Benedict Beckeld: Western Self-Contempt part 2

I'm not a good person, I'm a good person. I'm a good person. I'm a good person. I'm a good person.

I'm a good person. I'm a good person. I'm a good person. I'm a good person.

You're listening to Deconstructive Criticism. I'm Aaron Flan. Benedict Beckild has written the book on Western self-content. Last episode we explored most of it, but after our conversation I felt there were at least two subjects left to discuss.

If you haven't seen the first episode, I recommend you listen to that as well. In what order, I'll leave entirely up to you. But before we get there, I want to give a heartfelt thanks to you for supporting Deconstructive Criticism on patreon.com slash Aaron Flan in one word. That's Aaron with one A and Flan with one M or Swish, 0046, 076894, 3737, 0046, 076894, 3737, 3737.

You can also buy my own book. This is a Swedish tiger in English at my website, although it might be more practical since the shipping costs are huge to buy it as an ebook on Amazon Kindle. This is a Swedish tiger can be found on Amazon. I suggest you purchase your copy today, even though you might be uninterested in Sweden.

I believe that Sweden's trajectory of decline is ahead of the curve compared to the rest of the West, and there is much insight to be gained from exploring the culture of silence that have surrounded the social democratic hegemony. Benedict Bechkeld was born in Uppsala, Sweden and grew up in both Uppsala and Stockholm before moving to New York in his early teens. His academic journey is remarkable spanning continents and prestigious institutions. He has a PhD in philosophy Greek and Latin from Heidelberg University and has lived, studied and taught in France, Italy and Germany.

In the previous episode, we talked about his book on the history of Oikofobia in the West with a very apt title Western self-content. Oikofobia is the relatively new term for hatred of one's own nation or homeland. It is an interesting and insightful read. What struck me after our former discussion was that he hadn't talked anything about anti-Semitism in the book, which I thought a bit strange since what's going on in the States now seems to contain quite a bit of it.

So I naturally wondered if this is another sign of declining civilizations or something entirely different. Personally, I think there might be something to it. Benedict disagrees. One thing Benedict deals with quite extensively in his book that I failed to bring up last time is utopianism, another sign of the fall of a civilization according to Benedict.

Enjoy. And welcome back to deconstructive criticism, Benedict Bechkeld. Thank you so much for having me back. So what have you been doing since you were here last?

It's been almost four days now. Yes, exactly. I've been enjoying Stockholm and beautiful weather, which I hadn't expected, so I'll be very lucky. And of course, I've been enjoying the Swedish cuisine, where I have to say Sweden as well ahead of the United States.

Really? Yeah. I tend to disagree. Well, I mean, if you're a carnivore, which admittedly I am, you can get some really great food in the United States, but the quality of the ingredients is higher here, especially when it comes to pastries and baking desserts, everything like that.

It's just a lump of sugar, most things in the United States where you can really taste the ingredients. I've had a little too much of princess cake. I'd like to admit, over the last couple of days, I'm going to have to train hard when I get back. Is that what it's called in English as well?

Princess cake? Well, we have it from Sweden, but yeah, that's Princess cake is the translation. Princess torta. Yes.

And for Carpisco here and Vina Bred and all of these things, which the American audience I guess won't be familiar with, to their detriment, unfortunately. Yes. What I like about the US is the barbecue, the melted cheese, even though it's processed cheese. It's its own thing.

It's like a melted salty rubber. It's very nice. Sorry. No, I enjoy.

We have a good barbecue, so no, therefore they're very enjoyable as well. But it's good to try something different on it. Well, I have to have you back. I realized as soon as we finish the first session, not only because you were in Sweden and I had the opportunity, but because I forgot to bring up at least two subjects about your book that we discussed in the previous episode, which people can go back and listen to or watch in case they're interested, which they should be.

Well, there we have to be back. Yeah, absolutely. So there are two things that came to me right after the episode. It was utopianism and anti-Semitism.

And I want to start with utopianism because you identify utopianism as one of those indicators that tells you that an empire is on its way out. It's falling down. How so? Well, so it's utopianism is a sign of civilizational decadence in so far as it strives for something that is beyond that civilization.

So what early on in a civilizational phase or when a civilization is at its peak, people are proud of who they are. They consider themselves superior to all other civilizations to other societies. And utopianism is something that tends to, they're different forms of utopianism. But mostly utopianism tends to be to express itself as pan-humanism, if you will, something by which all human beings will come together.

Now, that of course takes different shape depending on what kind of utopianism we're talking about, Christian utopianism, communist utopianism, Nazi utopianism, there are lots of different utopianisms. Greek Greek. So Greek utopianism is also comes under play though. That's the first real manifestation of it that we have.

So that's indeed another form. Although some people would say that it's communist, some people might say it's fascist or a combination of the two, but... But say it's communist with a bit of fascism thrown in. Exactly.

Yeah, I would tend to agree. And of course, one could say it is that communism is a form of fascism. Obviously not in the Italian sense, but in the broader sense of the word, and I would agree with you. But so utopianism, regardless of its form, strives towards something that unites all of mankind in some way.

Maybe some parts of mankind has to be exterminated, but whatever is left of mankind will all be united. And so if one has this kind of feeling or this goal, then generally one has to go beyond the nation, of course, because the nation is only one particular group of people. The empire is only one particular group of people. And so utopianism shows that, okay, we're kind of tired of this whole empire business, of this nation.

That is above that. And the people who still want the nation or they still want the empire, they're sort of old-fashioned in their beliefs. They harken back to yesterday or two a day that no longer exists. And so that's how utopianism tends to be a sign of something that's falling apart or that there is a lack of future for that particular social paradigm in which people find themselves.

Because I've always had some sort of instinctive resistance to utopianism. Yeah. I don't know how much I thought about it, but you know, when you read about it across history, you realize that it always leads to revolution and bloodshed. Because in order to enact the utopia, you have to get rid of everything that is not in accordance with the ideals, which is when the mass murders usually start.

