All episodes
Jhunjhunwala 2002: Bought Titan as Profit Fell │ File 45 T1
Titan 2002-2018: Behavior Shift │ 3 Signals │ File 45 T2
Seth Klarman & The Baupost Group 1982–2024 : Structural Cash Mechanics, Downside Mandates & Multi-Decade Compounding│File 44 T1
Seth Klarman & The Baupost Group : Value Mandate LP Underwriting│File 44 T2
David Tepper 2009: Read the Bailout Terms │ File 43 T1
Appaloosa 2009: Rescue Terms │ 3 Signals │ File 43 T2
Chanos 2000: Return-on-Capital Signal │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 42 T2
Chanos 2000: The 7% Number Nobody Ran │ File 42 T1
Edward Thorp 1967 : He Was Pricing Options Correctly Before the Formula Existed - File 41 T1
Edward Thorp 1967 : Quantitative Options Pricing Edge Before Black-Scholes │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 41 T2
Sam Zell 2007 : He Sold the Entire Company Seven Months Before Everyone Wished They Had - File 40 T1
Equity Office Properties 2007: Cycle-Top Exit Timing at Record Scale │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 40T2
Starwood Capital 2009: Trough-Cycle Acquisition Timing in Frozen Credit Markets │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 39 T2
Starwood Capital & the 2009 Credit Freeze: Origination Mechanics, Corus Bank & Mortgage REIT Infrastructure | File 39 T1
Ares Management 2007–2008 : Raising $800M Before the Crash│File 38 T1
Ares Management 2008 : Distressed Credit LP Underwriting│File 38 T2
HDFC Bank 1994: Gave Up the Board Seat │ File 37 T1
HDFC Bank 1994 : Cohort Base Rate │GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 37 T2
Naspers/Tencent 2001: Minority Stake, Founder Control | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 36 T2
Naspers 2001: Signed the Deal Against Legal's Advice | File 36 T1
DBS Bank 2008-2020: Same Stress Test, Twice | File 35 T1
DBS Bank 2020 : Reserve Discipline Across Two Shocks | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 35 T2
Munich Re 2005: Cat-Risk Pricing │GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 34 T2
Munich Re 2005: Priced Katrina Before It Formed │ File 34 T1
Wells Fargo 2007: The Bank That Kept Saying No │ File 33 T1
Wells Fargo 2007: Underwriting Refusal Discipline │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 33 T2
Toyota 2008: The Car Company That Never Needed a Bailout │ File 32 T1
Toyota 2008 : Net-Cash Balance Sheet as Optionality │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 32 T2
Handelsbanken 1970: Decentralized Branch P&L │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 31 T2
Handelsbanken 1970: The Bank That Fired Its Own Budget Department │ File 31 T1
Temasek & GIC 1981: Sovereign Mandate Segmentation │ GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals │ File 30 T2
Temasek & GIC 1981: One Nation, Two Sovereign Funds On Purpose │ File 30 T1
Berkshire Hathaway 1965 : Shareholder Self-Selection & Zero-Dividend Alignment Design | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 29 T2
Berkshire Hathaway 1965 : The Company That Never Paid a Dividend on Purpose, for 60 Years | File 29 T1
CPPIB 1999: Governance Insulation & Long-Horizon Mandate Design | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 28 T2
CPPIB 1999 : The Pension Fund Canada Built So Politicians Couldn't Touch It | File 28 T1
Norway SWF 1996: Fiscal Rule as Governance Alignment Mechanism | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals| File 27 T2
Norway SWF 1996:The Sovereign Fund Built With a Legal Wall Between Politicians and the Money - File27 T1
Costco 1983: Membership-Fee Revenue as Incentive Alignment Mechanism | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 26 T2
Costco 1983: The Retailer That Makes Almost No Money Selling You Anything On Purpose | File 26 T1
BYD 2008 : The Battery Company Charlie Munger Told Everyone to Bet On Before Electric Cars Were a Category - File 25 T1
BYD 2008: Management-Team Conviction Ahead of Market Category Formation | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 25 T2
Carl Icahn /Apple 2013 : The Investor Who Spent Three Years Publicly Telling Tim Cook What to Do With His Cash - File 24 T1
Carl Icahn /Apple 2013: Activist Conviction & Sustained Public Pressure Campaign | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 24 T2
Coca-Cola 1988 : The Stock Warren Buffett Never Sold, Not Even Once, in Almost 40 Years - File 23 T1
Coca-Cola 1988: Multi-Decade Conviction & Resistance to Portfolio Rotation Pressure | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 23 T2
Goldman Sachs 2008: Crisis-Window Capital Provision & Term Negotiation Leverage | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals | File 22 T2
Goldman Sachs 2008 : The Deal Warren Buffett Closed the Same Week Lehman Collapsed -File 22 T1
