly, Multidomain Operations argues that MDO lacks credible tactical application. Robert Rose's chapter is particularly effective in this regard, highlighting how combat teams struggled to understand, and therefore implement, the doctrine. Rose's argument that MDO's "twisted roots" lie in bureaucratic compromise resonates strongly: in attempting to satisfy multiple stakeholders, the concept has become diluted to the point of impracticality. This critique aligns closely with Amos Fox's broader argument that MDO lacks both the resources and the operational clarity required to work as intended. While much of this analysis is grounded in the U.S. Army experience, other contributors extend the critique to joint and tri-service contexts, suggesting that the problem is systemic rather than service-specific. A recurring theme throughout the book and one echoed in other critical commentary on MDO is the issue of technological overreach. Davis Ellison and Tim Sweijs pose the provocative question: "Does the emperor have any clothes?" Their answer is, at best, uncertain. MDO is predicated on the assumption that advanced technologies, particularly in areas such as networking, artificial intelligence, and long-range precision fires, will enable seamless integration across domains. Yet many of these capabilities remain immature or unevenly distributed. As a result, the concept risks being built on a foundation of technological optimism rather than operational reality. This critique is consistent with wider debates in defence circles, where concerns about over-reliance on unproven technologies have become increasingly prominent. The question of the adversary further ...

This article is about the so-called 'scramble for the Arctic'. This would be a story of high farce rather than the high North but for threats made by the current US administration to forcibly annex Greenland – the territory of a NATO ally – on the spurious grounds that the island is 'covered with Russian and Chinese ships all over the place', and America must 'own' Greenland as a matter of security to prevent imagined Russian or Chinese ownership. Republican Senator Randy Fine has introduced a Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act that would authorise the White House to annex Greenland 'by any means necessary'. Control of Rare Earth Elements (REEs) is cited as a key reason why America must annex Greenland, ignoring the wishes of Greenlanders and setting aside what would be a gross assault on Denmark and more widely Europe and NATO. People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Greenland No Chinese warship has ever visited Greenland. There is no evidence a PLAN nuclear submarine has ever deployed to Greenland waters either. How would it get there and why would it anyway. At the time of writing of this article there are no commercial Chinese ships near Greenland either. The simple matter of logging on MarineTraffic and checking the AIS identities of vessels in these waters would tell you this. Chinese mines in Greenland There are no Chinese mines in Greenland. There never have been. It is unlikely there ever would be except in partnership with other Western companies. There was a period (2011-2018) when China expressed interest in mining and infrastructure projects but it came to nothing. Shenghe Resources currently has a 10.5% stake in the Kvanefjeld rare earths project. However, this project, led by the Australian Energy Transition Minerals, was halted in 2021 over uranium contamination fears and is subject to an $11.4 billion damages suit. It is unlikely it will proceed. The Russian Navy (Northern Fleet) in Greenland No Russian warship has ever visited Greenland. Or will. A Russian warship would not be welcomed in a NATO territory. Russian Naval Aviation is moribund and reliant on the small number of Soviet-era aircraft that remain airworthy. The Northern Fleet surface fleet rests on three modern frigates, only one of which ever sails at a time. The nuclear submarine fleet is finally leaving behind the troubled 90s and noughties with the commissioning of the Yasen-M and Borei-A class boats. It needs to – the old Soviet nuclear boats had become a menace to everyone (and indeed Western countries provided extensive financial and technical assistance in their decommissioning). The Fleet's best conventional capabilities are the Kinzhal and Tsirkon hypersonic missiles – which Putin is inordinately proud of – but Ukrainian air defenders have proved Russian hypersonic missiles can, in fact, be downed. Northern Fleet naval towns and bases on the Kola Peninsula are a picture of dilapidation and decline (which US intelligence perfectly knows). Just this New Year, districts of Severomorsk – almost all naval families or contractors – woke up without heat of electricity, in minus 30 degrees. If you could engage in a conversation with a sailor of the Northern Fleet, they would be much less inclined to talk about competition in the Arctic and more likely to vent views on the post-Soviet squalor and humiliation of their daily lives. Soviet Military Power 1988 (DoD) When a threat truly existed in the Arctic. NATO monitored between 130-140 Northern Fleet Russian submarines. Today, as many as two Russian nuclear submarines may be on patrol. There are no Russian commercial ships in Greenland waters either at this moment. Check MarineTraffic. The absolute and urgent priority for Russian commercial shipping currently is the 'shadow fleet' and associated oil and gas exports, not Greenland. Russian mines in Greenland There are no Russian mines in Greenland. There never have been. There won't be. Russian mining is in crisis: high interest rates, under-...