So how does this express itself then in Rome, for instance? So Roman utopianism only comes through Christianity, really. So that makes it a little bit different from Greece in the sense that Greek utopianism under Plato is still, I'm not going to say it's pagan because that's not the central part of its nature, but it's still not on Greek, so to speak. It's not something completely new, something new religion.

Whereas in Rome, it really is something new in the sense that Roman utopianism really is Christian. So that's the later empire that we're talking about. As Christianity is starting to take over, we have especially the greatest expression of it is Augustine, as I'm sure won't be surprising to many listeners, Augustine, city of God, early fifth century AD. And by that time, of course, it depends.

It's a question of definitions. Of course, some people might say, well, by that time, there's really no such proper thing anymore as the Roman Empire still exists, nominally, but it's so weakened that what we're really talking about is in Roman. That's, you know, that one could argue about the terms or about the definitions, but that's chronologically when it appears. It's Christian, wouldn't you say?

I mean, he's a member of the Roman Empire. He lives within the Roman Empire. Yes. So he's Roman Christian.

But as we mentioned in the previous episode, the Romans were slightly less prone to ochophobia than the Greeks because the Romans had a stronger sense of patriarchy, of hierarchy and everything like that. So they were a little more rooted in their sense of empire in a certain sense than the Athenians were in their sense of empire. But and so as long as we're still dealing with far Roman paganism, utopianism can't make a lot of inroads. So that really does come later with Christianity as the Roman Empire is already well on its way to work, collapsing.

But so then under Augustine, it really does become then something new, of course. It's related to philosophy of history as well. And much as you know, much about the book that I wrote is also about the philosophy of history, ochophobia plays itself out within the philosophy of history. And what the philosophy of history of Augustine is about is that humanity has goes through certain phases, which will ultimately lead to Christian redemption.

And that's the utopia that he's talking about. And so that goes far beyond any sense of the Roman Empire, beyond any sense of the Roman Empire as the ultimate station for mankind. Yes, but Augustine, he talks about utopia more in a spiritual sense. Yes.

Yeah, absolutely. Although, I mean, the Christian redemption is ultimate is not just about the next world. It is also about what will happen in this world. I mean, of course, there are many forms of Christian, it's open as a many forms of Christian redemption.

But what Augustine is talking about is not only the world beyond, he is also talking about the actual development of humanity in this earthly life. And it makes sense that Augustine would do so because he is living at a time. He himself, of course, can tell what's going on around him. He can tell that the Roman Empire is on its way out.

I mean, he lives in unstable times. And so it's natural that he and others would start asking himself, okay, well, what is going to come after the Roman Empire? How is this all going to make sense? And so that's his answer to that question.

So he's not somebody who simply decides to, who creates utopianism or his form of utopianism in order to rebel against the Roman Empire. He's already noticing that the Roman Empire is lost anyway. And so now we have to find a new solution. And Christianity would be the way.

Yeah. Something that in my own book, I mentioned some form of Christian utopianism, taking part, trying to reshape this world in the Anabaptist occupation of minster in the 15 or 1600s, assuming I've forgotten. Yeah. So yeah.

And what's interesting with their sect is that they want to do away with the difference between the sexes, the difference between men and women, marriage, that is, and traditional family. They want to get rid of the old religious authority, the church, to reinstate this kingdom of heaven and earth. They want to get rid of political leadership because who needs it if you live in utopia? And the results is chaos.

But you can also see from getting rid of all these types of authority, a sort of pro-to-Marxian ideology, because the Marxists and the revolutionaries in Russia and so on, they wanted to get rid of all these institutions. And the results was chaos every time. Yeah. Yeah.

No, and I think that's a very important point to make, namely that Marxism already in not just later Marxism, but in the person of Marx himself is in a certain sense, is in a certain sense. I don't want to say vulgarization of Christianity, but a further expression of certain aspects of it. Yes. I don't think utopianism, his form of Marxist form of utopianism wouldn't have been possible without a religious framework for seven being laid many centuries before.

I think that's sort of true. When it comes to the anarchy, of the Anabaptists that you mentioned, that's where we have different forms of utopianism being expressed within Christianity. You have certain Christians who are more pragmatic, if you will. Saint Paul already is one of them who basically argue that.

He doesn't obviously develop utopianism in the way that Augustine does, but who basically consider the leaders, the kings and the emperors and so on of this world as acceptable substitutes for now. And so they're a little more, they don't, their form of faith is not as toxic, if you will, to the powers of me, because they see that, well, as long as we are in this world, we do need political leaders and nations and so on, so as not to collapse into the sort of anarchy that you're describing. So, round around to Caesar. Yes, exactly.

Yes. So, the French Revolution, where utopianism is quite obvious. Yes. Yes.

So, the French Revolution is, that's one of those areas where I find it hard to stop talking because it's just so childish and embarrassing, everything that happens in the French Revolution, I mean, apart from obviously cruel and tyrannical and so on, that's those are the obvious parts. The utopianism of the French Revolution, as we talked about last time, the French are the first, offers the first instance of a Cofobia in the modern era. And it's not a coincidence then that the revolution in France is the one that takes the most Cofobia expression. We have various revolutions at various times, obviously, in Europe and elsewhere.

If you look at the Russian Revolution in 1917, it's ocophobic in certain respects against Russian culture, but not in other respects. Whereas the French Revolution is really ocophobic in almost every respect. Once they have reshaped France completely into something that they like, then they start waving the French flag, the Trigolo and everything like that, then they suddenly become patriotic because they are now representing something completely different. But it is ocophobic because they do really seek to approach everything.

The utopianism of the French Revolution is one, it's, so one can argue about the connection between the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. Obviously, there is a connection. The argument would be how strong a certain Enlightenment thinkers influence to what they're what extend they influence the actual revolutionaries. It's kind of different from person to person, but there's certainly an element of the humanism of the French Enlightenment in the French Revolution.