Bank of America 2011: Contrarian Capital Injection at Peak Pessimism | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 21 T2
Bank of America 2011 : The $5 Billion Phone Call Warren Buffett Made While Everyone Else Was Selling│File 21 T1
Yale Endowment 1985: The Endowment Model That Only Worked If You Could Get the Managers Everyone Else Couldn't│File 20 T1
Yale Model 1985: Illiquid Alternative Allocation & Manager Access as Execution Barrier | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 20 T2
Airbnb 2020: Multi-Front Crisis Execution & Demand-Shock Recovery | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 19 T2
Airbnb 2020 : How a Travel Company Prepared to Go Public While Travel Stopped Existing│File 19 T1
TSMC 1987 : The Chip Company That Bet Everything on Never Designing a Chip│File 18 T1
TSMC 1987: Pure-Play Foundry Execution Against Industry Consensus | GP/LP Analysis --- 3 Signals│File 18 T2
Apollo 2009: Distressed Debt Platform Scaling Under Time Pressure | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 17 T2
Apollo 2009 : How One Firm Built the Machine to Buy Everything Everyone Else Had to Sell│File 17 T1
Blackstone 2007 - The $26 Billion Buyout That Closed Two Weeks Before the World Fell Apart│File 16 T1
Hilton/Blackstone 2007: Operational Execution Under an Immediately Adverse Thesis | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 16 T2
Netflix 2007: Proactive Cannibalization & Broadband Adoption Curve Reading | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 15 T2
Netflix 2007-2011: The Company That Killed Its Own Cash Cow Before Anyone Forced It To│File 15 T1
Warren Buffett’s GEICO 1976-1995 : Insurance Float as Investable Capital Base | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 14 T2
Warren Buffett’s GEICO 1976 /1995 : The Insurance Company Warren Buffett Bought Twice Because Nobody Understood the Float│File 14 T1
Vanguard 1975 - The Fund Company Built on the Bet That Stock Picking Doesn't Work│File 13 T1
Vanguard 1975: Cost-Structure Edge & Mutualized Ownership Design | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 13 T2
Sequoia 2008: Portfolio-Wide Risk Signal & Pre-Emptive Capital Discipline | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 12 T2
Sequoia 2008: The 56-Slide Memo That Told Startups to Panic Before It Was Too Late│File 12 T1
Amazon 2006: How a Bookstore's Internal Plumbing Became a $100 Billion Business│File 11 T1
Amazon AWS 2006: Internal Infrastructure as Unrecognized Market Opportunity | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 11 T2
LVMH 2010 :Contrarian Brand Acquisition Timing Across Three Downturns | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 10 T2
LVMH 1984-2010: The Conglomerate Built by Buying During Every Recession Since 1987│File 10 T1
SoftBank 2000: Early-Stage Conviction Before Market Consensus Existed | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 09 T2
SoftBank 2000: The $20 Million Check Nobody Else in the Room Wanted to Write│File 09 T1
Oaktree 2008 --- The Fund That Had $10 Billion Ready the Week the Market Panicked│File 08 T1
Oaktree 2008: Distressed Debt Deployment & Contrarian Capital Timing | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 08 T2
Greenlight 2008: The Investor Who Said Lehman Was Insolvent Six Months Before Everyone Else│File 07 T1
Greenlight 2008: Public Short Thesis & Balance Sheet Forensics Under Pressure | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 07 T2
Paulson & Co. 2007 --- The Trade That Turned $15 Into Wall Street's Biggest Single Bet│File 06 T1
Paulson & Co. 2007: Subprime CDS Short & Asymmetric Payoff Structuring | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 06 T2
PIMCO 2007: The Bond Giant That Walked Away From the Trade Everyone Else Was Buying│File 05 T1
PIMCO 2007: Underwriting Standard Deterioration as Early Exit Signal | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 05 T2
Renaissance 2008: The Trading Algorithm That Didn't Know There Was a Crisis│File 04 T1
Renaissance 2008: Quant Strategy Design & True Market Descorrelation | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 04 T2
Citadel 2008 --- How One Fund Survived the Redemption Wave That Killed Its Rivals│File 03 T1
Citadel 2008: Liquidity Gates & Investor Communication Under Stress | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│File 03 T2
JPMorgan 2008: Fortress Balance Sheet & Counter-Cyclical Capital Discipline | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals| File 02 T2
JPMorgan 2008 --- The Bank That Went Shopping While Wall Street Was Burning| File 02 T1
Bridgewater 2008: Risk Parity & Regime-Agnostic Allocation | GP/LP Analysis - 3 Signals│ File 01 T2
Bridgewater 2008 : The Fund That Made Money the Year Everyone Else Lost Everything│ File 01 T1