Peter Apps's The Next World War: The New Age of Global Conflict and the Fight to Stop It is a timely and unsettling exploration of the shifting dynamics of global power, the resurgence of large-scale warfare, and the general state of international security in the 21st Century. Drawing on both his background as a journalist and extensive firsthand reporting, The Next World War is Peter Apps's at his best. Compelling, engaging, and excellent. In many ways The Next World War is a history of the future. At its core, The Next World War argues that the post Cold War illusion of peace has collapsed. Apps describes a world where great power competition has returned with renewed intensity driven primarily by tensions between the United States, China, and Russia. Rather than presenting war as a distant or hypothetical possibility, Apps frames it as a credible risk within the coming decade. A risk that is already shaping policy, military planning, and everyday life. One of The Next World War's greatest strengths is its ability to ground geopolitical tensions in real world settings. The focus on China and Taiwan, for example, are effective and his narrative makes it relevant to an average reader. Apps explores the normalcy of daily life with the looming threat of invasion highlighting how interconnected events are to normal human beings in reality. This contrast underscores one of his central arguments, and paraphrasing, that modern societies often exist in a state of cognitive dissonance, simultaneously aware of but detached from the possibility of catastrophic conflict. Apps's analysis of potential flashpoints is comprehensive. He examines the Taiwan Strait, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and locks in analysis from domains like space and cyber. Each region is presented not in isolation, but as part of an interconnected global system where crises overlap. Particularly compelling is his discussion of how simultaneous conflicts, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan coinciding with Russian aggression in Europe, could overwhelm existing military and political structures. This multi theatre and global perspective raises The Next World War from other texts which generally focus on a single-conflict analyses. Another notable aspect is Apps's emphasis on the changing character of warfare. He argues, and oversimplifying, that while nuclear weapons still loom in the background, most conflicts are likely to begin, and remain, in the conventional domain, at least initially. However, these conventional wars would be far from traditional. The integration of drones, cyber, artificial intelligence, and space based systems add how they add new unpredictability. Apps's descriptions of drone warfare in Ukraine, for example, highlights both the technological sophistication and the realities of modern combat. The Next World War also engages with the concept of deterrence. Apps revisits Cold War theories while acknowledging their limitations in a more complex and multipolar world. He suggests that deterrence today requires not just military strength, but also political cohesion, economic resilience, and societal preparedness. Finland is presented as a model of this approach, with its culture of national service and readiness serving as a counterpoint to what Apps sees as complacency in many Western nations. Linking these points The Next World War is a stark challenge to NATO policy makers. Stylistically, Apps strikes a balance between journalistic clarity and analytical rigor. His prose is accessible without being simplistic, and he avoids excessive jargon. The inclusion of interviews with military personnel, policymakers, and civilians adds texture and authenticity, making the book engaging as well as informative. Perhaps the most powerful aspect of The Next World War is its underlying message that the risk of global conflict is not inevitable, but it is real. And increasing. Apps does not succumb to fatalism in this. Instead, he emphasizes the role of h...

Britain's long awaited Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS 25) has been released. It commits the Government to the largest sustained uplift in defence spending since the Cold War and seeks to complement the ambition of Strategic Defence Review 2025 (SDR 25). It sets a short-term target of raising spending from 2% of GDP to 2.6% by 2027, declaring an "ambition" in the medium term for 3% by 2030 in the next Parliament. Longer term it outlines a "historic commitment" to reach a target of 5% alongside other NATO allies by 2035. The investment trajectory the strategy sets out seems intent not only to underwrite British national security but to position its defence industry as a key engine of sovereign economic growth, regional regeneration and technological capability development. DIS 25 follows close on the heels of the recent announcement of a successful £10bn contract being signed for the UK to supply the Norwegian navy with Type 26 anti-submarine frigates. Its release also coincides with the Britain's flagship defence industry sector event Defence and Security Equipment International 2025 (DSEI 25) in London that serves as a physical totem of the Government's intention to encourage domestic and international commercial interest. The 108-page strategy document contains suitably impressive numbers related to investment allocations. UK Defence Innovation has been tasked to "invest in [Britain's] most innovative defence companies" with a ring-fenced annual budget of £400 million, plus a mandate that 10% of its equipment procurement is spent on novel technologies. Likewise, £15 billion has been committed to the "sovereign warhead programme" and a further £6 billion to "strengthen our supply chains… in munitions this parliament". Efforts have also been made address procurement efficiency with the National Armaments Director being given authority of a "new segmented approach". Coupled with a commitment to a five-year, proactive forecasting process promises to reduce the need for emergency budget supplements and enhance market trust. Reference is also made throughout to wider Government targets that promise to "reduce administrative costs of regulation to business… to create a regulatory environment fit for the current era of threat". Taken on face value, there is much to be optimistic about. For the British Army there is much to be encouraged by. Faster contracting and procurement cycles promise to narrow the gap between user requirement definition and frontline delivery. Projects such as RAPSTONE and ASGARD are recent examples of how this approach can be done, alongside more deliberate (i.e. traditional) programme of record processes that continue at pace. Expanding these 'proven commercial routes' to deliver capabilities for units and formations that range from armoured platforms, ground-based sensors, communication suites and munition stocks is an exciting prospect. Equally promising is the DIS' pledge to "increase prototype warfare" as this directly relates to the Army's wholesale drive for Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) integration at every echelon. From a section operating with Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Air Vehicles (UAS), to a formation headquarters that can plan and execute with AI-enabled battlefield analytics, this approach may see the transition from lab to field at unprecedented speed. That said, whilst DIS 25 has been broadly welcomed for its ambition, there are concerns and criticisms surrounding DIS 25 it. Commentary at DSEI 25 revealed a persistent frustration among industry leaders regarding the MOD's pace of reform, particularly in contracting and capability delivery. Concerns were voiced about bureaucratic inertia and the slow translation of strategic ambition into executable contracts, with some firms publicly citing delays in the Land Mobility Programme (LMP) and uncertainty around the new medium helicopter programme as emblematic of systemic issues. In contrast, speeches by Defence Secretary...