Obviously, the most extreme expression of that in Ultimetry becomes Napoleon, who ostensibly, I mean, he's very much into just aggrandizing his own power, but who ostensibly wants to unite all of Europe into one nation so that there will never be war and everyone will just be together. That's a form of utopianism. And so that is the ultimate expression of the French Revolution because the French Revolution had to almost go in that direction because it was so chaotic, obviously, that it needed to coalesce under a leader, but it was also something that emphasized the importance of humanity, of humanism where everyone is tied together and where there's no such thing as better or worse. Of course, one season the Enlightenment thinkers, the fact that they actually did think very much that certain groups of people were better than others.

One can only read Voltaire to know that he despised greatly certain groups of people, but the utopianism is nonetheless there. And I think that's also an important point, especially when we talk about modern utopianism more so than about classical ancient utopianism, is that in order for humanity to be able to come together, there are certain groups of humanity that have to be exterminated, or if not exterminated, then at least sidelined because they are a stumbling block on the path toward this unity that people are talking about. That element is not so strong in Plato, for example, because Plato has a very strong sense of hierarchy, but the Greeks in general, it's going to come later on in the Hellenistic era, but the Greeks still at Plato's time do not have such a strong sense of a common humanity. And so they don't have this idea of very strongly of certain aspects, certain elements of humanity having to be extinguished in order for this ideal state to take place.

Plato's utopianism is still fairly localized, but once you're in the modern era, of course, then they do have a very strong sense of the entire globe. And that's when utopianism really becomes this sort of thing that, okay, well, this and this group have to be extinguished so that the rest of us can all come together in unity. And so that becomes so modern, utopianism, and that's becomes even more dangerous, even more murderous, if you will. Because the French revolutionaries don't just want to revolutionize France, they want to spread the revolution.

Exactly, so, yeah. And that's where you could say, well, you could ask, would Voltaire have approved an Napoleon? I think that's questionable. I think he probably would have made fun of Napoleon quite a bit, sort of seems to be his character, anything, that's sort of this hyper-nationalism that Napoleon can be built.

You mean, fun of utopianism as well, but Christian utopianism. Absolutely. Yeah, right, exactly, yeah. Although, Candide, is a book I would say.

Well, maybe he's not the tokenist because he already believes this is the best of all possible worlds. Well, he's making fun of that idea. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, so, Candide is, I think, undeservedly famous, but it does play an important part in the history of ideas, for sure.

But so, yeah, so I don't want to put, there are some things I like about Voltaire, you know, probably sounds like I hate him. I'm not a big fan, but there are certain things that I think he got right. And so that's why I want to be a little careful about the connection that I make between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, certainly with Napoleon. Well, we mentioned Mahomet the Prophet last time.

Yes. And you've read it, I suppose. Yes. So, I mean, that's quite good, isn't it?

Yeah, I would probably say it doesn't even go far enough. But yeah, absolutely. So there are certain, there are certain things that I would, that I would praise with him. Although when it comes to Mahomet, yes, so he attacks Islam and obviously many of those attacks agree with, but I don't think necessarily he attacks it.

I mean, you could say he attacks it, I was going to say he doesn't attack it for the right reason, but his attacks would, would be more trustworthy to me or would be more believable to me if he also didn't attack Christianity as vociferously or even Judaism to some extent. So that's why it sort of seems like it just attacks almost everything that is except for the Hindus and that attacks almost everyone is religious. And so if that's your attitude, then I'm saying maybe you're not attacking Islam for the right reason, that particular faith system. Although he does, he does have some, he does make some good points.

But so, so that connection is still a bit tenuous, but nonetheless, there is a certain humanism, humanism in the bad sense of the word that does connect Napoleon and the revolution with, with the French, with the French enlightenment. So you mentioned that the French revolutionaries were childish. Would you like to expand on that? They were childish in the sense that they felt that they had to get rid of everything that represented the old order.

Now, if you don't want a monarch, for example, you'd rather have a republic than a monarch, okay, I can understand. And so there are certain political reasons- But everything in French history shows that they can't have a republic. Right. They can't have a republic.

Exactly. So no, I suppose they felt that they really had to tear up everything in the stem. But probably the best example I can think of, why I would call it not just cruel and tyrannical, but also childish, is the new calendar, the revolutionary calendar, where they felt that they had to change the names of the months and everything like this, to make this sort of pseudo-neopagan calendar. If you have to go to such lengths that you have to now, you start counting the time from the day, from the revolution, replacing the birth of Jesus with the birth of the revolution, that to me is like a little child yelling at its parents because it doesn't get to have dessert or whatever, and just throws a tantrum and throws a plate into the wall or whatever, just everything should be torn down because I didn't get to have my dessert.

I want my chocolate and that's it. That's basically the revolutionaries, many of them, in my opinion. Yeah, and one of the points you return to in the book time and time again, one of your pips, I think, is that, as soon as religion recedes, some other type of faith, not science or rational thought will take its place because rational thoughts is one part of the human psyche and faith is another part. Yeah, except they're not contradictory.

A lot of the new atheists, the quote unquote new atheist today, these sort of pop intellectuals who style themselves as atheists, they tend to think that religion is antithetical to reason. It's not reason is a tool and reason can be used in favor of religion, it can be used against religion. The two are not tied in that way. There is the older Greek sense of reason where logos, where reason is also a divine force, but that's not the sense in which we use reason today.

The reason today is a tool. It is a divine force in Judaism as well. Is it not an intellectual principle is there? Yeah, absolutely.

We have a sort of logos. Oh, no, for sure. And I'm not against that conception of being fact, I actually prefer that conception of reason, which is also the Greek conception of reason where the logos has a whole other role to play. But this is not the new atheists when they talk about reason.

This is not the sense in which they mean it. If that's what they meant, I would have a lot more respect for it. But what they are talking about is the new sense is the modern sense of reason, which is reason as a tool to figure out certain things to make valid deductions. Yes.

And once you accept that particular kind of reason or that definition, then you cannot say that there's something antithetical between religion and reason. There is not. Again, then reason is simply a tool which you can use either to defend religion or to attack religion and to do a bunch of other things. And if it seems like a pet peeve of mine, you're probably right.

But the reason for that would probably be that we have a certain movement today. They call it the substitution hypothesis. I've heard it's used to come up with them. I've heard it too.

