#176 Of East Asian Transformations
from Anticipating the Unintended Hosted by Pranay Kotasthane
Global Policy Watch #1: The Road Not Taken Insights on policy issues making news around the world — Pranay Kotasthane East Asian economic success is one of India’s favourite public policy discussion themes. Regardless of the facts, we have strengthened our own beliefs based on that transformation. For instance, many Indians are convinced that South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan became powerhouses through well-executed industrial policies in which governments threw their full weight behind specific domestic sectors and companies. East Asian examples are often used to justify India’s protectionist trade measures, a business environment that places higher compliance requirements on foreign companies, and generous pro-business subsidies. In this debate, we forget the role of two other crucial factors. One, the role of geopolitics. As Arthur Kroeber’s notes in China’s Economy, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were part of the US alliance structure and benefited immensely from programs of technical assistance, educational exchanges, and access to the American market. Two, what’s more significant is that South Korea’s transformation as an export powerhouse predates industrial policy measures. Like India, South Korea too had a scarce foreign exchange reserves problem. Like India, it too opted initially for trade and monetary policies ostensibly aimed at preserving these reserves. But starting 1964-65, South Korean leaders—nudged by the US—were able to reimagine a future in which their foreign exchange problem was to be ameliorated not by import controls but by increasing exports. To explain the freakish similarities and differences between the paths India and South Korea chose, read these excerpts from an excellent NBER paper From Hermit Kingdom to Miracle on the Han: Policy Decisions that Transformed South Korea into an Export Powerhouse by Douglas A. Irwin. The economic problems of the 1950s South Korea were uncannily similar to India: Korea’s economic policy in the 1950s was built around “the three lows”—low grain prices, low interest rates, and a low price of foreign exchange—and the controls needed to maintain them. Although the controls led to perpetual shortages of grain, capital, and foreign currency, each had a rationale. The government sought low grain prices to keep the cost of living down, relying on grain imports from the United States made available through PL 480 (food assistance) grants. The government maintained interest rate ceilings, ostensibly to help borrowers and promote investment, but negative real interest rates meant there was little incentive to save, diminishing investment and financial development. The government kept the price of foreign exchange artificially low to make imported goods, particularly capital goods, cheaper than they otherwise would have been. The shortage of foreign exchange led the government to introduce import controls to conserve foreign exchange reserves. Import licensing was introduced in 1946 to impede the purchase of nonessential foreign goods. In 1949, the Ministry of Finance began preparing a quarterly foreign exchange budget to determine how export earnings and aid inflows should be allocated in purchasing imports. The overvalued currency had a devastating effect on the country’s merchandise exports, which declined from $40 million in 1953 to just $16 million in 1958, a year in which imports were $370 million. South Korea too had an aborted devaluation attempt in the 1960s. The government devalued the won in two steps… The February 1961 devaluation was made in conjunction with a major reform of the foreign exchange system. The government rationalized the complicated multiple exchange rate system and began to relax import controls, paving the way for a fully unified exchange rate in June of that year. The devaluation increased exports significantly, but caused pain in the short term. In the first two months of 1961, prices rose 15 percent, and industrial production, which depended on cheap imported intermediate goods, fell.21 The devaluation hurt the political fortunes of the deeply divided government, which went through several major cabinet reshuffles during its short period in power and never enjoyed strong public support. The government was widely seen as inept, and public dissatisfaction with the country’s situation led to protests. After renewed political unrest and street demonstrations by students, a military coup overthrew the nine-month-old government on May 16, 1961. Changing tack, the incoming military rulers opted for atmanirbharta: The government envisioned state investment to build up heavy and chemical industries to increase national security and end the country’s dependence on US aid and foreign sources of supply. Given Korea’s enormous trade deficit and tiny export base, the government thought it easier to replace imports by expanding domestic production of those goods rather than to try to make up the gap by exporting more. The plan was to make the country self-reliant in its ability to pay for its imports, but the plans were formulated “without due consideration of Korea’s short supply of capital and technology,” This plan failed as each of these required more foreign exchange, which was the limiting condition. Then came a food crisis. The US also withheld economic aid from Korea, including PL480 food assistance at a time when food was in desperately short supply. In April 1963, Korea agreed to a new stabilization program to reduce the budget deficit, in the hope of bringing inflation under control. The government also agreed to dismantle trade controls and eventually adopt a floating exchange rate. Aid was released, but by July it was clear the government was not living up to the agreement. Things begin to change after elections in 1963. Eventually, the government went ahead with another devaluation, and a slew of decisive policy reforms in 1964-65. In essence, Kim believed that the government would have to get rid of “the three lows”—the low exchange rate, the low-interest rate, and low grain prices—as well as reform the foreign exchange system. The devaluation had already raised the exchange rate; getting rid of low interest rates and low grain prices would be deeply unpopular. Said one leader: "“Eventually, the entire business world will protest the policies. Plus, the National Assemblymen will join them and intelligent media editorialists will criticize the policies . . . it will be very difficult.” The government began promoting slogans such as “exports alone promise a way to economic self-reliance” and “exports as the yardstick to measure the sum of our national strength” The economy started reaping the rewards even before the industrial policy kicked in: “The export success of the 1960s and 1970s was basically due to the removal of impediments to trade, namely, the complicated foreign exchange system and the negative effects on export of the protectionist import policy,” “Once the impediments were removed, the economy began realizing its huge export potential, which had been left unexploited until then." So next time someone sings paeans about South Korea’s industrial policy success, do tell them aap chronology samajhiye. Thank you for reading Anticipating the Unintended. This post is public so feel free to share it. The global outpouring of respect and admiration for Shinzō Abe is proof of his outsized impact on Japan and the world. To put his economic contributions in perspective, here’s an edited version of RSJ’s essay on Abenomics from edition #69. Global Policy Watch #2: Abe Yaar! Lessons From 'Japanification' (From our Archives) Insights on policy issues making news around the world —RSJ Shinzō Abe, the longest-serving Japanese PM ever, stepped down from office last week. His second term which began in late 2012 was marked by his prescription for reviving the Japanese economy. The world called it Abenomics. Through a mix of unconventional monetary policy, robust fiscal stimulus, and structural refo… This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit publicpolicy.substack.com
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