The recently reported move by the RAF to manage supply of vegan alternative uniforms on request, whilst not necessarily quite as new as it may seem, may initially appear to challenge military identity, organisational culture, and the nature and Operational Effectiveness of a modern fighting force. But whilst I'm not vegan myself and therefore won't be taking advantage of this policy, I believe that it's a sensible and entirely appropriate step forward, that strengthens the RAF by demonstrating its commitment to its people, broadening its appeal to potential recruits, and reinforcing its ethical foundations without compromising Operational Effectiveness. There's been a lot of hate and derision over this, on social media, in various media outlets, and sadly even in the Service itself - unfortunate but unsurprising in the current climate. But I've also received and seen some genuine and reasonable comments - some from people I greatly respect - that I think do deserve and warrant a considered response. I'm entirely uninterested in feeding trolls, but I do believe in giving and receiving reasonable challenge and engaging in respectful debate - this is my attempt to contribute to that conversation. Individualism vs Uniformity The core purpose of a uniform is to foster a collective identity and spirit, subordinating the individual to the team. The criticism is that allowing ethical variations undermines this principle. However, I'd suggest this is a misinterpretation of the meaning, intent, and value of uniformity. Uniformity is not conformity, and Unit cohesion is not threatened by diversity; indeed, combined with psychological safety and strong, effective leadership (as one would expect in a military environment), diversity enhances military organisational effectiveness. Uniformity in the military is therefore about common standards and unity of purpose, not the literal, molecular composition of every item. A Service person's identity and function are defined by their rank slide, trade badge, and the uniform's cut, feel, and colour, none of which are altered by using appropriate non-animal materials. The military has a long history of accommodating deeply held beliefs without sacrificing cohesion. We accommodate religious dietary needs in rations, allow turbans and hijabs that conform to regulations, and respect religious holidays. Providing a vegan uniform option is simply a modern extension of this principle to include deeply held ethical convictions. True cohesion comes from shared values like courage, respect, and integrity, not from enforcing conformity down to the last stitch. A force that respects and values the conscience and cognitive diversity of its people strengthens the moral component, and is thus more unified and resilient. I'd also note that as long as I've been serving, personnel have always been able to source different boots and other items, to optimise their comfort. Go to any military Unit, and you'll see personnel in Altberg, Aku, Kestrel, Lowa, Meindl, and many other brands of boot - all procured through the stores issue system, and all intended to ensure individual comfort and suitability. There's very simply nothing new or controversial about accommodating individual needs to enhance performance. Cost and Resources It's argued that this is an unnecessary expense, diverting funds from more critical areas, like frontline equipment or improving pay. But the Strategic Defence Review 2025 recognises that representation, empowerment, and flexibility for our people is an investment. The cost of recruiting and training a Service person is significant - tens of thousands for a recruit and millions for a pilot. Losing even a small number of highly skilled personnel, or indeed deterring potential recruits, because of an easily solvable conflict with their (non-Operational) beliefs, costs far more to Defence than the marginal expense of sourcing alternative boots or gloves. The policy is "on request", and with MoD ...