Yeah. It's come up with a couple of appearances I made in the past, where they have this hypo-cornical hypothesis that if religion collapses, maybe it's not going to to be replaced by reason and science. Obviously, it's not going to get replaced by reason and science. Exactly.

And I'm so glad to hear you say, obviously, because I was about to make fun of the fact that they called it a hypothesis. It's not a hypothesis. I live in Sweden. I know it's not a hypothesis.

Exactly. And this is why, and this comes to show, unfortunately, the degree to which our pop intellectuals, popular intellectuals and public intellectuals, the degree to which they just lack education. Because philosophers have known for centuries that this is what happens when religion collapses, that it is not replaced by more reason, whatever that's even supposed to mean. It's replaced by new beliefs, by new superstitions that are often just as toxic, if not even more so, than the superstitions or the religions that they replace.

This is what Nietzsche meant when he said that God is dead. Exactly. That's exactly right. It was referencing new prejudices.

Yes. Yeah. It has not at all been misinterpreted as somehow celebrating the fact that God is that, not at all. That's not what he's doing.

No, he's decrying it. Yeah. 100%. And so this is not a hypothesis.

We know very well atheism has existed in the past, not to the extreme degrees that we have now, but there is Plato already talks about in his laws. And a little bit else where mainly the laws, he talks about how everybody's an atheist nowadays. Nobody believes in the gods. We know very well what happens when mass atheism appears.

And again, it's something that's cyclical. And so because there is this misunderstanding- But it is much harder to be a polytheistic atheist than the monotheist. There's so many gods you have to, sort of deny. Right.

Yeah, definitely. Not too many polytheistic atheists these days, which might be an improvement of sorts. But at least now they can just focus on one. But it's, and I think that's why it's something that's so worth emphasizing, because we do have this sort of misunderstanding, which really is just a sign of declining education in our society, the fact that people believe that there's a possibility that maybe if we reject religion, we'll become more rational.

It's absolutely not. I share your dislike of utopianism. Obviously, it was instinctive with me. I haven't maybe thought of it as much as you have, or about why I hate it so much as much as you have.

But the instinctive resistance is there. But I have to ask you, because considering how much you seem to hate utopianism, you seem to throw in your own utopianism at the end of the book. Interesting. Well, you have a sort of a prescription and have to battle utopianism.

This is for somebody who has told me that, which is one so happy that I'm here, because I'm being challenged in a different way. In the last chapter, in the epilogue? No, the epilogue is about free will. We covered that in the last session, in our first session.

But in the confluence of the West, you talk about love and dispassionate love and about not hating things. Oh, I see. Right. That part.

Yes. So let's see if I can find the quote here. Well, the part about not hating things, I think, is in the epilogue. It's a bit of a while.

Maybe it is. Maybe it is. Maybe chapter 11 is just where you hate all other philosophers from the 1900s and numbers. Right.

Yeah. Yeah. 90s. Yeah.

Second half of the 19th century. That's where it all starts going downhill. Okay. So maybe we should first ask you about positivism and relativism.

Okay. Because I connect relativism to polytheism. To polytheism, you said. Yes.

Because if you have a polytheistic cosmo-gyny, would that be the correct way? Yeah. Yeah. Then you don't have one central authority.

You have several gods. And each god stands for its own truth. So you can have plenty of truths. You understand?

Yeah. And different perspectives are more readily acceptable, as long as they're polytheistic, that is. Right. So you're using the word polytheism, not so much in the literal sense, maybe but just sort of different centers of truth.

Because I mean, within one polytheistic system, you still tend to have one sheet in each other. And war each other. Yeah. So I tie the belief in one truth, one objective truth to one of the two pieces.

Yeah. Okay. Yeah. I wouldn't make that connection quite so strongly.

Depends because I mean, it depends which polytheistic system we're talking about. But if we take the Greek one as obviously for us, the most pragmatic one, you still have the chief of the gods, of course, Zeus, who sometimes when the other gods kind of get a little too rowdy sort of pulls the reins inside, okay, everybody calm down, you know, it sort of happens in the Iliad, where he tells them to just cut it out already and stuff on each other. And somebody like Plato, of course, Plato is not exactly a polytheist in the sense that he believes in the actual stories of the gods and so on. Plato Aristotle, the more educated men of Greece, certainly by that time in Greek history, they don't believe but he's not a strict monotheist in our sense of the word anyway.

And yet he certainly does believe in a higher truth. So I mean, I see what you're saying. I think we there's certainly many other ways they have discovered truth. They're on their way to monotheism.

I'm not saying that that might be true in itself. I'm just saying that in order to have objective truth, you need to have monotheism. And you're right. I mean, in the fourth century BC in the relevant literature, they start using just the word God, theos, and they use it.

They often use it synonymously with Zeus, but it is this sort of recognition that they don't they say theos singular, not the oil, plural, and this idea that there is sort of one higher power. They might be certain other divine forces, but they're sort of the one main thing. So so yeah, you're not wrong. But that wasn't was what I was sorry, because you write about the opposition and sort of the kindredness of the relativism and positivism.

Yeah. So could you first explain positivism briefly, just to the listener? Okay, sure. Yeah.

So positivism is something that I mean, I talk about relativism and positivism in terms of how they pertain to a copobia. Yes. But so positivism is something that develops later. Relativism comes first.

positivism and positivism is the part that is more obviously related to utopianism in the sense that positivism means that you have faith that we that humanity is going to be able to progress morally and is and that we're going all going to be able to reach a higher moral state than we previously had. That's positivism, basically in a nutshell. And so if we're all going to be able to progress to a higher state, humanity writ large, then that is a form of utopianism, even if it's not always as extreme kind of utopianism as somebody like Marx or Plato would have because it's also sort of a method, isn't it? Yes, yeah, absolutely.

It has to do with reason and science. Right. Absolutely. But so that is also then is related to a phobia in the sense that, okay, well, if we have this kind of progress, that means that we have to let go of old traditional customs and nationalism and so on.

And then relativism is what happens when monotheistic religion recedes. Right. So relativism, yes. So relativism comes earlier in this context, starts already in late fifth century Greece.

