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#137 Opening Up And Closing Down 🎧 episode artwork

Jul 25, 2021 17 min

#137 Opening Up And Closing Down 🎧

from Anticipating the Unintended Hosted by Pranay Kotasthane

India Policy Watch #1: A Winged Horse And A Prison Insights on burning policy issues in India - RSJ Heh! Let’s start in the most unoriginal way possible: Behind Winston’s back the voice from the telescreen was still babbling away….. The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it, moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time….. You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. —- 1`984, George Orwell The Pegasus spyware story broke this week. Coordinated investigations by 17 media organisations revealed governments, mostly authoritarian, used Pegasus, a product sold by Israeli surveillance company NSO, and hacked into over 50,000 phones to read messages, access mails and photos, record calls, activate microphones or even plant incriminating data into them. The NSO continues to maintain it sells Pegasus exclusively to governments for the sole intention of tracking criminals and terrorists. The analysis of the phone numbers so far suggests governments of Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Mexico, Rwanda, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Morocco, UAE and India have been users of Pegasus. The list has over 300 Indian names and counting. NSO has denied the story in its own way. It claimed it “does not operate the systems that it sells to vetted government customers, and does not have access to the data of its customers’ targets”. Further it “does not operate its technology, does not collect, nor possesses, nor has any access to any kind of data of its customers. Due to contractual and national security considerations, NSO cannot confirm or deny the identity of our government customers, as well as identity of customers of which we have shut down systems.” There’s a nice boilerplate ring to that response. The government of India’s response has been a mixed bag. The IT minister took shelter in the official statement of NSO to rubbish the claims. He told the Parliament there’s been no unauthorised surveillance because India has time-tested processes for lawful interception of electronic communication. There wasn’t a clear, unambiguous statement made about not being a customer of NSO and Pegasus. Or, if there indeed was any authorised surveillance on any of these numbers. We soon moved into the familiar narrative terrain of anti-national forces destabilising India and stopping its inevitable rise as a global superpower. This is a fairly routine manoeuvre by now. There was also the bizarre defence mounted by the former Union IT minister who suggested this to be some kind of a global conspiracy to cut India to size after its spectacular success in managing Covid second wave. This was one of those logical sentence puzzles. You couldn’t decide which factually inaccurate part should you challenge without making it appear you are accepting the other. The Genie Is Out I think there are a few truths that one can take away so far from this episode: * There’s a spyware (cyberweapon) like Pegasus that can enter undetected into any phone, stay there and relay back information to a central monitoring unit. This is true for iPhones too. Apple confirmed it (don’t believe those ads). If you remember following the San Bernardino attack in 2015, the US security agencies had recovered the iPhone of one of the terrorists. They couldn’t unlock it and Apple claimed there was no way they could create a ‘backdoor’ into the iPhone. The matter went to court before FBI (or NSA) withdrew from the case because they had unlocked the phone. The rumour then was an Israeli company had helped them. It shouldn’t take a lot of imagination to put two and two together. Also, so far nobody has denied that there’s a tool called Pegasus and it has these capabilities. And that NSO sells them to governments. * One only has NSO’s word that it sells exclusively to national governments. There’s no guarantee the software hasn’t fallen into private hands. Also, who decides which kinds of governments will be eligible to buy from NSO? There are rogue regimes around the world. There are regimes that are at war with one another. A security threat of one client country could be an asset for another client and vice versa. What control does NSO have on the end use for their software? My guess is very little. Like we have mentioned in an earlier edition, we mix up anti-government, anti-state and anti-nation in India (and elsewhere) quite often. So, the potential targets for authorised surveillance can be a wide, open field in any country. * Lastly, it is difficult to believe there’s only a single Pegasus-like software in the world. Technology talent and capital are both available with others to build an equivalent product. If it isn’t built so far, it will be in works after this investigation. In any case, the secretive nature of NSO’s work precludes any patents or IP rights for their products. So, this genie is now out of the bottle. It is a bit of a surprise how lukewarm the response in India media, political circles and public to this has been so far. The ‘anti-India’ and ‘chronology’ remarks from the Home Minister have been adequate for the partisans to dismiss the investigation and its significance. The opposition lacks the voice and the strength to make this a public debate. And surprisingly the Indian right and the conservatives who should champion individual rights and privacy have been quiet, The spectre of a surveillance state in the long-run when someone else could be in power and abuse this capability doesn’t seem to exercise them. Surveillance And Democracy There are the usual arguments to dismiss surveillance concerns these days. It is all pervasive in current times. That privacy is chimera in this connected world. I will make four points on how this time it is different and why a liberal democratic setup should think more deeply about this. Firstly, the tired defence about any government snooping is that it has been happening for ages. Everyone did it in the past. And the governments will continue doing so when they see perceived national security threats or for political reasons. There are two key differences now. One, the size and scale of digital footprint that we leave unknowingly or in the belief we are secure makes snooping easy and deeply intrusive. This is not the open postcard or ‘search your garbage bin’ era where your data in public was limited. Two, a Pegasus like spyware goes beyond the third-party doctrine which itself was an encroachment of individual privacy. The government now doesn’t even have to depend on a third-party to ask for information legally that’s been voluntarily handed over by users to them. They can eliminate the intermediary and directly source the information from the phones. This takes out even the iota of a check or restrain that was inbuilt into the third-party doctrine. Secondly, there’s the dumb argument that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about any kind of surveillance. This is what is expected from the citizens. On the flips side, the governments expect less transparency about their conduct. There’s an ever increasing trove of government work that’s categorised as secret or confidential which makes it inaccessible to citizens as part of any of their rights. This is an inversion of one of the fundamental principles of a democratic setup. That the elected must work under the spotlight while the electorate has the privilege of anonymity. There is a reason why we have a sec… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com

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