In the not-so-distant future, a U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific could be forced to fight two major wars at once - one against a Chinese assault on Taiwan, the other against a North Korean attack on the Korean Peninsula. This dual-front crisis scenario, long considered unlikely, is now routinely modeled in wargames and quietly debated in high-level policy circles. Yet the United States and its East Asian allies remain unprepared - not in terms of firepower, but in coordination, planning, and execution. Today's alliance architecture is not designed to handle a simultaneous conflict in Taiwan and Korea. The existing command structures are fragmented, force designs are nationally siloed, and procurement choices are often politically misaligned. In short, there is no unified playbook for fighting two wars in East Asia - let alone winning them. But the United States has faced a similar problem before. From NATO's founding in 1949 through West Germany's integration in 1955, Washington confronted a world where it had to deter simultaneous threats in Europe and Asia. It responded by building institutions - not just capabilities. The first phase of NATO's evolution offers enduring lessons in how to organize allies, align procurement, and prepare for multi-theater war. Today, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle urgently needs to draw from that experience before the next crisis begins. Learning from NATO's Blueprint At the 1952 Lisbon Conference, NATO members committed to fielding 50 divisions - an ambitious goal that drove significant increases in defense spending across Europe. Washington played a central role in catalyzing this shift through economic leverage, strategic vision, and the shared threat of Soviet aggression. But what mattered more than raw spending was the coordinated structure that emerged: NATO didn't just build forces; it built a cohesive force. A parallel dynamic is unfolding in East Asia. Japan has pledged to double its defense budget by 2027, investing heavily in standoff missiles, ISR, and munition stockpiles. South Korea already spends over 2.7% of GDP on defense and is expanding long-range strike capabilities, naval power, and missile defenses. But unlike the early NATO experience, these efforts remain nationally fragmented. Without integration, the investments of today may become the inefficiencies of tomorrow. NATO's lesson is clear: deterrence is not created by defense spending alone. It depends on force structure coherence, shared priorities, and a division of labor among allies. If Japan fields Tomahawk cruise missiles and South Korea invests in submarine-launched cruise missiles and explores the development of a light aircraft carrier, who integrates and sustains these systems when crises erupt? Which ally reinforces which theater, and how quickly? Without institutional answers to these questions, military planning becomes guesswork. The lack of a trilateral command mechanism is one of the most pressing gaps. In 1951, NATO established SHAPE - the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - as a centralized node for operational planning, logistics, and interoperability. Nothing like SHAPE exists in the Indo-Pacific today. The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and U.S.-Japan coordination under USFJ and INDOPACOM remain bilateral and compartmentalized. The result is a strategic blind spot. In a Taiwan conflict, U.S. naval assets might be redeployed from Korean waters. Simultaneously, while Japan's 2015 security legislation enables expanded support for U.S. operations, political and legal constraints could still delay or limit Japan's full-spectrum support in a Korean contingency - particularly absent a trilateral planning framework. Rather than creating an "Asian NATO," the immediate solution could be the establishment of a trilateral planning cell within INDOPACOM - drawing staff from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. With access to real-time intelligence and s...

At around the same time the video headlining this article was recorded, President Putin was hosting Russian Language, or Pushkin Day. This precedes Russia Day which is celebrated on 12 June. Putin spoke virtually from Novo Ogaryovo, his favoured residence on the outskirts of Moscow which boasts a heated, indoor, Olympic-sized swimming pool. Russian was one of the most expressive languages in the world, he extolled, 'reflecting our spiritual and moral traditions, culture, and unique identity.' The Russian president often blathers about Russia as a great 'civilisational-state'. It is even written into the country's national security doctrine: 'Russian World'(Russkiy mir) as counterpoint to the wicked 'Collective West'. A reader glancing at the image would likely imagine it shows two Ukrainian soldiers at the bottom of a sand pit. Not so. The two unfortunates are Russian soldiers - refuseniks. Not visible in the footage is another Russian firing live rounds into the sand around them and taunting them. This 'Russian World' - a reality far removed from the scented, polished corridors of presidential villas in Moscow - is the subject of this article. 'On the Russian Peasant' In 1922, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky wrote a later much-quoted essay 'On the Russian Peasant'. Why, Gorky mused, were Russians capable of apparently bottomless cruelty? 'I experienced and saw many atrocities. I could never find a justification for their existence …Where does this human cruelty come from?' His view of the Muscovite (Russian) national character was low and deserves to be quoted in full: 'It seems to me that the most striking feature of the Moscow national character is actual cruelty, just like English humour. This is a special cruelty, and at the same time a cold-bloodedly invented measure of the degree of endurance and resistance in patience that man can attain… The most interesting feature of Moscow brutality is its devilish finesse, its, I would say, aesthetic refinement. I do not think that these features can be explained by such words as "psychosis", "sadism" or similar. Because in essence, they do not explain anything. A consequence of alcoholism? - But I do not think that the people of Moscow were more poisoned by alcohol than other European nations. However, it must be admitted that the influence of alcohol on the psyche of a Muscovite is particularly fatal because our nation is worse off than others. I am not talking here about cruelty, which appears sporadically, like an explosion of a sick or perverted soul. These are exceptions that will chill a psychiatrist: here I am talking about mass psychology, about the nation's soul, about collective cruelty.' In Russia, he concluded, almost everyone enjoys beating someone. On the 'Special Military Operation' Putin's 'Special Military Operation' will be remembered for its barbarism. The Russian president arrogantly presumed to take Kyiv in three days and the rest of eastern and southern Ukraine in two weeks. Instead he has mired Russia in a disaster and revealed to the world the true nature of 'Russian World'. The Donbas, which he presumed to 'liberate', has been turned into a ravaged, depopulated wasteland, a region drained of children, jobs, hope or a future. Scores of settlements and towns have been erased from the map. The 'Russian way of warfare' has proved to be naked banditry. 'This is not the 'second army' of the world,' as one Ukrainian expressed following the invasion, 'this is a bunch of marauders, degenerates, executioners and rapists.' From Kherson to Kharkiv, daily and nightly drone attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure have not stopped for over three years. Russian contempt for the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Red Cross (IRC) has been breath-taking. Ukrainian PoWs are currently dispersed in around 300 prisons across Russia (Ukraine maintains five transit centres and five permanent prisons). Moscow will not allow the IRC anywhere near Ukrainian PoWs and...