Plato complains about it. There is this whole big debate that's invoked in the late fifth century about truth is truth something that we make up, or is it something that's natural? It's sort of thesis versus normals, nature versus law. And so that debate is very much in vogue and you have a lot of people who are relativists in this sense saying that, okay, well, what's true to me isn't necessarily true to somebody else and so on.

And that also ties into a copobia in the sense that, well, if truth is relative, then obviously our empire, our nation does not necessarily have a higher claim to truth than other societies and other nations and other empires. So both positivism and relativism, even though relativism does not think there is an absolute truth and positivism thinks that there is a higher truth of some kind toward which we should strive. In spite of this complete opposition between relativism and positivism, they still come together in a copobia. And this is a development that we see in history, and this is a big part of the philosophical thrust of the book to see how these two opposite philosophies actually come together in a copobia.

Now, in earlier days in antiquity, if you were an okafobia, tended to be a relativist. And then we get with the French Enlightenment, and this ties into our discussion about utopianism. If you have our French Enlightenment enlightened individual, you tend to be more of a positivist, you strive toward a higher moral state for all of mankind without bigotry, without prejudice and so on. And so that's more positivist than a relativist, but we see it earlier as well.

But today, in the 20th and 21st centuries, we see how these two opposite philosophies have come together, because a lot of people, especially young uneducated people, tend to be relativists and positivists at the same time. They are very adamant that, yes, what's true to me is and true to you, and we all have our own truths and so on. And yet, at the same time, they have a very clear idea of what a better society should look like. And they have this very utopianist drive that we should all agree on.

They are contradictory these two. Absolutely. I mean, it's whatever works. Whatever it works to tear down the society that currently hopes.

Everyone has their own way, but there's only one way. Exactly. It's a primo-syntepadis, as we said before, their first among equals, like Augustus. And so you see how...

It's not true of all of the folks, but a lot of other folks today, we see how completely inconsistent they are in their thinking, because they combine ideas that are actually mutually exclusive, but they do so because they'll take whatever is available to tear down their own society, to tear down the culture from which they come. Yeah, that's interesting. I mean, I've interviewed people for this podcast who share our concerns for our civilizations, but who would call themselves positivists and who would think that positivism is the way out of this rot. Yeah, so that's part of the tragic.

I was also talking about the tragic view of history, which is to say that there is no absolute solution. And this is another problem. I've already been criticizing a number of public intellectuals these days. People think too politically.

They are married to a particular political cause, and they say, well, this particular thing, that's the solution to our troubles. If we could just all agree on that, then we would be able to come up of our current malaise. And I mentioned last time that I've been criticized for not being... Including by the right for not being sufficiently visyphorous, maybe in some of my objections.

And I said, that's not my job, because I'm a philosopher, I'm not a politician. But another reason why I'm not that is because there is no one permanent solution. That in itself would almost be a former utopianism. What we really have to say is, okay, what does our society at this particular juncture in time need?

And then we can think of a certain solution of that, a certain answer to that question. What do we need right now to make things better? But to say that, okay, well, this particular philosophy or this particular political organization, that's going to be the solution to everything. That's naive.

Because... Well, I think we are pretty much in agreement over the few things we can do to correct course, which is freedom of speech and ownership rights, basically. Yeah, no, that would certainly come a long way. Yeah, because those are principles that have served our civilization well.

Yeah, right now, it's a form of a certain combination of conservatism and classical liberalism. That is what our society needs right now. But that's going to change maybe a few hundred years from now. And so we can be too married.

The conservatives in the classical liberals gain power. It will take them well within a generation, they'll start, you know, outlawing words, songs and movies and television. Exactly so. And this is what I...

Architecture. Architecture is a big one actually. I'm actually writing a little bit about that right now. And that's something I say in the book, it's one of the reasons why I don't call myself a conservative, even though obviously I do agree with conservative principles in a lot of cases.

But it is precisely for this reason because again, we do need every poll needs a counter poll, if you will. A dialectic, if you will. Exactly. So Hegel was right.

Hegel was right in a lot of respect. I don't want to say that because now I'm going to open myself. Neither do I. I just wanted to stunt you.

Yeah, but he was certainly an intelligent man. Right. So you have written a book aimed at the powers that be of our Western civilizations now. And you are born Jewish, even if you live as an ancient Greek philosopher.

So this is quite a feat. This is a classical piece of Judaism. You don the role of the prophet and you travel to the big city and you tell the powers that this is what's going on. You have sinned repents.

So because that's one of the things that I found a little odd when it came to your book that you neglect to mention anti-Semitism in the fall of civilization, Western civilization, specifically. How come? I don't think I do completely. I do mention it.

It's not mentioned a lot. That's certainly true. The quickest answer I could probably give to that question is that anti-Semitism is not necessarily Thai talkophobia. So there are instances, and especially modern times, yes, where there is a relationship between anti-Semitism and agitomism, that's something we can talk about.

But since I set out to describe agitomism itself, it's not a necessary part of agitomism. And there are certain manifestations, of course, more obviously in antiquity, but also in modern times where it's not, although the later we get in history, the more they do tend to be connected, that's true. I do mention when I get into British agitomism that around the close of the 19th century, I do mention certain that there are present among the agitomism, but it's true. It's not something I get into in any detail.

Let's get into the weeds on this. So in 38 CE, there was a big program against Jews in Alexandria at the time a Greek controlled city. So this is 38. Whereabouts in Greek civilizational history are we when this program takes place?

Very late in the sense that we can almost not even talk about a Greek civilization in that sense anymore. There is a Greek-speaking part of the Roman Empire, but that has become so diffused. And I mean, ethnically, they're not Greek. Some of them, yes, there are certain Greek elements, but it's a hodgepodge of different peoples living together, and their lingua franca is Greek.

But we can't really talk about a Greek civilization at that point, and at this time, we're really talking about a Roman civilization and with various mixed elements in it. But finally... Describes this. And I would say it should have something to do with...

