DIFTCL: Federal Narrative Summaries

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Ninth Circuit denied Amritpal Singh’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The court applied a substantial evidence standard to factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, and reviewed legal questions de novo. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination because Singh’s testimony contradicted itself and his written applications regarding non-trivial facts, while his narrative was more compelling than the documentary evidence he submitted. The court found the immigration judge reasonably rejected Singh’s explanation of confusion as an excuse for these inconsistencies, noting Singh had ample opportunity to clarify but instead reaffirmed the contradictions before retracting them. Because Singh waived any challenge to the agency’s finding that his documentary evidence failed to rehabilitate his testimony or independently meet his burden of proof, and because he cannot satisfy his burden of proof without credible testimony or sufficient corroboration, the petition was denied. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 1:20-CV-03501-RBJ) The Tenth Circuit denied Liberty Global, Inc.’s petition for panel rehearing and its request for rehearing en banc. The court granted pending motions for leave to file amicus briefs regarding the en banc consideration. Regarding the en banc request, the court transmitted the petition and response to all active judges for a poll, which failed to carry; consequently, the request was denied. Judges Hartz, Tymkovich, and Eid voted to grant en banc rehearing, with Judge Eid filing a dissent arguing that the panel majority’s interpretation of the economic substance doctrine under I.R.C. § 7701(o) improperly deferred to courts and the government rather than requiring a threshold relevancy determination based on common law application. The practical consequence is that the original panel decision denying Liberty Global’s tax deduction remains in full force and effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 5:25-CV-00535-SWS) The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Marquise Miller’s pro se civil rights complaint against Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell with prejudice. The appellate court upheld the dismissal based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, agreeing that Judge Mitchell’s order compelling Miller to attend a discovery conference in a separate lawsuit constituted a judicial act performed within her jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Consequently, Miller’s claims alleging she lacked legal authority were barred. The court also reviewed the district court’s denial of Miller’s motions to alter or amend judgment and for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b) for abuse of discretion, noting that Miller waived any argument regarding those denials by failing to explain why the district court’s reasoning was erroneous. The practical consequence is that the dismissal stands, barring Miller from pursuing further litigation against Judge Mitchell for these specific acts. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The first-circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s dismissal of Kyick Holdings, LLC’s petition contesting a notice of transferee liability for unpaid taxes. The court held that the IRS exercised reasonable diligence in determining the taxpayer’s mailing address by sending the notice to the address listed on the taxpayer’s most recent federal tax return, which satisfied statutory requirements even though the notice was returned by the Postal Service. Regarding the filing deadline in 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a), the court ruled that the ninety-day period is nonjurisdictional, rejecting prior First Circuit precedent that treated it as such based on the Supreme Court’s “clear statement” rule established in *Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner*. However, the court further held that despite being nonjurisdictional, the deadline is mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. The court reasoned that Congress explicitly provided specific exceptions and adjustments within the statute (such as extensions for notices mailed abroad or during holidays), indicating an intent to preclude open-ended equitable exceptions. Consequently, because the taxpayer filed its petition 143 days after the notice was mailed, the Tax Court lacked authority to hear the case, and the dismissal stands. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 1:22-cv-21735-RNS The eleventh-circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court held that an ERISA plaintiff is not required to identify an “apples-to-apples” comparator fund to establish loss causation in a breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding investment selection. The court applied the standard of review de novo and relied on its recent decision in *Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc.*, 111 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2024), which requires a plaintiff to prove that an investment was “objectively imprudent.” Under this standard, an investment is imprudent if it falls outside the “range of reasonable judgments a fiduciary may make,” such that a hypothetical prudent fiduciary with like aims would not have made the same choice. While comparator evidence can be relevant to demonstrate objective imprudence, particularly when used for quantitative analysis to control for differences in risk profiles and strategies, the court ruled that it is not always necessary. The determination of prudence is context-specific and may rely on qualitative evidence, such as a fund’s widespread unpopularity or negative industry ratings, or quantitative evidence relative to appropriate benchmarks, without mandating a direct comparison to an identical alternative investment. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the district court, which must consider the full record regarding the objective imprudence of the Russell Target Date Funds. The lower court is instructed to evaluate whether the unique features of those funds made them an objectively bad investment for the plan’s specific objectives, rather than dismissing the claim solely because the plaintiff failed to provide a direct “apples-to-apples” comparison with another target date fund. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 8:24-cr-00473-WFJ-NHA-5 The eleventh-circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under the standard established in *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), after conducting an independent review of the entire record. The court determined that no arguable issues of merit existed in the appeal, confirming counsel’s assessment that the case lacked legal grounds for reversal. Consequently, the court affirmed Duber Dario Torres Tapias’s conviction and sentence. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 0:21-cv-60125-RNS The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Circuitronix, LLC on Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co.’s claims and the jury verdict awarding damages to Circuitronix on its counterclaims. The court held that Benlida was precluded from asserting agency or alter-ego theories of liability against Circuitronix for debts owed by a separate corporate entity, Circuitronix-HK, because these theories were not pleaded in the complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and controlling precedent such as *Dukes v. Deaton* and *MSP Recovery Claims*, a plaintiff must provide fair notice of the grounds for its claims in the complaint; new legal theories cannot be raised for the first time at summary judgment or trial without amending the pleadings. Because Benlida failed to allege facts supporting that Circuitronix-HK was an agent or alter ego of Circuitronix, the district court correctly determined that Circuitronix could not be held vicariously liable for Circuitronix-Hk’s invoices under Florida law. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment on both the HK invoices and the Circuitronix invoices, as Benlida’s argument regarding “first-in-first-out” accounting relied entirely on the impermissible theory that payments made by Circuitronix could be applied to a separate corporate entity’s debt. Furthermore, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of Benlida’s expert testimony, which was based on the same unpleaded agency and alter-ego theories, rendering the testimony irrelevant to the counterclaims at trial. The practical consequence is that Circuitronix remains liable only for its own invoices, which it has already overpaid, while Benlida receives no recovery for the outstanding debts of Circuitronix-HK. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 5:23-CR-01389-MIS-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions on charges of sex trafficking and kidnapping while dismissing his appeal regarding a firearm possession charge. The court held that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss the charge of possessing a firearm while being a drug user or addict because he was not convicted or sentenced on that count after the district court granted a post-verdict dismissal of the specific charge. Under established precedent, a defendant generally cannot appeal the constitutionality of a statute absent a conviction or sentence, rendering the legal issue academic as if no charges had been made regarding that count. Additionally, the court rejected the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to the separate charge of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, noting that this argument is foreclosed by the circuit’s precedent in *United States v. Bondi*. Finally, the court ruled that Federal Rule of Evidence 413 permitted the admission of testimony regarding uncharged sexual assaults, clarifying that the rule applies to the circumstances of the alleged conduct rather than the specific statutory label of the charged offense, a position consistent with prior holdings in *United States v. Clay*. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:23-cv-00464-KKD-PBM The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Alabama Ethics Commission officials Byron Butler, Cynthia Raulston, and Thomas Albritton against police chiefs Ernest Finley and Jennifer Reaves. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their due process rights by fabricating evidence during an ethics investigation regarding a firearms qualification incident. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable jury could find that they acted with bad faith or fabricated evidence. Applying the standard that fabrication requires proof of intent to link the accused to a crime, the court found that the officials’ actions were based on good-faith beliefs supported by contemporaneous records. Specifically, the court noted that Department policy 2.311 remained active in the internal computer system and was cited in official communications and disciplinary forms at the time of the investigation, despite a purported rescission by policy 3.2.4. The officials’ reliance on City Attorney Stacy Bellinger’s representations regarding the policies and their mistaken belief that a memorandum attached the relevant policy were deemed honest mistakes rather than fabrication. Furthermore, the court found no evidence of bad faith in the presentation of a disciplinary form for Officer Richardson, as a similar form existed for another officer, validating the officials’ assertion that an officer had been disciplined under the active policy. As a result, the plaintiffs’ federal claims failed, and the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims stands. The judgment for the defendants is affirmed, leaving them immune from liability for their conduct during the investigation. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 8:23-cr-00110-CEH-AAS-1 The eleventh-circuit affirmed Barrett Purvis’s convictions for wire fraud and money laundering, holding that the district court properly instructed the jury on the doctrine of deliberate ignorance. The court applied the standard requiring evidence that a defendant was aware of a high probability that the fact in question existed and purposely contrived to avoid learning all the facts to maintain a defense against prosecution. The court found this standard met because Purvis’s shifting and evasive statements to law enforcement regarding his use of loan proceeds demonstrated awareness of a high probability that he could not spend the funds on personal expenses, and his decision to have an assistant complete the application while he spent only 32 seconds reviewing the agreement supported an inference that he deliberately avoided learning the specific restrictions. As a result, Purvis’s convictions stand and he remains subject to the sentence imposed by the district court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Fourth Circuit denied Greenbrier Minerals, LLC’s petition for review of the Benefits Review Board’s order affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s award of black lung benefits under 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-944. The court applied the substantial evidence standard, defining it as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and reviewed whether the Board’s legal conclusions were rational and consistent with applicable law. Finding that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s factual findings and that the decision was free of reversible error, the court denied the petition without oral argument, adopting the reasoning set forth in the Benefits Review Board’s opinion. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 1:22-cv-21997-CMA The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant-Appellant Joshua David Nicholas’s motions to set aside a default judgment and for reconsideration. The court first dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the February 4 order entering the default judgment, ruling that the appeal was untimely because no tolling motions were filed regarding that specific order. Consequently, the court limited its review to the June orders denying Nicholas’s Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) motions. The court applied a narrow scope of review for denials of Rule 60(b) motions, noting such appeals address only the propriety of the denial rather than the underlying judgment. While acknowledging that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, the court held that Nicholas failed to properly brief his arguments by not expressly challenging the specific grounds in the June orders or devoting discrete sections to Rules 60(b) and 59(e). The court determined that Nicholas abandoned any challenge to these denials because he raised no specific arguments under the relevant rules. Even assuming the challenges were not abandoned, the court found no error: Nicholas failed to demonstrate excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), failed to show a lack of notice or opportunity to be heard under Rule 60(b)(4), and failed to establish exceptional circumstances for the trading ban under Rule 60(b)(6). Additionally, the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion was not an abuse of discretion as it relied on arguments previously rejected. As a result, the district court’s orders are affirmed. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Fourth Circuit affirmed James Aaron Haburn’s conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and his resulting sentence. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court held that the district court committed no reversible error in finding officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and frisk Haburn, based on the vehicle matching the description of one involved in a recent shooting, the discovery of a bullet on the floorboard, and Haburn’s prior violent felony conviction. On sentencing, the court ruled that the district court did not clearly err in applying the attempted murder cross-reference under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, concluding that Haburn acted with the requisite mens rea after shooting an individual in the back from a moving vehicle following a fight. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part James Evans Hughes’s appeal from his conviction and sentence for distribution of methamphetamine. The court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal regarding all issues covered by the defendant’s valid appellate waiver contained within a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, while affirming any remaining issues not encompassed by that waiver. The court applied the plain error standard of review because Hughes failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, requiring him to show an error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. The court found no such error, concluding that the district court substantially complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 by ensuring Hughes’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis. Additionally, the court reviewed the appeal waiver de novo under the totality of the circumstances and determined it was valid and enforceable because Hughes knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal during the colloquy. The court further held that Anders counsel’s challenge to the reasonableness of the sentence fell squarely within the scope of this waiver, and no other meritorious grounds for appeal were found upon review of the entire record. As a practical consequence, the appeal is dismissed as to all issues covered by the plea agreement’s waiver, and the district court’s judgment is affirmed regarding any non-waived issues. The court also ordered that counsel must inform Hughes in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review and noted that oral argument was dispensed with. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The seventh-circuit affirmed the denial of Derek Fields’s motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The court held that Fields failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice required to succeed on his claim, even assuming arguendo that a late-breaking plea offer existed and that his trial counsel provided deficient advice regarding it. The court applied the two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in *Strickland v. Washington*, requiring a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Under the prejudice prong, Fields needed to prove by a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer had his counsel provided adequate advice, and that the court would have imposed a lower sentence as a result. The court found Fields’s claim failed on both counts: first, the record contained extensive evidence that Fields was adamantly opposed to any plea agreement involving imprisonment of 20 years or more, viewing such terms as “a lifetime sentence,” regardless of specific advice from his attorney; second, Fields could not show he would have received a lower sentence than the 43 years he currently serves, particularly because accepting a guilty plea would have waived his successful appeal regarding the invalidity of his § 924(c) conviction. Consequently, the court determined that the files and records conclusively showed Fields was entitled to no relief, meaning an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The practical consequence is that Fields’s motion for habeas relief remains denied, and his current sentence of 43 years’ imprisonment stands without further judicial review on this claim. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 5:08-CV-00832-R) The Tenth Circuit denied Brenda Evers Andrew’s petition for panel rehearing and her request for en banc rehearing, thereby affirming the denial of her federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ruled that Andrew failed to demonstrate that the admission of irrelevant, sex-based evidence at her trial rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause. In doing so, the panel applied the standard from *Payne v. Tennessee* and its progeny, specifically holding that relief is warranted only when evidence is “so unduly prejudicial” as to render a trial “fundamentally unfair.” The court concluded that Andrew’s challenge failed because she did not show the challenged evidence concerned central jury issues and because the evidence of guilt and aggravation was overwhelming. Additionally, the court determined that Andrew had abandoned her cumulative error claim and limited its review to ten specific testimonial passages preserved in the state court record. A dissenting judge argued that the panel’s standard improperly required irrelevant evidence to concern a central jury issue to be prejudicial, contending that such evidence is inherently prejudicial because it invites decision-making on prohibited grounds like sex stereotypes. Following this order, Andrew’s death sentence remains in effect, and the case is closed absent further Supreme Court intervention. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of A. Samuel Enloe’s False Claims Act (FCA) qui tam claims against Heritage Operations Group and Green Tree Pharmacy. The court held that Enloe failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the materiality standard required for FCA liability. The court applied the standard that an FCA plaintiff must allege with particularity that (1) the defendant made a statement to receive government money, (2) the statement was false, and (3) the defendant knew it was false. The court found Enloe’s complaint amounted to speculation resting on layers of assumptions rather than concrete factual allegations. Specifically, the court determined that Enloe failed to establish a clear violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), noting that federal regulations permit pharmacists to dispense Schedule II drugs in emergency situations upon receiving oral authorization, even if the pharmacist does not immediately review the prescription. The court further ruled that Enloe failed to plead materiality under *Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States*, as he did not allege that the government consistently refuses to pay claims based on the specific regulatory violations alleged, nor did he show that compliance with the CSA was a condition of payment that the government relied upon. As a practical consequence, Enloe’s appeal is dismissed, and the district court’s judgment dismissing his second amended complaint remains in effect. The court noted that while Enloe did not challenge the dismissal of his CSA and unjust enrichment claims on appeal, those claims were already properly dismissed because the CSA does not provide a private cause of action and the FCA failure precluded the unjust enrichment claim. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order requiring the return of two young children to Canada under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The court held that the children’s country of habitual residence was Canada at the time of their wrongful retention in August 2024, and that none of the respondent’s asserted affirmative defenses applied. The court applied the “totality of the circumstances” test established by the Supreme Court in *Monasky v. Taglieri* to determine habitual residence, focusing on facts existing as of the date of wrongful retention. The analysis weighed shared parental intent, noting that while the mother intended to settle permanently in the United States, the father did not share this intent and viewed their move as a trial period. The court also considered the temporary nature of the family’s E-2 non-immigrant visas, the anchoring of their economic base in Canada, the maintenance of Canadian driver’s licenses, and the strength of the children’s community ties in Quebec compared to Massachusetts. Regarding affirmative defenses, the court found that the “now-settled” doctrine was unavailable because the petition was filed within one year of the retention. The court further rejected claims of consent and acquiescence, determining that the father’s participation in temporary state court custody arrangements did not constitute a clear and unequivocal agreement to let the Massachusetts court determine final custody or a waiver of his rights under the Convention, particularly given his simultaneous efforts to seek the children’s return to Canada and his limited access to them due to the mother’s control over their passports and residence. As a result of this ruling, the judgment ordering the immediate return of the children to Canada is upheld, and the respondent must comply with the district court’s order to restore the status quo prior to the wrongful retention. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 5:24-cr-00067-MTT-CHW-1 The eleventh-circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions for obstructing the mails, assault upon a federal officer, aggravated assault upon a federal officer, and retaliating against a witness, as well as his 66-month sentence. The court applied de novo review to sufficiency of evidence challenges, requiring that the verdict be supported by reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Regarding the June incident, the court found sufficient evidence for forcible assault based on Franklin’s threats of bodily injury and his tractor’s proximity to the victim’s vehicle. For the December incident, the court held that a farming tractor equipped with a harrow constituted a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) and that the evidence supported aggravated assault despite Franklin’s claim of an accident or variance from the indictment. The court further determined that the failure to move for a directed verdict on the retaliation count required review only for a “manifest miscarriage of justice,” which was not met given the circumstantial evidence of Franklin’s racial animus and intent to retaliate. Additionally, the court applied but-for causation standards to uphold the jury’s finding that the offenses were committed because of the victim’s race under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(a). On sentencing, the court utilized the *Keene* doctrine, noting the district court expressly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of the procedural objection regarding the eight-level enhancement for obstruction to justice under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). Consequently, the court reviewed the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, finding the upward variance justified by the nature of the offenses and the racial motivation, thereby affirming the sentence without addressing the procedural guideline calculation error. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Walmart following a negligence trial where the plaintiff alleged she slipped on a plastic hanger in a parking lot cart corral. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) bifurcating the trial into liability and damages phases under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), (2) sequestering the plaintiff’s “attorney-in-fact” witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 615, or (3) excluding or limiting the testimony of two expert witnesses. Regarding jurisdiction, the court rejected Walmart’s argument that it lacked authority to review magistrate judge orders because the plaintiff failed to object within the 14-day deadline of Rule 72(a). The court reasoned that because the district judge addressed the merits of these issues in a subsequent order denying a motion for a new trial, the appellate court had jurisdiction to review those decisions. On the merits, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard to all challenged rulings. First, it found the bifurcation was proper to expedite and economize the trial, as many witnesses were only needed for the damages phase. Second, regarding the sequestration of the attorney-in-fact, the court determined that even if the exclusion was erroneous, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice because her legal team had ample time prior to trial to make alternate arrangements or seek permission for the witness’s presence. Third, concerning the expert testimony, the court applied the *Daubert* standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It upheld the exclusion of Russell Kendzior’s testimony because his opinions on causation were common-sense judgments within a lay juror’s knowledge and his opinions on industry standards addressed legal duties rather than specialized facts. The court further found any error regarding Kendzior was harmless because other evidence established Walmart’s breach of duty. Finally, the court affirmed the limitation of Andrew Rentschler’s testimony to the damages phase, ruling that his assumptions about causation were not probative and that his opinion on the mechanics of a fall was common knowledge unnecessary for expert explanation. The practical consequence is that the jury’s verdict in Walmart’s favor stands, and the plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed without relief. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Nicholas Peterson’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a federal search warrant execution. The court held that the state search warrants issued by Sarpy County judges in Nebraska for records held by Snap Inc. and Google in California were valid because Nebraska law expressly authorizes its county court judges to issue search warrants for service upon corporations located outside the state, specifically under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-812. The court rejected Peterson’s argument that these warrants violated the Fourth Amendment due to lack of territorial jurisdiction or non-compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, noting that Rule 41’s limitations apply only to federal magistrate judges, not state judges who possess the authority granted by their respective states. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if the warrants were invalid, the evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception established in *United States v. Leon*, as it was objectively reasonable for the investigating officer to rely on the warrants issued by a state judge with apparent jurisdiction. Consequently, the evidence obtained from Peterson’s devices and his subsequent statements remain admissible, and his conviction and 262-month sentence stand. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Third Circuit affirmed Jose Tavares’s conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and his 40-month prison sentence. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements from Tavares’s proffer session during the government’s case-in-chief because defense counsel’s opening statement affirmatively advanced a factual theory—that Tavares was an unwitting “sacrificial pawn” with no knowledge of the scheme—that directly contradicted his admissions made under the proffer agreement. The court clarified that while opening statements are not evidence, they constitute “arguments offered on [the defendant’s] behalf” sufficient to trigger a waiver provision allowing the government to rebut those arguments with prior inconsistent statements. Regarding the exclusion of character evidence, the court found no plain error in preventing Tavares from testifying about his lack of a criminal record under Federal Rule of Evidence 405, as such testimony regarding specific instances of conduct is inadmissible unless character is an essential element of the charge, which it was not for wire fraud conspiracy. The court also affirmed the denial of a mitigating role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, finding no clear error in the District Court’s determination that Tavares was an active and integral participant rather than substantially less culpable than the average participant. Finally, the court concluded the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting the District Court properly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and imposed a term within the advisory Guidelines range. The practical consequence is that Tavares’s conviction and sentence remain in effect, requiring him to serve the 40-month prison term and pay $570,077 in restitution as ordered by the District Court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and granted qualified immunity to Nurse Jessica J. Brady. The court held that the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, failed to demonstrate that it was clearly established that Brady’s conduct constituted deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The court applied the standard that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. To overcome this defense, the plaintiff must show that the official violated a clearly established right by acting with deliberate indifference, defined as a mental state akin to criminal recklessness, rather than mere negligence. The court found that Brady responded to all of McKee’s requests, authorized diet changes, reasonably denied bunk requests due to lack of documentation, and forwarded prescription records to a physician when her own license did not authorize prescribing medication. The court concluded that while Brady may have been negligent in relying on the detainee’s self-assessment or failing to act more aggressively, negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference, and there was no clearly established right requiring a nurse to monitor a physician’s treatment decisions or prescribe medication outside her scope of authority. As a result of this ruling, the case against Nurse Brady is dismissed at the summary judgment stage, and she is shielded from further liability for the alleged constitutional violations. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Eighth Circuit affirmed Anfernee Rondeau’s conviction for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2246(2)(D) and his sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdict, applying de novo review and viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government. The court found that a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Rondeau knowingly engaged in a sexual act with a minor in Indian Country based on the testimony of the victim’s witness (C.W.B.), the victim (C.A.) supported by expert testimony regarding child disclosure, and forensic evidence, despite Rondeau’s intoxication defense. Regarding the admission of evidence concerning Rondeau’s refusal to complete a scheduled polygraph test, the court applied plain error review because no objection was made at trial. The court determined that any potential error in permitting Agent Kane to testify about Rondeau’s decision to stop the examination or in the government’s rebuttal argument referencing that refusal did not affect Rondeau’s substantial rights or seriously impact the fairness of the proceedings. The court reasoned that the district court provided a curative instruction, the evidence of guilt was strong and extensive independent of the polygraph references, and the government’s closing argument was a fair response to the defense’s claims regarding coercion and the nature of the unrecorded interview. Consequently, the conviction stands, and no further relief is granted. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The eighth-circuit denied the petition for review filed by Salvadoran citizens and their children seeking asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and reinstatement of voluntary departure. The court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) correctly determined the Petitioners’ proposed particular social groups were not cognizable because they were impermissibly defined by the persecutory conduct itself, a legal conclusion reviewed de novo. Because the failure to establish a cognizable particular social group independently disposes of the asylum and withholding of removal claims, the court declined to address the Petitioners’ challenges regarding past or future persecution or the one-year time bar for filing asylum applications. Furthermore, the court found substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection, noting that the government does not acquiesce in torture merely by being aware of it and that relocation within El Salvador was possible. Finally, the court dismissed the request to reinstate voluntary departure for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which prohibits judicial review of judgments regarding the granting of voluntary departure relief. As a result, the BIA’s order denying all forms of relief and ordering removal to El Salvador remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 4:21-cv-08084- The ninth-circuit reversed the district court’s order granting class certification in a deceptive advertising action alleging that The Happy Group violated consumer protection laws by labeling eggs as “pasture raised” without adhering to specific industry standards. The panel held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because they lacked common proof of consumer deception. The court applied a rigorous analysis under Rule 23, including a *Daubert* review of expert testimony. It affirmed the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Morris’s expert opinion, which claimed that American Humane Association and Humane Farm Animal Care standards were the dominant industry definitions for “pasture raised,” finding his methodology unreliable as it relied on informal, non-scientific observations rather than rigorous survey data. Without this excluded testimony, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that a single or dominant industry standard existed or that a reasonable consumer would understand the labeling to imply compliance with such standards. Consequently, common questions of deception did not predominate over individual issues. Furthermore, the court ruled that the district court erred in certifying the class based on common issues of materiality and damages. The panel explained that under Rule 23(b)(3), a court must weigh common issues against individualized ones to determine if the common questions are important enough to justify class-wide treatment. Because deception is a central element of the plaintiffs’ claims, the lack of a classwide showing on deception could not be overcome by common questions regarding materiality and damages that were “unmoored from any classwide showing of actionable wrongdoing.” The practical consequence is that the district court’s certification order is vacated, and the case cannot proceed as a class action on the current record. The plaintiffs would need to demonstrate sufficient common proof of deception through reliable expert testimony or other evidence to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) before seeking certification again. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:23-cr-01527-SMM-1 The ninth-circuit dismissed Israel Castro’s appeal of his criminal conviction based on a valid appellate waiver contained in his plea agreement. The court applied the standard that an appeal waiver is enforceable if its language encompasses the grounds raised and was knowingly and voluntarily made, noting that jurisdiction to review such waivers is limited to determining whether they are valid or if an exception for a “miscarriage of justice” applies under *Hunter v. United States*. This exception requires showing that the sentence is marred by egregious error bringing the judicial system into disrepute. The court rejected Castro’s arguments that the district court impermissibly considered his nationality and failed to follow the specific procedural steps for applying a mitigated role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The court held that mere mention of nationality does not constitute an aggravating factor, and sentencing guideline determinations are waivable matters of law rather than procedural due process violations. Furthermore, regarding the role adjustment, the court ruled that district courts are not required to explicitly “tick off” every factor or mechanically analyze each element on the record, as there is a presumption that judges know the law and consider all relevant factors. Consequently, the alleged errors did not meet the high bar for a miscarriage of justice. The practical consequence is that Castro’s appeal is dismissed without review of the merits of his sentencing claims, effectively upholding the district court’s judgment. The court also granted Castro’s motions to lift the stay of proceedings and to supplement or correct the record as part of the dismissal process. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 3:18-cv-00087-MJP The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, rejecting Debra Rena Graciani’s claims of race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The court held that Graciani failed to demonstrate that her November 2016 termination was motivated by unlawful discrimination or retaliatory intent. Specifically, the panel found that Providence had a sound, non-discriminatory basis for firing Graciani based on her admitted access to a patient’s protected health information in 2014 and her role in an October 2016 incident where a patient died following improper handoff procedures. The court ruled that temporal proximity between alleged protected activities and the termination was insufficient to prove pretext because the documents cited by Graciani did not alert Providence to those activities, and there were equally likely non-discriminatory causes for her discharge. Regarding the jury verdict, the court determined that the district court did not err in refusing to find the defendants’ reasons pretextual or in limiting the scope of evidence presented at trial. The panel noted that Graciani was permitted to present evidence regarding a pattern of retaliation over an eighteen-month period and that the termination relied on objective facts rather than subjective bias. Furthermore, the court upheld the district court’s application of issue preclusion based on after-acquired evidence from state administrative proceedings. Citing *Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation* and *University of Tennessee v. Elliott*, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Alaska Superior Court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision to revoke Graciani’s license had preclusive effect in the federal civil action, preventing Graciani from disputing her admission that she deleted and falsified patient data. The practical consequence is that the jury verdict for the defendants stands, and Graciani’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims are dismissed with no relief granted. The case is closed, and the judgment against Graciani remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:14-cv-01968-RFB-NJK The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Karen Bodden’s habeas corpus petition regarding her claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a forensic biologist. The court held that this claim was procedurally defaulted and could not be excused under *Martinez v. Ryan* because the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) to introduce new evidence, specifically a declaration from Dr. Elizabeth Johnson, which was necessary to prove ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel. Citing *McLaughlin v. Oliver*, the court ruled that federal habeas courts may not consider new evidence on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless § 2254(e)(2) exceptions are met. Additionally, the court declined to consider Bodden’s alternative “actual innocence” argument raised for the first time in her reply brief, noting it was waived and beyond the scope of the certificate of appealability granted by the panel. As a result, the underlying claim fails, and the district court’s denial remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s revocation of Danny Roney’s conditional discharge from a federal mental-health facility under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g). The court held that while the statute permits revocation only for a failure to comply with the “prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment,” it does not allow revocation based on violations of ancillary conditions unrelated to that regimen. In applying this standard, the court determined that the specific condition Roney violated—a prohibition on possessing weapons—was an integral component of his prescribed treatment regimen rather than an ancillary restriction. The record established that Roney’s delusional disorder was linked to violent behavior involving weapons, and the facility director had certified the no-weapons condition as necessary to manage his illness and mitigate the risk he posed to the public. Consequently, violating this condition constituted a failure to comply with the prescribed regimen, justifying the revocation of his discharge and subsequent recommitment. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 8:22-cv-01977-MSS-SPF The eleventh-circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The court held that Florida Statute § 116.21 is not facially unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, but its application to Plaintiff Blake Warner was unconstitutional because the Hillsborough County Clerk failed to provide notice reasonably calculated to reach him. Specifically, the court found the Clerk’s reliance on publication in a predominantly Spanish-language newspaper serving less than 0.2% of the county and continued mailing of letters to an address where the Clerk had received thirteen return-to-sender notices was insufficient. The court applied the standard from *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.* and *Jones v. Flowers*, ruling that when the government knows or should know a property owner’s whereabouts, it must use more direct means of notice, such as the email address and phone number available in the state’s e-file system which the Clerk could have accessed. Furthermore, the court reversed the district court on Warner’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim. The court held that the Clerk effected an unconstitutional taking because there was no valid evidence that Warner abandoned his funds. Under Florida law, abandonment requires a voluntary intention to relinquish property, and the Clerk could not presume such intent based on Warner’s failure to respond to constitutionally deficient notice. Consequently, the taking of the funds for public use without just compensation violated the Fifth Amendment. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 1:20-cv-00706- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, holding that the agency was not required to conduct contract-specific National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review or Endangered Species Act (ESA) consultation before converting water service contracts into repayment contracts under the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act. The court applied the legal standard that NEPA and Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA require agency action only when the agency possesses discretion to consider environmental effects or take actions to benefit protected species. The panel interpreted 43 U.S.C. § 4011(a) of the WIIN Act as creating a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty for the Bureau to convert water service contracts upon a contractor’s request. The court reasoned that while the statute allows the agency to negotiate terms related to the payment structure, it expressly prohibits the modification of “other water service… contractual rights,” such as water delivery quantities or purposes. Because the WIIN Act stripped the Bureau of any discretion to alter non-payment terms to alleviate environmental harms during the conversion process, the court concluded that the conversion constitutes a nondiscretionary act exempt from specific NEPA and ESA requirements. As a result of this ruling, the Bureau may proceed with converting water service contracts under the WIIN Act without preparing individual environmental impact statements or initiating ESA consultations for each conversion. However, the court clarified that this holding does not exempt the resulting water deliveries from broader environmental review; such deliveries remain subject to programmatic environmental impact statements and biological opinions prepared as part of the ongoing operation of the Central Valley Project. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 3:23-cr-00017-SLG-KFR-1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Cornelius Leon William Smith for dealing firearms without a license, transferring a firearm to an out-of-state resident, and making false statements during firearm purchases. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence regarding the criminal history and conduct of Smith’s cousin, Andrew Williams, finding it relevant to prove Smith’s knowledge that he was selling firearms to individuals who could not lawfully possess them, and determining that the probative value of this limited testimony was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Additionally, the court rejected Smith’s challenge to the admission of two photographic exhibits (Exhibits 11 and 31) depicting recovered firearms, ruling that they were admissible to prove the recovery of the weapons and did not conflict with other evidentiary rulings regarding firearm modifications. Regarding the denial of a mistrial motion, the court applied the standard from *United States v. Lemus*, concluding that the district court’s curative instruction to disregard an agent’s irrelevant testimony about drug residue on a scale was sufficient to cure any prejudice, particularly given the jury’s acquittal on one count and the strong presumption that jurors follow such instructions. Consequently, Smith’s convictions stand and he remains subject to the sentence imposed by the district court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Kenneth Hunt on his Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim against Officer Dale Acosta and related defendants. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding specific proffered testimony regarding a judge’s standing order, as the excluded evidence was not critical enough to create a reasonable assurance that the jury would have reached a different conclusion, particularly since the officer presented abundant other evidence about the order and the basis for the stop. Furthermore, the court rejected the officer’s argument that attorney’s fees should be reduced due to Hunt’s rejection of a settlement offer, noting the offer was significantly lower than the final damages award, and upheld the district court’s reduction of counsel’s hourly rate from $425 to $350 based on local market rates for similar cases in the Eastern District of Arkansas. Consequently, the jury verdict awarding Hunt $25,000 in compensatory damages, $15,000 in punitive damages, and approximately $106,548.75 in attorney’s fees remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:25-cr-00240- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah from supervising the prosecutions of three defendants, holding that the Attorney General cannot bypass Senate confirmation requirements by designating an individual as a first assistant to a vacant U.S. Attorney office after the vacancy has already occurred. The court applied the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), specifically 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), ruling that the statute’s automatic succession provision applies only to the first assistant serving at the exact moment a vacancy arises, not to a person appointed to that role after the vacancy exists. Furthermore, the court held that the FVRA serves as the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official under 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a), thereby prohibiting the Attorney General from circumventing these limits by delegating all functions and duties of the U.S. Attorney to a single person via general delegation statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 515. The court dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals challenging the denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the question of whether Chattah was lawfully appointed is not inextricably intertwined with the remedial question of whether the indictments must be dismissed, as the latter does not require a resolution of the former. Consequently, the disqualification order stands, but the indictments remain valid and the cases proceed without dismissal. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:25-cr-00240- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah from supervising the prosecutions of three defendants in the District of Nevada, holding that the Attorney General cannot bypass Senate confirmation requirements by designating an individual as the first assistant to a vacant U.S. Attorney office after the vacancy has already occurred. The court applied the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), specifically 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), ruling that the statute’s automatic succession provision applies only to the first assistant who held that position at the precise moment the vacancy arose, not to a person appointed as first assistant after the office became vacant. Furthermore, the court held that the FVRA is the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions of a Senate-confirmed office under 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a), thereby prohibiting the Attorney General from circumventing the Act by delegating all powers and duties of the U.S. Attorney to a single individual via general delegation statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 515. The court dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals challenging the denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the legal questions regarding Chattah’s appointment authority and the appropriate remedy for an unlawful appointment are not inextricably intertwined, as resolving one does not require resolving the other. As a practical consequence, the disqualification order stands, preventing Chattah from supervising the prosecutions, while the indictments remain valid and the cases proceed without dismissal based on the appointment defect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:25-cr-00240- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah from supervising the prosecutions of three defendants in the District of Nevada, holding that the Attorney General cannot bypass Senate confirmation requirements by designating an individual as the first assistant to a vacant U.S. Attorney office after the vacancy has already occurred. The court ruled that under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), specifically 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), the automatic succession of a first assistant applies only to the individual holding that position at the precise moment the vacancy arises, not to someone appointed as first assistant after the office becomes vacant. Furthermore, the court held that the Attorney General cannot create a de facto Acting U.S. Attorney by delegating all functions and duties of the office to a single person, as the FVRA serves as the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official under 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a), prohibiting general delegation statutes from being used to circumvent these statutory limits. The court dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals challenging the denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments, concluding that it lacks appellate jurisdiction because the question of whether Chattah was lawfully appointed does not dictate the remedy for an unlawful appointment, meaning the issues are not inextricably intertwined and review of one order does not require review of the other. Consequently, the disqualification order stands, but the indictments remain valid as the district court correctly determined that Assistant U.S. Attorneys derived their authority from the Attorney General rather than the Acting U.S. Attorney. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:20-cv-00108-SCJ The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a Title VII race discrimination case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Robinson failed to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, specifically concluding that her proposed comparators were not similarly situated and that there was no evidence indicating the reasons given for denying her a raise and title change were pretextual. Additionally, the court rejected Robinson’s argument that she presented a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination through circumstantial evidence and found no reversible error regarding the district court’s decision to admit the defendant’s declaration despite alleged contradictions with deposition testimony. As a result, the judgment in favor of the defendants stands, and the appeal is dismissed without further proceedings. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 3:21-cr-00062-MAH-1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Rolando Hernandez-Zamora’s conviction for cyberstalking in violation of a protective order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(A) and (B) and 2261(b)(6). The court reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding the admission of Hernandez-Zamora’s two prior assault convictions for abuse of discretion, applying Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) and Rule 403. Regarding Rule 404(b)(2), the court held that the prior convictions were admissible to prove intent and mindset, rejecting the appellant’s arguments that the evidence was too remote in time or insufficiently similar to the charged offense. Citing *United States v. Johnson* and *United States v. Berckmann*, the panel determined that because the prior acts involved the same victim and occurred within a decade-long course of conduct, they were sufficiently similar to shed light on the defendant’s intent, regardless of the passage of time. Regarding Rule 403, the court found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The panel noted that the evidence was directly connected to the elements of the crime and that the district court had issued an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury regarding the proper purpose of the prior convictions. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the evidence was needlessly cumulative, finding it demonstrated a specific course of conduct rather than mere repetition. The practical consequence is that Hernandez-Zamora’s conviction stands, and he remains subject to the sentence imposed by the district court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:25-cr-00240- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah from supervising the prosecutions of three defendants in the District of Nevada, holding that the Attorney General cannot bypass Senate confirmation requirements by designating an individual as the first assistant to a vacant U.S. Attorney office solely to trigger automatic succession under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA). The court ruled that 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1) applies only to a first assistant who held that position at the exact moment the vacancy arose, not to someone appointed after the vacancy occurred. Furthermore, the court held that the FVRA serves as the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official under 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a), prohibiting the Attorney General from delegating all functions and duties of a vacant U.S. Attorney office to a single person via general delegation statutes like 28 U.S.C. § 515 to create a de facto Acting U.S. Attorney. The court dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals challenging the denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the validity of Chattah’s appointment does not dictate the appropriate remedy and that the issues are not inextricably intertwined. As a practical consequence, the disqualification order stands, barring Chattah from supervising these cases, while the defendants’ indictments remain valid and the criminal proceedings continue without dismissal. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-17 Docket: 2:25-cr-00240- The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order disqualifying Sigal Chattah from supervising the prosecutions of three defendants, holding that the Attorney General cannot bypass Senate confirmation requirements by designating an individual as a first assistant to a vacant U.S. Attorney office after the vacancy has already occurred. The court ruled that under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), the automatic succession provision for a “first assistant” applies only to the person holding that specific position at the exact moment the vacancy arises; it does not permit the executive branch to appoint a new first assistant after the fact and immediately elevate them to Acting U.S. Attorney. Furthermore, the court held that the FVRA serves as the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the duties of such an office, thereby prohibiting the Attorney General from delegating all functions and powers of the U.S. Attorney to a single person to create a de facto appointment. The panel dismissed the defendants’ cross-appeals challenging the denial of their motions to dismiss the indictments for lack of appellate jurisdiction, determining that the validity of Chattah’s appointment is not inextricably intertwined with the appropriate remedy for such an appointment, and thus reviewing one order does not require reviewing the other. As a practical consequence, the disqualification order stands, preventing Chattah from supervising these cases, while the indictments remain valid and the prosecutions may proceed under Assistant U.S. Attorneys who derive their authority directly from the Attorney General rather than through Chattah’s supervision. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 The sixth-circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc in *United States v. Benson*. The original panel concluded that the Department of Justice failed to obtain Michigan’s unredacted voter file because the state Secretary of State did not “come into possession” of the aggregate file under Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (52 U.S.C. § 20701), as the record was internally generated by state officials, and because the written demand for records did not contain both a legal basis and factual purpose in a single letter as required by 52 U.S.C. § 20703. The full court found that less than a majority of judges voted in favor of rehearing, noting that the issues raised were fully considered by the original panel. The practical consequence is that the panel’s decision affirming the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss stands. The United States may attempt to comply with the procedural requirements identified by the panel—specifically by issuing a new letter unambiguously requesting individual underlying records and clarifying the basis and purpose in a single document—but the current ruling prevents the immediate production of the statewide voter file under the specific demand made. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 The federal-circuit dismissed the petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board because the petitioner failed to file the brief required by Federal Circuit Rule 31(d) within the time permitted. The court ordered the dismissal based on the petitioner’s failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules, resulting in the termination of the appeal without a decision on the merits. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 The Third Circuit vacated the stay of removal that had been pending for Petitioner Jose Arcenio Aristy-Rosa and denied his motion to hold the proceedings in abeyance. The court held that the Petitioner failed to satisfy the four-factor test established in *Nken v. Holder* for obtaining a stay of removal, specifically finding he could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Regarding the likelihood of success, the court determined the Petitioner failed to address critical procedural barriers to his motions for statutory reconsideration and reopening under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) and (7). The court noted that the Petitioner did not argue against applicable time bars, failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling despite years of delay, and offered no jurisdictional basis for reviewing the BIA’s denial of his “sua sponte” reopening motion. Furthermore, the court found that relying on a Second Circuit decision (*United States v. Minter*) as a change in law was insufficient without addressing these independent statutory impediments. Regarding irreparable harm, the court ruled that the Petitioner’s claims were speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court rejected arguments regarding family separation and potential removal at a scheduled meeting with DHS, noting that removal is not categorically irreparable and that the Immigration and Nationality Act allows for facilitated return if an alien prevails on appeal. The court also dismissed reliance on DHS Directive 11061.1 as insufficient to abrogate binding precedent regarding the ability of removed aliens to seek relief. Finally, the court found that the public interest and the Executive Branch’s interest in finality favored vacating the stay, particularly given the Petitioner’s history of prolonged litigation and alleged abuse of immigration processes over more than 15 years. The court also denied the motion for abeyance because the new collateral attack on the underlying state conviction appeared to be a dilatory tactic unrelated to the merits of the federal removal order, as state expunctions do not automatically negate federal removability absent a defect in the criminal proceeding itself. The practical consequence is that the stay of removal is vacated effective immediately, allowing the Executive Branch to proceed with enforcing the final order of removal while the underlying petition for review on the merits remains pending. A separate opinion addressing the substantive challenges to the BIA’s denial of reopening and reconsideration will follow. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 Docket: 1:24-cr-00063-JPB-JEM-1 The eleventh-circuit affirmed the defendant’s 35-month and 2-day sentence for illegal reentry following removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2). The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to review the district court’s discretionary decision to deny a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, comment. (n.6), because the record indicated the district court understood it possessed the authority to depart but chose not to exercise that discretion. Regarding the defendant’s claim of substantive unreasonableness, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the two-step review process established in *United States v. Trailer*. The court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion because it properly considered all relevant sentencing factors, including the defendant’s criminal history and personal circumstances, and imposed a sentence within the advisory guideline range that was well below the statutory maximum. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 Docket: 1:23-CR-01485-WJ-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed Nathen Garley’s 240-month federal prison sentence, which was imposed consecutively to an anticipated state murder sentence. The court rejected Garley’s challenges regarding both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Regarding the procedural challenge, the court held that Garley failed to demonstrate plain error in the district court’s refusal to apply U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), which mandates concurrent sentences when a state term of imprisonment is anticipated for “relevant conduct.” The appellate court found no clear or obvious error because the district court correctly treated Garley’s state murder conviction as criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4) rather than as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. The court reasoned that the state offenses were not sufficiently related to the federal fentanyl offense to qualify as relevant conduct, noting they involved different crimes (murder versus drug distribution) without a common scheme or plan, and thus did not meet the “similarity” or “regularity” factors required for such a determination. Regarding the substantive challenge, the court found the 100% upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range of 120 to 135 months was reasonable under an abuse of discretion standard. The district court provided a cogent explanation based on the totality of circumstances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), specifically citing the dangerousness of fentanyl, the “illogical” treatment of fentanyl compared to methamphetamine in the Guidelines, and Garley’s “serious crime spree” involving the murder of an 11-year-old boy just one week prior to his federal arrest. The appellate court declined to reweigh these factors, concluding the district court’s decision fell within the realm of rationally available choices. As a result of this decision, Garley’s sentence of 240 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release remains in effect and must be served consecutively to his state sentence. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 The First Circuit granted the government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal in part, but denied it in part regarding a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) partial final judgment entered by the district court in favor of plaintiffs challenging three immigration policies under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court applied the four-factor test established in *Nken v. Holder*, which requires a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury absent a stay, substantial injury to other parties, and consideration of the public interest. After reviewing the government’s arguments regarding agency action, finality, and ripeness, the court concluded that the government failed to meet its burden for two of the challenged policies but succeeded in demonstrating entitlement to a stay only for the “Comprehensive Re-Review Policy,” which directs USCIS personnel to re-review approved benefit requests for aliens from certain countries who entered the United States on or after January 20, 2021. Consequently, the stay is limited exclusively to that specific policy, while the district court’s judgment regarding the other two policies remains in effect and the government’s request for a broader stay is denied. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 Docket: 1:19-CV-02811-WJM-KAS) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (ATS) on its breach-of-contract claims and against Flatiron Constructors, Inc.’s joint venture counterclaims. The appellate court rejected the joint venture’s arguments that four specific district court rulings warranted a new trial. First, the court held that the district court did not err in denying the joint venture’s motion for judgment against itself on ATS’s breach-of-contract claim. Applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez*, the Tenth Circuit determined that an unaccepted offer of judgment does not render a plaintiff’s case constitutionally moot under Article III, regardless of whether the defendant seeks to force a settlement or assumes the role of plaintiff. Consequently, ATS retained a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, and the district court acted within its discretion by allowing the claim to proceed to trial rather than forcing a settlement on an unwilling party. Second, the court affirmed the denial of the joint venture’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Reviewing de novo, the court found that the evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that the joint venture waived the subcontract’s requirement to submit change orders to the Design Change Control Board through its conduct, including submitting an order without approval and later shelving others for litigation resolution. Additionally, the court held there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the proposed changes were outside the scope of the original work, even if some specific chart descriptions were missing, based on project manager testimony regarding “additional work.” Third, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court clarified that while Colorado law implies this duty in contracts allowing for discretion, it is not an inherent element of every breach-of-contract claim. Furthermore, the joint venture failed to preserve the theory because it was not raised in the final pretrial order, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify the order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) to prevent manifest injustice given the significant delay in raising the issue. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of the joint venture’s motion to add fraud counterclaims one year after the final pretrial order was entered. Applying the abuse of discretion standard and the “manifest injustice” test under Rule 16(e), the appellate court found that the joint venture failed to demonstrate diligence or good faith, having waited sixteen months after discovering alleged facts to plead fraud. The court also agreed with the district court’s finding that allowing the new claims would cause substantial prejudice to ATS, which had spent years preparing for a breach-of-contract trial rather than a fraud case, and that reopening discovery would disrupt the orderly and efficient administration of justice. The practical consequence is that the jury verdict awarding ATS $5.259 million in compensatory damages, plus interest, stands as final, and the joint venture’s counterclaims for breach of contract and teaming agreement are dismissed. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 The Tenth Circuit denied Brunel Ntwari’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The court applied the substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s factual findings, requiring that the petitioner demonstrate the evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the agency’s conclusion. The court rejected Ntwari’s arguments on two primary grounds. First, it held that it could not consider new affidavits submitted after the BIA decision because judicial review is strictly limited to the administrative record on which the removal order is based under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). Second, the court found the BIA did not err by treating the lack of corroboration as dispositive despite finding Ntwari generally credible; the immigration judge reasonably determined that Ntwari’s testimony contained implausibilities and inconsistencies, rendering it insufficient to meet his burden of proof without additional evidence. As a result of this denial, the order of removal issued by the immigration judge remains in effect, and Ntwari is subject to deportation. The court granted his motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees but affirmed the agency’s decision denying relief. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-08-14 Docket: 1:22-cv-03985-SDG The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in a premises-liability action arising from a plaintiff’s fall on an apartment staircase. The court held that even if the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to two defendants (a managing member and his company) by finding they owed no duty of care, such error was harmless under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61. The court applied the standard for harmless error, which requires determining whether an error affected a party’s substantial rights. Relying on *Perrine v. Fredericks* and *Thomas v. Whitworth*, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs had the full opportunity to present their case regarding these defendants to the jury, as the liability theories and evidence were identical for all four remaining defendants. Because the jury returned a verdict against the plaintiffs on their claims against the two remaining defendants (the property owner and the property manager), and the plaintiffs offered no evidence suggesting the jury would have reached a different result had the other two defendants remained in the case, the court concluded the error had little or no impact on the plaintiffs’ substantive rights. The practical consequence is that the judgment entered by the district court in favor of the defendants stands, and the plaintiffs’ appeal is dismissed with no further relief granted. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.