The United Kingdom's procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, encompassing both the F-35B and F-35A variants, reflects a complex interplay of strategic, operational, political, and industrial considerations spanning decades. The 1998 decision to select the F-35B, driven by industrial pressures and inter-service rivalries, laid the foundation for the UK's Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability via the Royal Navy's Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. The recent announcement to procure 12 F-35A jets, as part of the planned 138 F-35s, introduces a tactical nuclear role for the Royal Air Force (RAF) within NATO's nuclear-sharing framework. This paper examines the 1998 F-35B selection, the rationale for excluding the F-35A and F-35C, the motivations for the 2025 F-35A acquisition, and the multifaceted challenges, including impacts on the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), infrastructure, training, sovereignty, and CEPP. It argues that while the F-35A's assignment to 207 Squadron (OCU) and short-term cost savings address immediate needs, the legacy of 1998 decisions, combined with current policy shifts, risks undermining GCAP, increasing long-term costs, and enables Lockheed Martin to exploit tensions with GCAP partners Italy and Japan, jeopardising the our strategic autonomy and future air combat capabilities. The 1998 Decision to Select the F-35B and Inter-Service Pressures The UK's commitment to the F-35B originated in the late 1990s, formalised in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), which prioritised restoring a credible carrier strike capability lost with the retirement of the Invincible-class carriers and Sea Harrier FA2 by 2006. As a Tier 1 partner in the US-led Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme, the UK evaluated three F-35 variants: the F-35A (conventional take-off and landing), F-35B (Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing, STOVL), and F-35C (carrier-based, catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery, CATOBAR). The Royal Navy initially favoured the F-35C, which offered greater range (1,200 nautical miles versus 900 for the F-35B), higher payload, and compatibility with CATOBAR systems, aligning with ambitions for a more capable Queen Elizabeth-class carrier design. However, political and industrial pressures tipped the scales toward the F-35B. Rolls-Royce exerted significant influence, advocating for the F-35B due to its role in developing the LiftSystem for STOVL operations, securing substantial workshare and economic benefits for British industry. Other UK firms, including BAE Systems, supported the F-35B, as it ensured integration with the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers' STOVL configuration, avoiding costly CATOBAR retrofits estimated at £2 billion per carrier. The Labour government, under Tony Blair, prioritised industrial jobs and domestic manufacturing, aligning with the SDR's emphasis on economic dividends from defence spending. The F-35B's selection promised thousands of jobs in Rolls-Royce's Bristol facilities and BAE's supply chain, outweighing the Royal Navy's operational arguments for the F-35C. Inter-service rivalries further shaped the decision. The RAF, keen to consolidate its dominance in fixed-wing aviation, supported the F-35B's joint RAF-RN operation, arguing it could serve both carrier and land-based roles, simplifying logistics and training. This contrasted with the F-35C, which would have entrenched the Royal Navy-centric carrier operations. To fund the F-35B programme and the carriers' development, the MoD faced intense inter-service pressures, leading to the controversial early retirement of the Harrier fleet. The RAF lobbied to retire the Royal Navy's FA2 (Sea Harrier) by 2006, citing its limited air-to-air capabilities compared to the F-35B's multi-role potential. Subsequently, the 2010 SDSR accelerated the retirement of the RAF's Harrier GR9 fleet, completed by 2011, despite its proven effectiveness in Afghanistan and Libya. RAF leaders argued that resou...