Well, the thing is though that... So here's my theory, basically. If a nation is strong, a western nation, because we're talking about western self-contempt and not eastern or southern, or any other type of self-contempt, but western. So if a nation is strong and believes in itself, then it can afford to invite Jews into their midst.

And as soon as they start to doubt themselves and the civilization is falling and you're starting to look for scapegoats, then the Jews would be an obvious target, even in antiquity. Yes, and other barbarians are polytheistic. You can sort of meet another polytheist, if you're Greek, and you can say, oh, you call the god of the sea, this or that, we call him Poseidon or whatever. And you call the god of lightning this, and we call him Zeus.

And you understand? But when it comes to the Jews, it's different, because they're monotheists and they don't eat pork, and they take one day off every week or shout out. And you see this in quite a lot of Greek works. Now, I'm sitting...

It's making me nervous enough to have to conduct an interview in another language, which is English, which I think I'm quite proficient at. You're doing it, but not like that. Yes, but now I'm sitting with a person who's proficient in Latin and Greek. So I don't know if I would be able to pronounce these names correctly.

Okay. But we have, of course, we have Ampere Chos Epiphanes. He's a Greek monarch. He sort of pronounces and edicts against the Jews and their religion.

He wants them to become Hellenized. This leads to the revolt by the Maccabees. But that's the opposite of Opophobia. Okay.

So that would be... Because that's naturalistic. And Opophobia. Exactly.

Okay. Because they consider the Jews to be on other. Yes, but that would still be anti-Semitism. Oh, yeah, of course.

Right. Because... All right. So we have that.

And then we have... And I really want to get the pronunciation right here. Lissimakos. Well, so if you want to say it in the English way, we say Lissimikas.

Lissimikas. Yeah. But that's not... Lissimakos.

Lissimakos. Okay. He was a ruler of race, quite anti-Semitic. And then we have...

He also had an edict against the Jews. And then we have Karimom. Karimom? Karimom.

Karimom. Yes, I believe. Is that the English plural? Yes.

Karimom. Yes. And he seems to get a lot of his... Let's call it anti-Jewish sentiments from an etho-an-Egyptian anti-Semite.

Because the Egyptians had their... Not familiar with that last name, but okay. No, because he was Egyptian. So he's not in a real way.

He's not in an Ethiopian. But he was an Egyptian. He was a ruler and a priest of some kind, Lord Giver. And he had written quite extensively about why Egyptians hated the Jews, which was because one of their pharaohs had gone to a soussayer who told him that what was ravaging his kingdom was a form of leprosy.

And he should gather all the lepers and dump them in the wilderness. And those are according to Egyptian theories from that time, the Jews. And the Greeks have different ideas about the Jews. They think they come from Crete and stuff because of Judea sounds a bit like Aia, which was a town close to I think Crete or something in ancient Greece.

And then we have the Romans who never detects on Jews from the Jews. So there is some anti-Semitism in the history of Okofobia as well. But that's not the history of Okofobia. If anything, you could maybe say it's an anti-Okofobia reaction.

But so I mean, I love everything. There's so much to talk about here. So two main points I would make. The first one is that the first one is basically what I just said.

These reactions that are these anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish reactions, they are responses to a certain liberalization, if you will. They are pro the own nation. That's going to be especially true for the Roman Empire. All Roman anti-Semitism, I don't think I can think of any exception, really.

Roman anti-Semitism is nationalistic. It's pro-Roman. They are tired of this upstart people from their point of view that is constantly rebelling against them and killing thousands of Roman legionaries. Tacitus is quite clear on that.

Exactly. So when they hate the Jews, they are doing so from a pro-Roman perspective. So there's really nothing Okofobia about that. And the same holds true, I think pretty much for all of the examples you just listed, unless something there escaped me, that it tends to be something that is trying to preserve the own civilization where the Jews are considered a foreign element.

That ties into what you mentioned before about how if a nation is confident enough in itself, then it can afford a Jewish element. And so that in that sense, anti-Semitism becomes a sign of the decline. That's true. But the thing is, we also find that early on in the civilization, I'll give you William I in England, 1290, he expels all of the Jews from England.

Why does he do that? You could say, OK, well, he's living at a time when they're feeling a certain uncertainty about their own society and so on. But it's true from a certain point of view, but you also have to remember that this is at a time when English nationhood is actually being formed and they're actually rising. And so part of the coalescing of a nation and the creation of these conservative principles that will then be safeguarded by nationalists and so on is precisely the expulsion of foreign elements.

So there, it's not so much that a civilization is collapsing. It's more that a civilization is rising. And so what I would say is that, yes, I think you're right, that anti-Semitism often becomes a sign of a lack of confidence in one's own civilization, but it can also be something that takes place earlier on in the civilization for that reason, because in order for a nation to be created in the first place, it has to get rid of certain elements. It has to coalesce.

And so what I would say is that this sort of middle state where one has become strong, but hasn't started to decline yet, one still has faith in one's own civilization, that is the sort of middle phase, somewhat more liberal, but still not ochophobic, where Jews are welcome because they are considered an asset to the civilization. And it's understood that they're not going to destroy everything. But one is still strong enough or one is still confident enough to allow that to be the case. So that's where I would place, if we're going to talk about general civilization trajectories, that's where I would place phyllo-Semitism, if you will, in this sort of middle section of a civilization development.

When it comes to these examples, I think you're right that yes, they are an expression of lack of confidence. And that's certainly true of Rome as well, when juvenile complains about Jewish influence. Yeah, soothsayers in Rome, that is from the perspective of a lack of confidence. He's talking about that because he does feel that things are going downhill.

So that's certainly true. But that's not ochophobic. So you could just say that it's certainly relevant in the civilization trajectory that I also talked about in the book, but specifically for ochophobia, I wouldn't say so much. Although that does indeed come in the modern areas.

So let's move on, because you brought up England and we miss talking about their utopianism. So how does that express itself? So the English tend to be somewhat less utopian in general in the history of ideas than the Germans and the French. It is hard to imagine them utopian.

Yeah, right. I guess they live their weather is too bad for them to dream about the dream of the modern state. They tend to be a little more practical in that sense. It's a bit of a cliche, but it tends to be true.

