Case Explained: ALEKSEY RUDERMAN, ARTURO SALDIVAR, and CHRIS POCKNELL v. KENOSHA COUNTY, WISCONSIN, et al

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-06-05 The seventh-circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of a civil rights suit alleging forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the term “whoever” in § 1589 encompasses Kenosha County, Wisconsin, rejecting the argument that the statute applies only to private entities or human trafficking. Relying on the Dictionary Act and precedents establishing counties as “persons” under federal civil rights statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that municipalities lack sovereign immunity from this federal criminal statute’s civil damages remedy. The court further ruled that the district court erred in limiting § 1589 to human trafficking based on the title of the larger Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, noting instead that the statutory text prohibits obtaining labor through threats of physical restraint or abuse of legal process. The opinion concluded that threatening civil immigration detainees with solitary confinement (a form of physical restraint) or loss of phone privileges to compel unpaid custodial work falls within the prohibitions of § 1589(a)(1) and § 1589(a)(3). Because the County did not argue that any statute or regulation authorized such forced labor for civil detainees, the court found the allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the district court to determine whether the plaintiffs can prove their allegations and to assess appropriate damages. The remand also instructs the lower court to consider the County’s argument regarding the unconstitutionally vague nature of the statute, a question the appellate court deemed inappropriate for initial resolution. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.