It is the lot of the infantry to hold ground and get shot at. This is the mundane history of the infantry, not the story you hear during training at Catterick or Brecon. But our social media feeds show us the reality. Soldiers in Ukraine are repeatedly filmed sitting in trenches waiting to be mortared, attacked by artillery or chased by a suicide FPV drone. Encounters involving small infantry units engaging each other are rare; instead, remote firepower remains the dominant killer on the 21st century battlefield. Despite this, however, we are once again considering changes to small arms and small arms ammunition. This is being driven by discussions of lethal effect against body armour at over 600 metres. In this short commentary piece, I want to put the selection of a new rifle and ammunition into its wider societal, historical and organisational context. In the process I hope to persuade readers that the Army should not put new ammunition at the top of its priority list. Although relative to the specific environment and type of conflict, comparatively speaking, the infantry is the least lethal branch of the armed forces.1 Paradoxically, however, the infantry sits at the heart of the army's identity and purpose. As representatives of the polity, infantry soldiers embody the social contract between the citizen and the nation. As I argue in Weapon of Choice this contract is underwritten by the engineer and the rifles they create.2 Framed this way, the rifle is more than a weapon. It becomes the tangible symbol of the bond between the state and its soldiers. If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Getting small arms acquisition wrong not only jeopardises military effectiveness but it also risks the legitimacy of the sovereign state. The stakes are therefore far greater than the practicalities of small arms calibre or the frailties of weapon design. They touch on the very principles of governance and trust between the nation and its defenders. If the state cannot provide a reliable and effective rifle, then it has failed at upholding its side of this foundational bargain. Unfortunately, since at least the middle of the 19th century, the introduction of every new service rifle with the British Army has been associated with controversy of some sort. The Martini Henry failed in the Sudan in 1884. The Short Magazine Lee-Enfield heralded arguments about the utility of the cavalry. The introduction of Fabrique Nationale's Self-Loading Rifle occurred only because the Americans rejected an intermediate calibre in the 1950s. And of course, the SA80 failed in the desert during the First Gulf War and was subsequently suspended - at the request of the UK's NATO delegate on small arms - from the Alliance's Nominated Weapon List.3 Rifle failure Given the symbolism and significance of the rifle and the long history of failure associated with its introduction into the Army, buying a new design of small arms and ammunition needs to be done with considerable care. In part this is because the UK no longer has the industrial capacity to produce a large fleet of weapons and will need to recalibrate existing ammunition production for a new calibre. Buying small batches of bespoke ammunition and specialist weapons does not necessarily create problems. However, buying a new fleet of rifles to fill the requirements of an entire Army brings with it unique practical challenges associated with introducing a new system, a new ammunition and the development of a new production line. Take, for example, the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). The EWS was the pre-cursor to the SA80. Initially designed for a 4.85mm round, the weapon was specifically intended to allow the infantry to fight from an armoured fighting vehicle and be used in close quarters. The small calibre was selected primarily because 7.62mm ammunition was completely inappropriate for use in Northern Ireland wher...