It's not a coincidence that the philosophy of utilitarianism started in England. It has certain precursors, but started in England and not in France, for example. It's a very unfrench way of thinking. Isn't it a form of utopianism?

You could say, yeah, so we're starting to use the word utopianism a bit more broadly, but you could say so in the sense, I mean, to go back to what you mentioned before about how certain, or what we talked about, when that, for example, certain people that you've interviewed in the past, they are positivists. And I mentioned, well, that's almost a form of utopianism in the sense that they think there's this one thing that's the solution. So in that sense, yes, I think you're right. That could be seen as a form of utopianism.

I think putting one's faith too much in any one thing is an expression, maybe not so much of utopianism strictly speaking, but a certain faith in a certain intellectual laziness, I would almost say. Well, I would argue that utilitarianism is utopian in the sense that, first of all, the people who suggest this way of making decisions, let's say, they are renouncing law given on principle and focus on outcome. And they focus on outcome for the most people, best outcome for the most people, right? Instead of how closely a decision would adhere to a principle.

So that sense, it would be a token in my view, but that might be a very broad definition. Yeah, no, but it makes sense. I mean, yeah, well, I think the definition is itself is less important, but what you say, I mean, I think it's true what you're saying, yes. So it's a very short jump to Marx.

Yeah, you would say a short step from consequentialism to Marxism. Okay. Because you focus on that. Right.

Yeah. Okay. That's, I have to think about that at the moment. Well, I'm not a philosopher, I'm asking you.

Yeah, you're right. Yeah, I think I think that might be a little too cruel to consequentialism. I would, the thing is, I would see consequentialism. I mean, I certainly see the connection.

I would just make the distinction that Marxism is political and consequentialism is ethical. So they kind of deal with somewhat different domains. No, obviously they're related. But Marxism, you could say, if I think the most you could say, if you want to make that connection would be to say that Marxism is consequentialism to the 10th power, maybe or something like that, consequentialism squared, maybe something like that.

Could make sense. Yeah. But the, when it comes to utopianism as a form of, as a form of positivism, we could certainly make the anti-Semitism connection there. And I think that's also why it comes across that why we see more of it one reason why we see more of it in modern times, because as we said before, positivism is more modern than, and relativism started a little earlier as I'm using the terms in the book.

And that's one other reason why anti-Semitism is not so much tied to you can see why relativism might be a little more friendly toward the Jews, obviously, because we have our truths and then the Jews have their truths and so on. So okay, we can sort of all get along so to speak. Whereas if you have positivism, which then comes more with the enlightenment, Jews become more dangerous because the Jews of course have to agree to, for all of us to, in order for all of us to achieve this higher human state. And the Jews were there particular local customs and sort of very- Most abandoned.

Exactly. And so we do see, so that's where anti-Semitism starts to become more relevant for homophobia and why we start to see some anti-Semitism among all the folks in France, I would say comes even more so later on in England, but you do have certain elements already in the French enlightenment because Envouter says some things. He's more focused on the questions than the Jews, but he does say some rather unpleasant things to say about the Jews as well, because again, the Jews are this sort of little noxious group. If you are the the elect people of God, then obviously- Well, they insist on being different.

If you want to hear it in a population, then you can't have people who insist on being different. And that's why the Romans were not particularly anti-Semitic. They were polytheistic, as you would say, relativists in that particular sense. And they only became anti-Semitic once the Jews started to rebel.

And so, in that sense, it's not that a connection to homophobia isn't really there, but we do see it in modern times in France. So where were we? I think we got- No, no, it's fine. We're heading in the right direction, I think, because we were talking about English exceptionalism, utopianism.

And then American utopianism, which is a bit more obvious, I suppose. Yeah, well, certainly now, yeah, absolutely. So the American, or the British still, the British is, the British utopianism is, I wouldn't even speak so much about a British utopianism, I guess, for that reason. I would say a certain of British, because I'm thinking now when, sort of, when Okofobia starts to set in, in the last couple of decades of the 19th century, it doesn't take that expression.

It's, if anything, it's more sort of in favor of, let's see, so, okay, sorry, I'm going to backtrack a little bit there. So British Okofobia, when it starts, it's not, it's sort of, it's a bit nadeless in the way, because it associates anti-Semitism with the ruling classes. In that sense, you could say that British Okofobia when it starts is, it's sort of, and this is also why the lower classes become involved in Okofobia for the first time in England, more so than was the case in France, because it also sort of pro-lower class is against the ruling classes of Britain, and who supposedly are in cahoots with the Jews to make war against the South Africans, against the Boers, and it's the regular, regular English folk who are suffering from it because of the old, because of this old inbred class of royals and the ruling elite and, and their Jewish capitalists, friends and so on. So that's more clearly anti-Semitic, and that's not utopian either, for obvious reasons.

And so I don't think that British utopianism is, is a particularly strong factor. It was much, French utopianism was a much stronger factor in that sense than it was in England. English, English anti-Semitism, Okofobia is more local in that sense. It has, it has, it doesn't have as great aspirations as French, as the beginnings of French, Okofobia and the beginnings of French anti-Semitism, at least, beginnings of French anti-Semitism in the Okofobia face of that civilization.

When it comes to the United States, it's more similar to France in that sense. French, sorry, American Okofobia and concomitant anti-Semitism really starts in the last third or so of the previous century. The, the Okofobes in the United States were not anti-Semitic in the beginning, and that's because the Jews were actually considered to be part of the oppressed class. This is, this is where your thesis is illustrated quite beautifully when I think when xenophobia, the upward trajectory or the civilization meets Okofobia on the downward trajectory.

Right. Yeah. You can sort of see them meld together. Yes.

Right. Yeah. So you have, you have, after World War II, it's really the left that is final Semitic for obvious reasons. There is quite a bit of anti-Semitism in the late 40s and 1950s in the United States, but it tends to come from the right, from the question right.

And it's really the left that is considered, that considers the Jews to be part of the civil rights movement, the civil rights movement, exactly, which tends to be fairly pro-Jewish. That of course changes the more powerful or the more powerful the Jews are perceived to be, obviously, most significantly with the Six-Day War, when the, when Israel is able to vanquish its enemies and suddenly shows that it's the strongest fighting force in that whole part of the world. That's when the divorce between the left and the Jews begins, if you will. Certainly for the, I don't swear to, but certainly in the United States.

And, and that's really when Okafobia comes into its own, because earlier in the United States, you had certain elements that were anti-American, but they were much smaller. Is particular cliques of intellectuals and certain writers like you think of the Beatniks, for example, certain expatriates in the 1920s, as well, certain American expatriates in the 1920s. But it's not until the late 60s and 70s that it becomes, that Okafobia becomes a mass movement. And that's of course also the time at which Israel rises in terms of its power.

And so there is a convergence there of Okafobia and anti-Semitism, and that has only grown stronger. Yeah, exactly. By, and now of course it's, it's in the open for everyone to see. But it's, that's a process that's now going back for about 50 years, a little more.

And so we certainly, the connection also corresponds to what you write in your book, because you say in your book, well, a nation becomes first cohesive and very strong and unified and a bit conformist, you might say. And at the time when America did this, the Jews didn't have the same rights as everyone else. And then you have the civil rights movements. The Jews are one of the first groups together with the African-Americans who, well, the Jews didn't have the same rights, but they weren't perceived to be equal to the white women.

Well, you couldn't get into any country club. Right. Yeah, exactly. That's why that joke about the fact that, you know, when you're invited to a country club and say, well, my kind isn't allowed over there.

It doesn't really work anymore, because now the right is, now Jews are allowed in the country clubs. And it's certain other elements, like my kind isn't allowed in that, you know, that's like, yeah, exactly. Of course, for Palestine or that left wing bar in Greenwich Village or whatever, that would be more difficult. So yeah, so that joke has changed now.

And yeah, so the, the, the, the connection between anti-Semitism and homophobia, which I guess is the larger point, is something that becomes stronger and stronger than the, the later on we get in history. It's Darston France, it's stronger in Britain, and strongest today. Now, of course, continues then to also to be strong in the United States and in France and elsewhere, but then it's also a little bit of American influence, because as we've seen in other Anselaire phenomena, talkophobia, as we mentioned last time, they tend to be hella cold, they become stronger and stronger with every iteration, more extreme with every iteration, and we see that certainly we in the United States are the latest iteration of this. And so it's sensory reason that justice orophobia is the most extreme.

So to our anti-Semitism is the most extreme, not talking now about, you know, Muslim-era immigrants, that's obviously a whole other element, but talking now about the native population of France or England or the United States, our okophobes also tend to be the most anti-Semitic, which makes sense from a, from historical perspective. Yeah, so now we're sitting in Sweden, you grew up here until you were 12 or 13? 14, yeah. 14, okay.

How much has it changed since you were a child? Sweden? Yes. So in one way, positive actually, I've told a number of people that I remember, I mean my child in Sweden seems like a different millennium, well, literally was a different millennium, but it feels like a eons ago.

But from what I remember, I remember Swedish people being sort of rather sour and depressed and not very helpful and rather unpleasant people. And now I come here as an adult 30 years later, and I find everyone to be so pleasant and smiling and willing to help if I'm asking for some where do I find such and such. I've actually been stunned by how nice I find the Swedes to be all of a sudden. So I've asked people, do I just remember incorrectly or has there really been a change?

And I think most Swedish people would do my spoken. They also perceive that people have actually become I. In my lifetime, it has definitely changed. Yeah, that's interesting.

Yeah. The social democracy of my youth was stifling. It was a truly extremely conformist, kind of backward, very materially well to do nation. And then we started letting in immigrants, and mainly from North African Middle East, some from Central Asia.

And now I would say close to 30% I think of Stockholm's population is immigrants. And this goes back to a little bit the tragic view of history that I talked about before, because of course it's nice that there has been that positive change in people are friendly or in so on, but at what cost? If it is at the cost of Sweden no longer being Sweden and Swedish or Kofobia having become so strong that that Swedish culture is no longer considered to be a thing of value to be preserved in any way. And that.

One Swedish I think historian said that there is no such thing and has never been a Swedish culture. I think I heard that. Yeah, exactly. Yeah.

And there was that which I mentioned right, I think on the first page of my book, the essay is commercial, that there is no such thing as a Swedish culture and everything that just last year Swedish State Television, which is our biggest and pretty much only television channel made a big documentary about the history of Sweden and the Swedes. And apparently the first Swedes were blacking. Yeah. Right.

Yeah. See the black blacking is conquering Russia. Yeah. Right.

Interesting. This is like Stone Age people. Yeah, right. Right.

Coming from the continent. Right. Yeah. Yeah.

It's more tan from exposure. Right. Exactly. A few houses to a few sunglasses.

Yeah. One doesn't know what to offer to I prefer to laugh, but it's and that's a thing. So at what cost exactly? I mean Swedish or Kofobia is one of the more extreme forms.

Yes, it is. And it's so strange because Belgium is in dire straits right now from taking in lots and lots of predominantly Muslim immigrants. But Belgium had colonies. Yeah.

Congo, which apparently was some sort of slaughter house for them. I think it's Britain. Sure. You can understand their self doubt and their bad conscience about the empire and colonizing half the world.

Sure. Fine. France. Same.

Sweden didn't really have colonies and we certainly didn't colonize North Africa or the Middle East. Yeah. To be sure. I think Swedish or Kofobia and you have your pulse on Swedish culture much better than I do.

So I'll stick here. Your opinion. But yeah, my impression is that Swedish Kofobia is a memetic phenomenon, basically. It's very imitative.

And you see this not just in Kofobia, but in many other aspects of Swedish culture. And this is something I did notice also as a child, namely that Swedish people, Swedish culture in general, does very much look abroad for inspiration and influence. All European cultures do. I mean, obviously America is culturally hugely influential still.

But if you compare the Swedes with the French, for example, the French, of course, are typically very proud of their own culture. And they try, there is certainly American French. Exactly. But they're actually springing in any word for a new invention.