#160 Through The Looking Glass
from Anticipating the Unintended Hosted by Pranay Kotasthane
Global Policy Watch: What Ukraine Tells Us Indian perspectives on global events — RSJ Among the rare joys of writing a weekly newsletter is the ability to pretend you’re an expert on everything under the sun. That way the last 2 years has been a gift that has kept on giving. Science of epidemiology, methods of lockdown, the efficacy of vaccines, how fiscal stimulus should be structured, what to do about China, the transitory nature of inflation or the long-term impact of working from home - there’s a wide swathe of subjects that I have claimed expertise on. The only thing missing was war. This week God, Putin heard me. And there was war. Now we do talk about matsyanyaaya a lot around here. That is all international relations can be reduced to the maxim of ‘big fish eating small fish’. To many, it seems like a simplistic formulation. Surely it cannot be just about power, they say. What about things like global order, liberal values and democracy that we hear nations claim that govern their outlook? Didn’t we do just that during the cold war? Fought on principles and brought down an evil empire? I can sympathize with them. There’s so much talk about higher-order morals in international relations that you can easily be taken in by it. Well, my view is that most of that stuff is garbage. The naked truth about international relations is grotesque. It needs the garb of pious intentions. And this becomes clear as daylight when you have a war. As much as it is a humanitarian crisis that saddens you, war is also a moment when all pretenses fall away. And you see the truth. So, what are the truths that emerge from the Russian invasion of Ukraine? The usual response to that question is about Putin, his ego and his frailties, his hegemonic ambitions and his desire for leaving behind a legacy that might appear dubious to us but important to him. Here’s a cross-section of views from experts in Brookings. Just to pick one of them (Pavel Baev, non-resident senior fellow): “Now we know that Putin’s obsession with Ukraine — which constitutes a threat to his regime not because of hypothetical NATO missiles, but because of its choice for democracy and closer ties with Europe — prevailed over common political sense and strategic risk assessments. Wars rarely go according to plans, and this one is set to turn bad for Russia because it is based on serious miscalculations about Ukraine’s capacity to defend its statehood, the strength of NATO resolve, and quite possibly the readiness of Russians to partake in this aggression. Every setback will prompt Putin to raise the stakes yet further.” In summary, Putin doesn’t like democracy in his neighbourhood, especially in countries with large Russian speaking populations. He fears any success there will have a risk of such ideas being transplanted and taking roots in Russia. So, he has to act. He will win the initial rounds but lose eventually though no one knows when. There are other views too but mostly in the same vein. I don’t have much to quarrel with these but I think there are other truths to consider in this clear moment of war. Firstly, there was a view gaining strength in the past decade that the interconnected nature of global trade and funds flow allows those who orchestrate them to wield tremendous power. An example of this was the way Iran was brought to the negotiating table by the US by freezing them out of SWIFT, a global financial messaging system that’s the spine that supports the money flow across the world. The term that’s often used to explain this ‘weaponized interdependence’. As Daniel Drezner of Tufts University in his introduction to the anthology, The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, puts it: “Weaponized interdependence (WI) is defined as a condition under which an actor can exploit its position in an embedded network to gain a bargaining advantage over others in a contained system… WI challenges long-standing ways that international relations experts think about globalization. States with political authority over central economic nodes can weaponize the networks to gather information or choke off economic and information flows, discover and exploit vulnerabilities, compel policy change, and deter unwanted actions.” In the abstract of their original paper, Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, Farell and Newman, also explain this: “Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.” As we have seen in the past few days, this all-seeing, all-knowing panopticon (like the SWIFT) hasn’t worked as a deterrent against Russia. The Biden administration sanction order sounded like we will see a complete freeze on SWIFT for the biggest Russian banks and energy companies. But tucked under a subclause in that order was an exemption for energy companies. Hah. I mean what are you left with on sanctions if you exempt the Russian energy sector. So, the question is why was this carved out? There is only one answer. All the networked interdependence by itself doesn’t create real, hard assets on the ground. It only facilitates their trade in a manner that reduces friction. Real world operates a step removed from this. Russia has cheap energy and the EU needs it. And the EU doesn’t love Ukraine more than the cheap, assured heating in their homes. That’s the reality. The other thing that we learned is any kind of freezing out of a node in a global interconnected network doesn’t put that node away for good. The network is so vast with so many strands crisscrossing them that quite soon a new equilibrium is reached. Order is restored and the freeze circumvented. The simple lesson here is that cyber warfare, paralyzing a network or cutting someone lose from the interdependence are legitimate and novel weapons in international conflicts. But when it comes down to the crunch, real assets trump everything. The other truth to appreciate is the hollowness of nuclear power as a deterrence to any potential escalation of conflict. The idea was somewhat simplistic. This is captured in the definition of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT): “…the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” Viewed from a perspective of deterrence, what was unwritten was the non-nuclear-weapon state would do good to ally… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com
Embed this episode
No transcript yet.