The end of the Warfare Officer? You're not unskilled, they're the wrong skills. In a rain-beaten marina on a rugged coastline, near a nameless village more familiar with fishing than fleet operations, a teenage Able Seaman sits inside a converted shipping container. Watching a laptop screen, they remotely pilot a small crewless boat through choppy waters via a suite of cameras and RADAR feeds. For all intents and purposes, they are the Captain. Down the road, on a slipway framed with lobster pots and fishing gear, a Petty Officer and Leading Hand haul 15-metres of uncrewed craft onto a trailer. With a police escort arranged and explosives securely stowed in a separate vehicle, they tow it down narrow B-roads to its next launch site. Followed by a small convoy of HGVs containing ancillary equipment and spares. Armed with little more than an expense account the skill to reverse an oversized trailer, they fulfil the traditional roles of Navigator and Officer of the Watch where moving naval fighting capabilities is concerned. These scenes stand in stark contrast to the age-old image of a Commanding Officer directing a Frigates movement across open sea from his chair on the bridge. Modern navies are undergoing a seismic shift in relevance, away from the skill set of their senior officers who cut their teeth on 5,000-tonne, 130-metre warships and bigger, and toward young operators and technicians independently deploying tiny uncrewed systems from the backs of lorries to greater maritime effect. The hierarchy of most navies has long been built around crewing entire flotillas of ships, with only a limited number of shore-based roles supporting operations from the rear. But the rise of autonomous platforms is disrupting that structure, challenging the relevance of the traditional command pipeline. In tomorrow's navy, do expert leaders qualified in seamanship and commanding operations from capital ships offer more value than an Able Seaman who can command multiple vessels from a single screen? What does it mean to grow officers through the classic path of shipboard appointments when the conventional warship is fast becoming the exception, not the rule? If most naval capability in the future is delivered from shore, operated remotely, or automated entirely, then is the role of the seagoing 'sailor' now something rare and specialised, less a core function and more a niche within a much broader system biasing towards land operations with maritime effectors deployed at reach? Today, battles at sea are already being won by lone teenagers remotely piloting a USV with helm controls mapped to a modified Xbox controller and laptop from miles away, supported by a mechanic with a Cat C+E licence hauling the latest capability on a trailer, as by a seasoned commander on the bridge of a warship with charge of a crew several hundred strong. Modern Navies are discovering that expertise in the latest iteration of nautical skills no longer guarantees expert opinion in utilising modern technology. This article argues that autonomy and uncrewed systems are reshaping naval power, placing greater importance on digital literacy and low level mechanical skills found in trades once considered vocational, rather than the strategic conversations based on traditional strategic warfare roles. Navies around the world are rapidly adopting uncrewed systems, on the surface, underwater, and in the air, to take on roles once reserved for fully crewed warships. The U.S. Navy's Ghost Fleet Overlord programme, for example, fields 90-metre drone ships that have sailed thousands of miles and even launched missiles under remote supervision by operators too junior to stand a traditional bridge watch. Australia has followed suit with Sentinel, a converted patrol boat and now the country's largest autonomous vessel, monitored by a skeleton crew of engineers camping onboard and advanced autonomy software. The Royal Navy, meanwhile, has demonstrated this shift through its NavyX...

With the imminent publication of the new government's first Strategic Defence Review this article throws out a challenge. Can we make the first cheap British Army division of the modern period? Can we afford not to? The 'world-beating' delusion Britain has a 'world-beating' epidemic. It would be funny if we were not paying such a high cost for this delusion. Who started it may be debated. That it has become an empty boast is indisputable. The graph below shows the frequency of use of the phrase in Parliament. It has only got worse. How is Britain world-beating? Our social statistics certainly attract attention: 40% of adults pay no income tax, because their annual income does not exceed the £12,570 personal allowance threshold; One third of 35-45 year olds in England now rents (it was one in ten at the beginning of the century), and four in every ten of the private renters is receiving housing benefit (or they would be on the street); By the time Universal Credit is fully rolled out, one in four working age households will be receiving it; Almost one fifth of Britain's school children, apparently, have special educational needs; At the other end of the scale, Britain's graduates now collectively owe around £240 billion in student loans; Over one million16-24 years olds are neither in education, employment nor training (the NEETs), the main reason cited is 'mental health', remedied by a Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (over 3.3 million Britons in England and Wales were claiming a PIP last year). And so we could go on. How the British Army is 'world-beating' also raises questions. Marlborough's Grand Alliance army at the beginning of the 18th century was bigger. Cromwell had more cavalry regiments. The country that invented the tank can today deploy and sustain one tank regiment (plainly, there must be a reserve or you would be unable to rotate troops). The British Army is effectively air defenceless. In one of the most painful sagas of many in recent times, the Army will finally be receiving a new armoured personnel carrier, 20 years late, and with no weapon beyond a machinegun. And personnel statistics, perhaps reflecting wider society, do not make happy reading. Just five years ago, around 4,500 service personnel brought claims against the MOD. Today the number has jumped to almost 7,000 - or roughly, one in every 17th serviceman or woman on a parade square is making a claim against the MOD. Is serving in the (smaller) non-operational Army really so dangerous? Has the MOD become more negligent in the last five years? We can't go on like this. The first thing we must do is face reality and drop the 'world-beating' delusion. Good, better, best In the early 1960s, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara - America's most talented holder of the post in the second half of the 20th century - coined the phrase 'Good, better, best', in an interview with LIFE magazine. The Ford 'whizz kid' ('human IBM machine' was his other nickname) had been recruited by Kennedy to reform the bloated Department of Defence. He did, against some opposition. 'Good, better, best' referred to defence kit. The majority of defence kit, McNamara argued, just needs to be good. A small proportion needs to be better. And the smallest proportion needs to be 'the best'. The reason was cost. If each of the services proposed the best kit, every time, the defence budget would be bankrupted. Who knows what McNamara would make of Washington's trillion dollar defence budget today. His wisdom is certainly missed. Or cheap is good enough Or, perhaps, we could shorten McNamara's dictum and simply state cheap is good enough, most of the time. We were good at cheap. It was the foundation for what today would be called 'success stories'. The Land Rover story began in 1947 with Rover responding to a War Department requirement for a cheap, jeep-like, utility vehicle. Millions have since rolled off the production line. In contrast, a recently procured patrol vehicle (this auth...

In August 2024 a surprise Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast resulted in the capture of 1,376 square kilometres of Russian territory. Over the next six months the enclave was repeatedly attacked. Ukrainian-controlled territory shrunk to an area anchored on the town of Suzhda. In the second week of March the Ukrainian defence collapsed. Units withdrew to the border zone. The Russian command hailed a bold operation involving infiltration via a gas pipeline as catalyst for the Ukrainian retreat - Operacija Potok, or Operation Flow. This article assesses Operation Flow and the wider Ukrainian withdrawal from the Kursk salient. Preparations for Operation Flow Operation Flow was three weeks in the making. Command was vested in the Chechen Lieutenant-General Apti Alaudinov. Alaudinov has been a tireless self-promoter during the Kursk campaign. Operation Flow provided him with another opportunity to burnish his credentials with the Kremlin. First, methane gas residues had to be cleared from a 15 kilometre stretch of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline that runs north-east of Suzdha. This was not entirely successful and a number of soldiers were hospitalised with neurotropic poisoning. Some Russian bloggers reported suffocations. Next, ammunition, food and water had to be ferried down the pipeline on special barrows. Toilets were also sent down. One Russian channel described the conditions thus: 'Walk, crawl almost 16 kilometres through a narrow dirty tunnel 1.45 m in diameter with vapours from the remains of liquefied gas; sit in a pipe waiting for the command to storm for several more days. Breathe in methane vapours, excrement, vomit of those who were the first to be poisoned, and there is no longer any possibility of calling for evacuation from this point, when the enemy is closer than our own.' Volunteers were drawn from multiple units: 11th Airborne Brigade, 106 Airborne Brigade, 72nd Motor Rifle Division, 30th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the Veterans Airborne Assault Regiment, the Vostok Airborne Assault Regiment, and Akhmat (Chechen) special forces. A total of 800 troops were involved (General Gerasimov reported a lower number of 600 to President Putin in a later staged meeting). Due to the conditions, troops had to enter in small groups of five people with a distance of at least ten meters between groups. At halts soldiers moved a couple of meters away from each other so that they could breathe. A distance of 11-12 kilometres was covered over four days. Some spent as long as a week in the pipeline. As many as four exit points are believed to have been made in the pipeline, but possibly only one used. The Ukrainians actually intercepted communications between Russians complaining about the awful conditions in the pipeline. On Saturday 8 March the order was given to break cover and infiltrate northern Suzdha. Was the pipeline operation a success? Ukrainian reporting suggests Operation Flow achieved limited tactical success. The Ukrainian command was aware of the scheme and was keeping the pipeline under surveillance. YouTube video evidence shows a group that emerged in fields was quickly struck by artillery fire and dispersed in a nearby wood line. Another group reportedly reached a two-storey building in the industrial area of Suzdha but was destroyed. In total, Ukrainian sources report only around 100 soldiers actually emerged from the pipeline. That no Russian video or imagery was presented showing soldiers hoisting unit flags - a common practice to demonstrate success - suggests Ukrainian reporting is credible. Even so, an 82nd Air Assault Brigade soldier (the formation that engaged the Russians) also reported that although his unit was aware of the plan and repelled Russians that emerged from the pipeline, a number still managed to infiltrate the area of northern Suzdha. He told this was 'the reason why his brigade was forced to destroy part of its available equipment and withdraw from the eastern flank to the...

Ufuk Koçak 1999 depreminde enkazda bacaklarını bırakarak kurtuldu. Bedensel Engelliler Dünya Serbest Dalış Rekortmeni olan Ufuk Koçak "İnsanı bir yerden bir yere götüren ayakları değil, omurgalı, dik duruşudur" diyor. Sıra dışı hayatını NTVRadyo'ya anlattı.  

パートナーはTBS山本匠晃アナ。パーソナリティ・ライムスター宇多丸との軽妙なやりとりをお楽しみください。(18:00〜18:04頃) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

第542回 5/9(水)の放送(11:08～11:15頃)より。パートナーは、TBS長峰由紀アナ。テーマは「肌に塗るだけじゃない！ニベア万能説！！」See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

第540回 5/7(月)(12:07～12:17頃)より。39歳女性から「ネットショッピング、洋服の衝動買いがやめられません。届くまでのドキドキが楽しくて…。どうしたらやめられますか？」という相談。ジェーン・スー＆TBS小笠原亘アナのコンビで。See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices