DIFTCL: Federal Narrative Summaries

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:22-CV-00033-JB-JFR) The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a Federal Tort Claims Act medical malpractice case. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiffs’ causation expert, Dr. Bruce Polsky, as a sanction for repeated violations of court orders and failure to comply with discovery obligations. The court applied the five-factor test established in *Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds* to evaluate the exclusion sanction, finding that: (1) the defendants suffered actual prejudice due to wasted time and lost settlement opportunities; (2) the plaintiffs’ conduct interfered with the judicial process by causing months of delay; (3) the plaintiffs were culpable for willful noncompliance with court orders, even absent bad faith; (4) the plaintiffs had constructive notice that failure to comply could lead to dismissal or exclusion; and (5) lesser sanctions were insufficient given the history of noncompliance. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of a substitute expert, Dr. Michelle Harkins, ruling that her untimely affidavit did not cure the lack of admissible expert testimony required under New Mexico law to prove causation in a medical malpractice claim. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims are dismissed with prejudice because they failed to produce the essential expert evidence necessary to establish causation, leaving no genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:23-CV-02792-GPG) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees to Joshua Savelkoul under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The court held that Savelkoul did not qualify as a “prevailing party” because the district court’s remand of his Purple Heart application to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records was based on new evidence rather than an error in the agency’s administrative proceedings. Under *Buckhannon* and related precedent, a remand that merely instructs an agency to reconsider a claim with additional evidence does not constitute relief on the merits or materially alter the legal relationship between the parties without a judicial finding of agency error. Furthermore, the court determined that the government’s position was “substantially justified” because its initial denial and subsequent litigation stance were reasonable given the sparse and ambiguous medical records available at the time. The Army’s reliance on those records to conclude Savelkoul’s injury did not meet the statutory requirement for treatment by a medical officer satisfied the EAJA’s reasonableness standard, even though the position was later found to be incorrect after the introduction of new evidence. Consequently, Savelkoul is not entitled to recover his legal fees, and the district court’s judgment denying his motion remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The First Circuit affirmed Rey David Fulcar’s three federal convictions and his sentences, holding that while the District Court erred in applying the career offender sentencing enhancement based on a prior state conviction, such error was harmless. The court determined that the term “controlled substance” within the career offender guideline refers exclusively to substances controlled under federal law at the time of the defendant’s federal sentencing, not state law or the time of the prior conviction. Consequently, Fulcar’s 2008 Massachusetts conviction for possession with intent to distribute a substance defined as “cocaine” (which included ioflupane) did not qualify because ioflupane had been removed from the federal Controlled Substances Act schedules by the time of his federal sentencing. Additionally, the court rejected Fulcar’s challenges to his guilty pleas and Second Amendment arguments regarding his firearm possession conviction, finding that he failed to preserve a claim regarding Rule 11 warnings for plain error review and waived his Second Amendment argument by failing to develop it in his appellate brief. Because the District Court explicitly stated at sentencing that it would have imposed the same 96-month prison term regardless of the Guidelines calculation, the court concluded that the erroneous application of the career offender guideline did not affect Fulcar’s substantial rights or the fairness of the proceedings. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:22-CV-00581-CNS-NRN) The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the United States Election Integrity Plan (USEIP) as a defendant and its grant of judgment on partial findings in favor of the individual defendants, vacating the final judgment and remanding the case for a new trial. The court held that unincorporated associations qualify as “persons” who may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), rejecting the district court’s reliance on *Lippoldt v. Cole* to exclude them from liability under those statutes. The appellate panel reasoned that while *Lippoldt* correctly interpreted “person” in § 1983 to exclude unincorporated associations, the text, legislative history, and distinct purposes of § 1985 and the VRA demonstrate a congressional intent to include such entities as potential defendants for conspiracies and intimidation. The court further found that the district court abused its discretion by excluding video evidence of defendant Shawn Smith’s public remarks and by limiting the scope of evidence regarding USEIP’s organizational activities, which prevented the plaintiffs from being “fully heard” on the issue of voter intimidation. Consequently, the dismissal of USEIP was deemed reversible error affecting substantial rights, necessitating a new trial where the organization can be properly included as a defendant. The court also dismissed the individual defendants’ separate appeal regarding attorney fees as moot due to the vacatur of the underlying judgment. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 2:25-CR-00066-KG-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment imposing a total sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment on Jose Socorro Pantoja-Hernandez for illegal reentry and a supervised release violation. The court applied a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to review the defendant’s challenge regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because both sentences fell within the correctly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines ranges, they were presumed reasonable, placing a heavy burden on the appellant to rebut that presumption. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that his placement in Criminal History Category VI created an unwarranted disparity under § 3553(a)(6), noting that Category VI applies to defendants with at least 13 criminal history points regardless of whether offenses are violent, and finding no evidence presented by the defendant showing actual sentencing disparities compared to similarly situated offenders. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the parties’ recommended lower sentences, as sentencing courts are not bound by such recommendations and must exercise independent judgment based on the statutory factors. Additionally, the court determined that any procedural argument regarding the district court’s failure to explicitly discuss sentence disparities was not properly before it, as the appeal challenged only substantive reasonableness, and the district court’s general consideration of § 3553(a) factors was sufficient for within-Guidelines sentences. As a result of this decision, the defendant’s convictions and sentences remain in effect, and he must serve the imposed term of imprisonment. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 4:24-CR-00406-GKF-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, rejecting Defendant Kyle Thomas Smith’s as-applied constitutional challenge to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that Smith’s appeal lacks merit because Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent foreclose his argument. Specifically, the panel relied on its decision in *Vincent v. Bondi*, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025) (“Vincent III”), which reaffirmed that the Second Amendment does not render § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional under the framework established by *United States v. McCane* and clarified by *United States v. Rahimi*. The court further noted that Smith’s position was already foreclosed by *Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis*, 121 F.4th 96 (10th Cir. 2024), and *United States v. Warner*, 131 F.4th 1137 (10th Cir. 2025). Consequently, the conviction and the sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release remain in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 6:24-CV-01073-DDC-ADM) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ class-action claims, holding that the Natural Gas Act (NGA) field-preempts state-law claims brought under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) against natural gas wholesalers. The court determined that the NGA occupies the field of matters relating to wholesale sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, granting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exclusive jurisdiction over these transactions. Applying the “direct-target” test established by the Supreme Court in *Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.*, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit directly targets interstate wholesale transactions between the defendants and local distributors, rather than retail sales or non-jurisdictional marketplace conditions. The court distinguished this case from *Oneok*, noting that while *Oneok* involved state laws applied to retail rates affected by background market conditions, the claims here specifically challenge the reasonableness of wholesale prices set within FERC’s exclusive regulatory authority. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ allegations that wholesalers profiteered during Winter Storm Uri are barred because they seek to regulate conduct exclusively reserved for federal oversight. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the wholesalers are invalid and cannot proceed in state or federal court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:24-CV-00423-CNS-MDB) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Estate’s § 1983 claims against police officer Sean Reed and paramedic Nicholas Fischer. The court held that Fischer is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim because the Estate failed to demonstrate that his right to be free from such force was “clearly established” at the time of the incident. Applying the standard that a right is clearly established only if existing precedent places the constitutional question beyond debate, the court found that prior Tenth Circuit cases, including *Weigel v. Broad*, involved materially different conduct where force was used for significantly longer periods after a suspect was subdued. In this instance, Fischer’s use of force lasted approximately 81 seconds while Reed applied handcuffs to Dizmang, who was actively fleeing and struggling; thus, the law did not provide fair notice that such restraint constituted excessive force. Regarding the failure-to-intervene claim against Reed, the court affirmed dismissal because the Estate waived its challenge by failing to defend the original Fourth Amendment theory on appeal, instead attempting to argue a new Fourteenth Amendment custodial duty theory for the first time. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim as abandoned, noting that the Estate failed to address Fischer’s qualified immunity defense regarding this specific federal claim in its response briefs, having only argued state-law tort immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. The practical consequence is that the judgment of the district court is affirmed, resulting in the dismissal of all federal constitutional claims against the defendants with prejudice on qualified immunity and abandonment grounds. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 4:24-CR-00121-SEH-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding Defendant Phillip Eugene Wallace, Jr.’s conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that Wallace’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the statute lacks merit because Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent foreclose his arguments. Specifically, the court relied on its prior decision in *Vincent v. Bondi*, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025), which reaffirmed that the Second Amendment does not render § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional for felons, and noted that this holding remains valid in light of *United States v. Rahimi*, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The court also cited *Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis* and *United States v. Warner* as controlling authority. Consequently, Wallace’s conviction and the district court’s sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release remain in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because a settlement agreement between the parties ended the controversy required for Article III jurisdiction. The court applied the standard that an actual controversy must exist at all stages of review, noting that while a party’s lack of interest does not always bar adjudication, the case becomes moot when the appellant voluntarily settles the dispute and precludes the opposing party from having a stake in the outcome. Specifically, the agreement granted Trustpilot a worldwide license to the patent in exchange for a settlement fee, resolving the infringement claims that formed the basis of the lawsuit. Although the agreement allowed Trustpilot to participate in the appeal and contained recitals acknowledging prior disagreements, the court found these provisions insufficient to maintain a live controversy given that the underlying claims were settled and Trustpilot had no financial stake tied to the appeal’s outcome. As a result, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to any other actions, costs are not awarded, and the district court’s judgment regarding patent invalidity remains unreviewed by this court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of DesOrmeaux’s Title VII and ADA retaliation claims (Counts I and III) because he failed to preserve arguments regarding protected activity and but-for causation by failing to address them substantively in his district court opposition brief, resulting in waiver. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Count IV (perceived disability discrimination) because DesOrmeaux waived appellate review of that specific claim by not presenting distinct arguments differentiating it from the precedent set in *Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC*. However, the court reversed summary judgment on Counts II, V, and VI (ADA failure to accommodate and state law claims), holding that the district court erred in applying *Odell* as a matter of law without resolving material factual disputes regarding whether DesOrmeaux’s specific accommodation request—relying on his immunity status rather than scheduling modifications—was “inextricably intertwined” with the Collective Bargaining Agreement under the Railway Labor Act. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion to allow development of the record concerning the specific nature of the requested accommodation and its potential impact on the CBA’s seniority-bidding system. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 4:24-CR-00276-SEH-1) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant D-Rayle Montey Nelson’s motion to dismiss his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on an as-applied constitutional challenge, relying on Supreme Court precedent and prior Tenth Circuit decisions such as Vincent v. Garland (Vincent III), Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, and United States v. Warner. These rulings uphold the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, under the Second Amendment. Consequently, Defendant’s appeal is without merit, and his conviction stands; he will serve the imposed sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Louisiana, holding that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law and does not violate the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, or the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vagueness. The court applied a presumption against preemption, reasoning that public health and consumer protection are traditional areas of state police power and that Congress did not clearly manifest an intent to occupy the field of drug distribution logistics or contract pharmacy relationships under the Section 340B Drug Pricing Program (42 U.S.C. § 256b). The court found no conflict preemption because Act 358 regulates conduct distinct from the federal enforcement scheme, and no obstacle preemption because the state law advances the federal goal of ensuring access to discounted drugs for vulnerable populations without altering the statutory price ceiling or the relationship between manufacturers and covered entities. Regarding constitutional challenges, the court held that Act 358 does not effect a physical or regulatory taking because it imposes only a negative obligation of non-interference rather than compelling the transfer of property, and it does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause because the statute regulates relationships to which the manufacturers were not parties and does not alter the terms of their Pharmaceutical Pricing Agreements. Finally, the court rejected the vagueness challenge, concluding that the term “interfere” is sufficiently clear when read in context with neighboring words like “deny,” “restrict,” and “prohibit.” The practical consequence is that Louisiana’s Act 358 remains in effect, prohibiting drug manufacturers from interfering with covered entities’ use of contract pharmacies to dispense discounted drugs. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit granted the Government’s motion for summary affirmance and denied its alternative motion for an extension of time, affirming the district court’s judgment imposing a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment and one year of supervised release on Juan David Padilla-Perez for illegal reentry. The court held that the defendant’s challenge to a supervised release condition—which authorized a probation officer to require notification to a third party if the officer determined the defendant posed a risk—was foreclosed by binding circuit precedent established in *United States v. Mejia-Banegas*, 32 F.4th 450 (5th Cir. 2022). Although Padilla-Perez conceded that his argument was legally foreclosed, he sought only to preserve the issue for future review; consequently, the court applied the summary affirmance standard under *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis*, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969), and affirmed the judgment without further briefing or oral argument. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 9:25-cr-80102-DMM-1 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Rodzebies Smith’s conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), granting the government’s motion for summary affirmance. The court held that Smith’s Second Amendment challenge to the statute is foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, specifically *United States v. Rozier* and *United States v. Dubois*. Applying the standard of review for summary disposition, the court determined that the government’s position was “clearly right as a matter of law” because no substantial question existed regarding the outcome. The court rejected Smith’s argument that the en banc decision in *National Rifle Association v. Bondi* abrogated prior precedent by requiring a new application of the Supreme Court’s history-and-tradition test from *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen* and *United States v. Rahimi*. The panel reasoned that *Bondi* merely reiterated the general methodology for evaluating Second Amendment challenges without explicitly overruling previous decisions, allowing it to coexist with *Dubois*, which confirmed that *Rozier* remains binding precedent regarding felon-in-possession laws. Consequently, the court found that *Dubois* controls the case and bars Smith’s constitutional challenge. The practical consequence is that the district court’s judgment of conviction stands, and Smith’s sentence remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The First Circuit vacated Joan Rosado Maldonado’s sixty-month prison sentence and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. The court held that the District Court erred in calculating Maldonado’s base offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(2) by treating his two prior Massachusetts drug convictions as “controlled substance offenses.” Applying a de novo standard of review, the court determined that the term “controlled substance” within Guideline § 4B1.2(b) encompasses only substances regulated by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), not those defined solely by state law. Because Massachusetts law at the time of sentencing defined “cocaine” to include ioflupane—a substance removed from the federal CSA schedule in 2015—the state convictions were not a categorical match to the federal definition and thus could not serve as predicate offenses for the sentencing enhancement. Consequently, the procedural error required vacatur because the government failed to demonstrate that the District Court would have inevitably imposed the same sentence absent the miscalculation. The court declined to address Maldonado’s separate challenges to his supervised release conditions, noting that any ambiguities regarding those terms would be resolved during resentencing. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:21-CV-00090-JNP) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States, holding that federal tax liens validly attached to real property in Utah despite RC Smithfield, LLC holding legal title. The court determined that the defunct Sid Crookston Construction (SCC) retained a beneficial interest in the parcels, thereby qualifying as “property” or “rights to property” under federal tax law subject to IRS enforcement. The court applied the two-step framework established in *United States v. Tingey* and *Drye v. United States*: first, determining rights under state law (Utah), and second, assessing whether those rights constitute property under federal tax law. Under Utah law, which follows the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court found that a resulting trust arose in favor of SCC because SCC paid half of the purchase price for the parcels while RC Smithfield took legal title, with no evidence that SCC intended to make a gift or receive an exchange of value. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the LLC status shielded the property, clarifying that the IRS was attaching a lien to SCC’s beneficial interest rather than piercing the corporate veil to reach a member’s personal assets. Additionally, the court held that Plaintiff waived its argument regarding the specific language of the filed liens due to inadequate briefing in its opening brief. As a result of this affirmation, the district court’s ruling stands, meaning the federal tax liens against SCC and its successor-in-interest remain valid encumbrances on the Utah parcels, and RC Smithfield, LLC cannot quiet title to the property free of those liens. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 0:21-cr-60078-RAR-1 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Louis Charles Younglove’s conviction for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute and his 120-month sentence. Regarding the suppression motion, the court held that the district court correctly denied Younglove’s claim that the traffic stop constituted a de facto warrantless arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Applying a mixed question of law and fact standard, the court determined that even if the stop was an arrest, officers possessed probable cause to arrest Younglove without a warrant based on extensive investigations into his drug dealing, including observations of hand-to-hand transactions and corroborated confidential informant testimony. Regarding the sentence, the court found no procedural or substantive unreasonableness. The court ruled that the district court did not misapprehend its discretion by failing to conduct a de novo resentencing; rather, the record showed the court explicitly intended to resentence Younglove de novo and weighed all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court further held that the district court properly considered evidence of Younglove’s post-sentencing rehabilitation but was within its discretion to find it insufficient to warrant a lower sentence given his criminal history. Additionally, the court rejected the argument of unwarranted sentencing disparity between Younglove and his son, noting they were not similarly situated due to differences in their criminal histories. Finally, the 120-month sentence was deemed substantively reasonable as an upward variance well below the statutory maximum, justified by Younglove’s prior federal conviction, continued serious drug activity, and lack of remorse. As a result of this affirmation, Younglove’s conviction and sentence stand, and he remains subject to the 120-month term of imprisonment imposed by the district court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of The Bank of New York Mellon on Robert Lynn’s claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII, Section 1981, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The court applied the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework to analyze the discrimination and retaliation claims, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo. Regarding the race discrimination claim, the court held that Lynn failed to establish a prima facie case for his termination because the fact that his position was eliminated rather than filled by a replacement of a different race, combined with the short timeframe between his hiring and firing by the same manager, did not create an inference of unlawful discrimination. The court further ruled that Lynn failed to prove a “constructive demotion” claim regarding his transfer from one division to another, finding no evidence that he was compelled to leave his original role due to unpleasant working conditions, as his supervisor had provided positive reviews and assistance in securing the new position. Regarding the retaliation claim, while the court agreed that Lynn established a prima facie case based on the thirteen-day temporal proximity between his EEOC charge and subsequent termination, it affirmed summary judgment because Lynn failed to demonstrate pretext. The court found that BNY’s proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for termination—the reorganization of the team and Lynn’s documented poor performance—were not shown to be false or a cover for retaliation. The record indicated that Lynn’s manager attempted to assist him in improving his performance and that the decision to eliminate his position was based on objective business needs and performance reviews from multiple sources unrelated to Lynn’s protected activity. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment claim because Lynn forfeited the issue by failing to meaningfully address the five required elements of the legal framework in his appellate brief. As a practical consequence, the judgment for the employer stands, and no relief is granted to the appellant. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff-appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his appeal as frivolous. The court held that the district court correctly applied Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period to the plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims, noting he filed suit more than a year after becoming aware of the alleged injuries without demonstrating a nonfrivolous argument for tolling under *contra non velenem* or other doctrines. Regarding his claim that defendants opened his legal mail, the court found the issue abandoned because the plaintiff failed to challenge the district court’s determination that such conduct did not raise a cognizable constitutional issue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Consequently, the appeal lacks arguable merit under *Howard v. King*. As a practical consequence, this dismissal counts as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and the plaintiff is warned that accumulating three strikes will prohibit him from proceeding in forma pauperis in future civil actions or appeals while incarcerated unless he faces imminent danger of serious physical injury. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Saltgrass, Incorporated, holding that the district court correctly interpreted a Reciprocal Easement Agreement to require Eastex’s consent before demolishing or constructing new buildings on its parcel. The court applied Texas contract law, which mandates that while ambiguous contracts are ordinarily resolved by a jury, undisputed extrinsic evidence resolving an ambiguity allows the court to interpret the contract as a matter of law. The court found that Steven Scheinthal, the executive who drafted and executed the agreement for both parties at the time, provided uncontroverted testimony establishing that the intent of Section 3.3 was to grant each owner the right to withhold consent for any new construction or demolition on the other’s parcel. Because this extrinsic evidence definitively resolved the contractual ambiguity without creating a genuine dispute of material fact, no jury trial was required under the Seventh Amendment. Additionally, the court dismissed Eastex’s appeal regarding attorney fees awarded by the district court for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the notice of appeal was filed before the fee order was entered and failed to include the fee issue. The case is remanded to the district court solely to determine the specific amount of Saltgrass’s appellate attorney fees. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Louisiana, holding that Act 358 is not preempted by federal law and does not violate the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, or the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vagueness. The court applied the presumption against preemption, reasoning that public health and consumer protection are areas traditionally reserved to state police powers and that Congress did not clearly manifest an intent to supersede state regulation of drug distribution logistics in the Section 340B Drug Pricing Program. The court found no field preemption because the federal statute is silent on contract pharmacies; no conflict preemption because compliance with both laws is possible and they regulate distinct spheres (federal enforcement of pricing versus state enforcement of delivery); and no obstacle preemption because the state law advances, rather than frustrates, the federal goal of providing discounted drugs to vulnerable populations. Regarding constitutional claims, the court held that Act 358 does not effect a physical or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment because it imposes only a negative obligation of non-interference rather than compelling a transfer of property. The court further ruled that the statute does not substantially impair contractual obligations in violation of the Contracts Clause, as the federal pricing agreements do not address delivery to contract pharmacies and manufacturers operate in a heavily regulated industry with notice of potential state regulation. Finally, the court rejected the void-for-vagueness challenge, concluding that the term “interfere” is sufficiently clear when read in context with neighboring terms like “deny,” “restrict,” and “prohibit.” Consequently, Louisiana’s Act 358 remains enforceable against pharmaceutical manufacturers. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 Docket: 1:24-cv-23143-BB The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Carnival Cruise Line on plaintiff Maurice Cunningham’s negligence claim arising from an alleged injury caused by ingesting glass while dining on a cruise ship. The court held that under general maritime law, a carrier owes a duty of reasonable care to passengers only if it had actual or constructive notice of the specific risk-creating condition. Because Cunningham conceded there was no evidence that Carnival knew or should have known about the foreign object in the food prior to the incident, and because his failure to conduct timely discovery prevented him from obtaining such evidence, he could not establish that Carnival owed him a duty of care. The court further ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to create an inference of negligence sufficient to satisfy this burden, as the doctrine permits an inference of breach but does not eliminate a plaintiff’s obligation to prove that a duty existed in the first place. Consequently, the judgment for Carnival stands, and Cunningham is barred from proceeding with his claim on the merits. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed their appeal as frivolous. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a nonfrivolous appellate issue regarding the district court’s dismissal of their claims under *Bivens*, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Specifically, the court found that while the plaintiffs argued the district court misapplied res judicata to their First Amendment retaliation claim, they did not meaningfully brief or challenge the district court’s reasoning for dismissing their FTCA claims against the United States, rendering those claims abandoned. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to meaningfully address the district court’s analysis concerning the remainder of their claims, which were also deemed abandoned under Fifth Circuit precedent. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 42.2 and applicable case law governing frivolous appeals. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc in the case of *Ayestas v. Harris County District Attorney’s Office*, vacating the panel opinion issued on March 9, 2026, and ordering that the cause be reheard by the full court with oral argument at a later date. The court determined that a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service voted in favor of the poll to reconsider the matter. As a procedural consequence of this order, the panel opinion is vacated, and the Clerk is directed to specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs. This action effectively halts the finality of the prior panel decision regarding appellate jurisdiction and discovery disputes, returning the case to the appellate docket for full court consideration rather than allowing the previous dismissal or ruling to stand. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits to Dimitrios Liapis. While the court acknowledged that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) committed multiple legal errors in rejecting the medical opinion of Dr. Mark Pushkash, it ruled these errors were harmless and did not warrant remand. The court applied the standard of review requiring reversal only if an ALJ’s decision lacks substantial evidence or involves an error of law. Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, the court found the ALJ erred by failing to articulate reasons based on the two most critical factors for determining medical opinion persuasiveness: supportability and consistency. Instead, the ALJ relied on discretionary factors, such as the number of evaluations performed and the doctor’s specialization, while incorrectly dismissing Dr. Pushkash’s assessment that chronic pain could cause mental limitations. The court also noted the ALJ ignored evidence of aggressive psychiatric treatment and surgical interventions when characterizing Liapis’s symptom control as “good.” Despite these errors, the court concluded they were harmless because the record does not support a finding of disability even if Dr. Pushkash’s opinion had been accepted. Under Social Security regulations (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1), a claimant is disabled only if they have “marked” limitations in two areas of mental functioning or an “extreme” limitation in one. The ALJ found Liapis had only moderate limitations in three areas and a mild limitation in another. Dr. Pushkash’s opinion suggested a marked limitation in only one area (concentration, persistence, or pace). Since the other four consultative examiners concluded Liapis could work with routine breaks, and a single marked limitation is insufficient for a disability finding under the regulations, the court determined with great confidence that a remand would result in the same outcome. Consequently, the denial of benefits stands. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Daniel Eta’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a manual search of his cell phones at an international airport. The court held that brief, manual searches of electronic devices at the border are “routine” under the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment and therefore require neither a warrant nor individualized reasonable suspicion. Relying on its precedent in *United States v. Mendez*, the court rejected Eta’s argument that the search was non-routine due to its duration or scope, emphasizing that bright-line rules are necessary for administrative workability at the border. The court further ruled that the search did not require a “genuine border-related justification” on a case-by-case basis, as routine border searches are reasonable simply by virtue of occurring at the border. Additionally, the court stated that even if the search were deemed unconstitutional, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply because law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent (*United States v. Wanjiku* and *United States v. Skaggs*) which did not require a warrant or probable cause for such searches at the time. The practical consequence is that the evidence remains admissible, Eta’s conviction stands, and his 109-month prison sentence is upheld. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit denied Javier Antonio Amador-Ardon’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of his motion to reopen proceedings and rescind his in absentia removal order. The court affirmed the BIA’s determination that Amador-Ardon failed to meet the statutory requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii) because he did not demonstrate that his failure to appear at the removal hearing was “through no fault of his own.” The court found the BIA correctly concluded that Amador-Ardon was at fault for failing to provide his current address to immigration authorities and the court after his release from apprehension, which resulted in a lack of proper notice and his subsequent inability to attend the hearing. The court rejected Amador-Ardon’s arguments regarding legal error, factual speculation, and impermissible factfinding, noting that he failed to show the evidence compelled a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s or that the agency abused its discretion. Additionally, the court held that Amador-Ardon abandoned any claims related to termination based on claim-processing rules, cancellation of removal, asylum, or sua sponte reopening by failing to brief them. As a result, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order upholding the denial of the motion to reopen remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming a partial final arbitration award and appointing a receiver to enforce that award in a contract dispute involving Farm Credit Act lending associations. The court held that the arbitration panel’s Phase I Award was final and confirmable because it unconditionally determined liability and damages regarding the Payoff Proceeds, leaving no significant issues for the arbitrator to resolve on those specific claims despite retaining jurisdiction over independent counterclaims in Phase II. Furthermore, the court ruled that the award did not violate public policy under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) or Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., because even if the underlying Master Participation Agreement were unenforceable due to statutory violations, the arbitrator independently awarded relief based on alternative claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Regarding the appointment of a receiver, the court found no error, determining that the district court acted within its discretion under federal equitable principles and the six-factor test from *Aviation Supply Corp. v. R.S.B.I. Aerospace, Inc.* because CAL’s CEO engaged in extreme noncompliance, concealment, and obstructionist tactics that rendered legal remedies inadequate to protect Compeer’s claim to the funds. As a practical consequence, the district court’s order confirming the award and the appointment of a receiver to identify and recover CAL’s assets to satisfy the arbitration judgment remain in full force. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Navashia Akins’ pro se action brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. Applying a de novo standard of review to the record and the parties’ arguments, the court found no basis for reversal and determined that the district court’s decision was supported by the record. As a result, the dismissal stands and the appeal is denied. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The seventh-circuit denied the government’s motions to dismiss petitions for review filed by noncitizens seeking withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that reinstatement orders constitute “final orders of removal” subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, rejecting the government’s argument that such orders fall outside the definition of a final order of removal as interpreted in *Riley v. Bondi*. Additionally, the court ruled that the thirty-day filing deadline for petitions for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. The court determined that equitable tolling was appropriate because the petitioners diligently pursued their rights while relying on binding circuit precedent that required them to wait until withholding-only proceedings concluded before filing, a rule abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Riley*. Consequently, the petitions were deemed timely despite being filed after the statutory deadline had passed. The court further rejected the government’s argument that the petitions were unripe, noting that *Riley* explicitly anticipated and provided for the review of withholding-only claims alongside final removal orders even while agency proceedings remain pending. As a practical consequence, the motions to dismiss are denied, the motion to transfer venue is denied, and the petitions will be held in abeyance until the agency issues final decisions in the petitioners’ withholding-only proceedings. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence, rejecting Dymond Hayden’s argument that his prior Minnesota third-degree murder conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The court applied de novo review to the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines and its determination of whether the prior conviction constituted a crime of violence. The court held that Minnesota third-degree murder falls within the enumerated offenses clause of the Guidelines because it substantially corresponds to “generic” murder. In adopting the definition of generic murder established by the Third Circuit in *United States v. Marrero*, the Eighth Circuit defined generic murder as causing death intentionally, during a dangerous felony, or through conduct evincing reckless and depraved indifference to serious dangers posed to human life. The court found that Minnesota’s statute, which criminalizes causing death by an act eminently dangerous to others while evincing a depraved mind without regard for human life, aligns with this definition of “depraved heart murder.” Consequently, the district court correctly applied the sentencing enhancement based on this prior conviction. As a result of this ruling, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, and Hayden’s sentence stands as imposed. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Merli Carolina Valdez-Merida, a Guatemalan national seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the petitioner forfeited her claims for asylum and withholding of removal because she failed to meaningfully challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination regarding the lack of nexus between the proposed harm and her membership in the particular social group of “women in Guatemala who are defenseless.” Under Ninth Circuit precedent, arguments not raised in an opening brief or presented only as conclusory statements in a reply brief are forfeited, and the court declined to exercise its discretion to address the issue. Regarding the CAT claim, the court applied the substantial evidence standard of review and affirmed the BIA’s denial because the petitioner failed to establish that it was more likely than not she would be tortured if removed to Guatemala with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. The court found that neither the petitioner’s limited country conditions evidence nor her explanation for failing to report harassment to the police was sufficient to demonstrate government acquiescence, noting that generalized evidence of violence and crime does not satisfy this requirement. Consequently, the petition is denied in its entirety, leaving the BIA’s order denying all forms of relief in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The federal-circuit granted the Merit Systems Protection Board’s motion, with the petitioner’s consent, to waive Federal Circuit Rule 27(f) requirements and remanded the case to the Board. The court exercised its discretion to allow the agency to reconsider its previous decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing *SKF USA Inc. v. United States* as authority that such a remand may preserve party and judicial resources without drawing conclusions on the merits. Consequently, the Board is ordered to reconsider the dismissal consistent with the motion and this order, while each side bears its own costs. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The federal-circuit granted the Merit Systems Protection Board’s motion to remand the case to allow the agency to reconsider its previous position in light of two recent decisions, *Reese v. Department of the Navy* and *Holman v. Department of the Army*. The court exercised its discretion to remand based on the principle that such action could preserve party and judicial resources without drawing conclusions regarding the merits of the parties’ arguments. As a result, the case is returned to the Board for further consideration consistent with the motion and this order, with each side bearing its own costs. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Louisiana and its intervenor, affirming that Louisiana Act 358 is not preempted by federal law and does not violate the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause, or the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on vagueness. The court held that the statute, which prohibits drug manufacturers from interfering with covered entities’ use of contract pharmacies to dispense Section 340B drugs, falls within traditional state police powers over public health and consumer protection. Regarding preemption, the court applied a presumption against preemption in areas traditionally reserved to the states, finding that Congress left the distribution of drugs and the role of pharmacies unregulated under 42 U.S.C. § 256b, thereby allowing state supplementation. The court rejected conflict preemption arguments, noting that the federal enforcement scheme and the state law operate in distinct spheres without creating an impossibility of compliance or an obstacle to congressional objectives. On constitutional grounds, the court ruled that Act 358 does not effect a physical or regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment because it imposes a negative obligation of non-interference rather than compelling a transfer of property, and it does not substantially impair contractual obligations under the Contracts Clause since the federal pricing agreements did not address delivery logistics to contract pharmacies. Finally, the court determined the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, concluding that the term “interfere” is sufficiently clear when read in context with neighboring terms like “deny,” “restrict,” and “prohibit.” The practical consequence is that Louisiana Act 358 remains enforceable against pharmaceutical manufacturers participating in the Section 340B Program. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-06 The seventh-circuit denied the government’s motions to dismiss petitions for review filed by noncitizens E.E.V. and M.C.C.-G., who sought withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) after their statutory thirty-day filing deadlines had passed following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Riley v. Bondi*. The court held that it possesses jurisdiction to review reinstatement orders as “final orders of removal” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, rejecting the government’s argument that such orders are unreviewable and affirming that the “zipper clause” allows for judicial review of withholding-only proceedings alongside challenges to final removal orders. Regarding timeliness, the court applied the standard that non-jurisdictional statutory filing deadlines carry a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling. The court found this presumption was not overcome by the statute’s mandatory language or the government’s policy arguments, and determined that the petitioners acted diligently by relying on binding circuit precedent that required them to wait for withholding proceedings to conclude before filing. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Riley*, which changed the rule regarding when the deadline begins to run, constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling. The court further denied the government’s motion to transfer venue and ordered the petitions held in abeyance pending the final administrative decisions on the petitioners’ withholding-only claims. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 The First Circuit granted the Department of the Interior’s motion to stay the district court’s June 12, 2026, order that had preliminarily enjoined the implementation of Secretary’s Order No. 3431 and required the restoration of interpretive materials at National Park Service sites. The court held that the Department satisfied the four-factor test for a stay established in *Nken v. Holder*, primarily because it made a strong showing that the district court erred in finding the plaintiffs likely to suffer irreparable harm, which is a prerequisite for preliminary injunctive relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705 and general equitable principles. The court applied the standard requiring a movant to demonstrate that irreparable injury is “likely” and grounded in evidence rather than conjecture or unsubstantiated fears. It concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden because their claimed harms—such as frustration of organizational missions, reputational damage, and loss of membership—were either not traceable to specific directives in the Secretary’s Order or were speculative regarding independent actors’ choices. Furthermore, the court found that the district court improperly relied on generalized public harm and the alleged educational losses of a single member who had no concrete plans to visit the specific parks identified as affected, noting that no changes had actually been made to materials at those sites. Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate likely irreparable harm, the Department was deemed likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal challenging the district court’s ruling. The practical consequence is that the district court’s preliminary injunction and order to restore interpretive materials are suspended pending the resolution of the Department’s appeal on the merits. The National Park Service may resume implementation of Secretary’s Order No. 3431, including the review and potential removal or revision of interpretive materials deemed inconsistent with Executive Order 14253, while the underlying legal challenge proceeds in the First Circuit. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying St. Dominic Academy’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Maine’s Human Rights Act (MHRA) provisions. The court held that the school lacked standing to challenge the Employment Rule because statutory carveouts explicitly permit religious schools to hire only co-religionists and require employees to conform to religious tenets, eliminating any credible threat of prosecution. Regarding the Religious Nondiscrimination Rule and the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Nondiscrimination Rule, the court concluded the school failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits; it determined these rules are neutral and generally applicable under *Employment Division v. Smith*, subject only to rational basis review, which they satisfy given the state’s legitimate interest in preventing discrimination in publicly funded education. However, the court reversed the denial of injunctive relief concerning the Religious Expression Rule, finding that St. Dominic had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its First Amendment claim. The court ruled that the rule is facially nonneutral because it singles out “religious expression” for special regulation compared to other forms of identity-based expression, thereby failing strict scrutiny as it does not advance an interest of the highest order necessary to justify infringing free exercise rights. Consequently, the case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction specifically against the Religious Expression Rule as applied to St. Dominic. The court also dismissed the parental-rights claims as moot due to the Radonises’ change in circumstances and substituted Megan Sanders for Jefferson Ashby regarding official-capacity claims under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 0:24-cv-61178-AHS The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Ramon Gonzalez Figueroa’s negligence claim against JetBlue Airways Corporation. The court held that the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”) preempts the plaintiff’s state-law common law negligence claim, which alleged that JetBlue negligently placed him on an uninvited-to-fly list in violation of Florida tort law. Applying the standard of review de novo for the dismissal and abuse of discretion for the denial of leave to amend, the court determined that Florida’s common law constitutes a “law” under 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) and is “related to… service of an air carrier.” The court reasoned that JetBlue’s decision to deny Figueroa access to future transportation services constitutes an economic decision regarding the bargained-for provision of labor, thereby falling squarely within the ADA’s preemption scope. The court distinguished the plaintiff’s reliance on dicta from *Xiaoyun Lucy Lu v. AirTran Airways, Inc.*, noting that unlike a wrongful removal claim arising during a flight, Figueroa’s suit challenged the airline’s refusal to provide future services after his flight concluded. Because any amendment to the complaint would be futile given that additional factual details regarding the encounter with law enforcement would not alter the fundamental preemption analysis, the district court properly denied leave to amend. Consequently, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, leaving the claim dismissed permanently. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 4:22-CV-00089-DN-PK) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of default judgment against Brian Gifford and the assessment of $196,054.70 in damages following his failure to comply with discovery orders in a diversity action for conversion and defamation brought by Diamond G Rodeos and the Gilberts. The court rejected Gifford’s five appellate arguments, ruling that: (1) challenges to the sufficiency of proof regarding ownership go to the merits of the claim rather than Article III standing, which requires only a plausible allegation of injury; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gifford’s motion for default judgment because no live claims remained for him to defend against once his own counterclaims were dismissed and he was defaulted; (3) the fraud-on-the-court allegation failed as it was conclusory and unsupported by the record, which showed damages were based on sworn declarations and documentation rather than the evidence Gifford cited; (4) recusal motions were properly denied because a party’s prior service on a confidential judicial selection panel does not create an appearance of partiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), nor do adverse rulings constitute bias; and (5) filing restrictions and transcript procedures imposed due to Gifford’s noncompliance did not violate his right of access or 28 U.S.C. § 753(b). The practical consequence is that the default judgment stands, Gifford’s motion to supplement the record with post-appeal transcripts is denied, and the court declined to consider a request for appellate attorney’s fees because it was not filed via a separate motion as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 1:25-CV-02086-LTB) The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rothschild’s pro se § 1983 complaint without prejudice and denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case after Rothschild failed to cure deficiencies in his prisoner complaint form despite two prior opportunities and specific orders to do so. The appellate panel noted that Rothschild failed to explain on appeal why he could not cure these deficiencies, a failure to raise which precluded reversal of the dismissal. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court’s determination that Rothschild lacked a good faith basis for an appeal because he presented no nonfrivolous arguments, thereby justifying the denial of IFP status for the appeal. As a result, the dismissal stands, though Rothschild retains the ability to refile his complaint in the district court, and his motion to proceed without prepayment of fees is denied. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 2:24-cr-00014-SPC-NPM-1 The eleventh-circuit affirmed Nicholas P. Smith’s conviction for possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), ruling that the district court correctly denied his motion to suppress evidence found during a traffic stop and subsequent search. The court applied a mixed question of law and fact standard of review, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court held that officers had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop because they observed Smith violating Florida statutes by stopping in a crosswalk and running a red light. Regarding the vehicle search, the court determined the automobile exception applied; a K-9 dog alerted to narcotics inside the vehicle, establishing probable cause to search the readily mobile car without a warrant. The court further found the stop was not unreasonably prolonged, as the canine alert occurred within three and a half minutes of the stop’s initiation. Finally, the court concluded that the recognizable smell of marijuana, combined with Smith’s behavior, the K-9 alert, and visible “shake” found in the vehicle, provided sufficient probable cause for the arrest and search that led to the discovery of fentanyl on Smith’s person. The court also declined to address a request to certify a question regarding Florida crosswalk laws, as it was raised for the first time in a reply brief. As a result of this decision, Smith’s conviction stands, and he remains subject to his 65-month prison sentence imposed by the district court. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 1:25-cv-00222-JB-MU The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The court held that the case no longer presented a live controversy because the appellant, Jamal Allen, had been arrested under the warrant he sought to enjoin and was now subject to ongoing criminal proceedings. Applying the standard that an issue is moot when intervening events prevent the court from granting effectual relief, the court determined that its ability to provide the requested temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction had been eliminated by the arrest. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and all pending motions were denied as moot. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 1:23-cv-22670-MD The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of Miami on Wanda Jean-Baptiste’s claims of retaliation under the Florida Whistleblower’s Act and Title VII, as well as her claim of race discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court held that Jean-Baptiste failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor regarding any of the three claims. Regarding the retaliation claims, the court applied the standard requiring proof of protected conduct, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the two. The court found that Jean-Baptiste abandoned her arguments on appeal by failing to cite specific record evidence to support her assertions of pretext or suspicious timing. Furthermore, regarding her Title VII retaliation claim, the court determined that causation was lacking because the disciplinary actions (a 40-hour suspension and permanent transfer) had already been recommended by a panel three months prior to the email she alleged constituted protected activity; under Eleventh Circuit precedent, temporal proximity is insufficient to establish causation when the employer contemplated the adverse action before the protected conduct occurred. Regarding the race discrimination claim, the court applied the standard that a plaintiff must produce evidence showing that the reason for an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination. The court found Jean-Baptiste failed to establish a prima facie case because her proposed comparators were not similarly situated; she provided no record evidence regarding their disciplinary records or the specific discipline they received, and the record indicated only her misconduct resulted in a wrongful termination. Additionally, the court declined to consider portions of the appellate record that had been stricken by the district court, noting Jean-Baptiste did not challenge those striking orders on appeal. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the City of Miami stands, and Jean-Baptiste’s lawsuit is dismissed without a trial on the merits. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 9:21-cr-80188-RKA-1 The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because the government completed the sale of the property that was the subject of Dion De Cesare’s attempt to enjoin its forfeiture. The court held that since the core issue of the appeal was whether the district court erred in declining to stop the sale, the completion of that sale rendered the controversy moot under the principle that courts lack authority to adjudicate moot cases. Consequently, all pending motions before the court were denied as moot, and no further relief regarding the injunction or forfeiture order will be granted by this appellate panel. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 8:20-cr-00201-CEH-SPF-4 The eleventh-circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation under the standard established in *Anders v. California*, following an independent review of the record that revealed no arguable issues of merit. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellant’s motions to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 9:24-cv-81529-MD The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction because the district court’s order was not a final, appealable decision. The court held that although the plaintiff filed a stipulation to dismiss Count V (the Florida Public Whistleblower Act claim) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, this dismissal was ineffective as it addressed only one of five pending claims rather than the entire action or all claims against the defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, an appeal may only be taken from a final decision that disposes of all claims; because Count V remained unresolved, the district court’s summary judgment ruling on Counts I through IV was not final. Consequently, the appellate court lacks authority to review the case at this time, leaving the underlying litigation in the district court pending resolution of the remaining claim. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 8:24-cr-00500-SDM-TGW-4 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a 108-month sentence on Darwin Jose Martinez Anchundia for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute, rejecting his claim that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable due to the failure to apply a minor-role reduction. The court applied the clear error standard of review, noting that the district court has considerable discretion in determining whether a defendant qualifies for an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). Under this guideline, a minor participant is one less culpable than most other participants but not minimal. The opinion emphasizes that a defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they played a minor role in the specific conduct for which they were held accountable. The court reasoned that Anchundia was accountable for transporting 4,230 kilograms of cocaine and understood the nature of his trafficking conduct, even if he lacked decision-making power regarding the broader conspiracy. Citing *United States v. De Varon* and *United States v. Gruezo*, the court held that a defendant cannot claim a minor role simply by comparing themselves to participants in a broader scheme for which they were not held accountable. Because Anchundia was responsible for transporting a significant quantity of drugs worth millions of dollars, his involvement was deemed serious enough to deny the adjustment. Consequently, the district court’s decision is upheld, and the sentence remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Filed: 2026-07-02 Docket: 9:25-cr-80072-AMC-3 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 20-month prison sentence and three-year supervised release imposed on Richard Lazaro for illegally reentering the United States after removal following a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a procedurally or substantively reasonable sentence under the standard set forth in *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). Regarding procedural reasonableness, the court rejected Lazaro’s argument that the district court committed error by speculating his reentry was for drug trafficking. The opinion clarified that while the district court questioned whether visiting his ailing mother was the sole purpose of reentry, it expressly declined to rely on any speculation regarding criminal intent. Instead, the court based its sentence on the defendant’s conduct of breaching immigration laws without authorization. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court applied the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumed reasonable and that district courts have broad discretion in weighing a defendant’s criminal history and the nature of the offense. The court found the sentence was well within the statutory maximum of ten years and squarely inside the recommended Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months. The district court properly considered Lazaro’s proffered purpose for reentry but exercised its discretion to treat it as a “wash” due to indeterminacy, while giving appropriate weight to his recent release from custody for possessing a substantial amount of fentanyl and the circumstances of his unauthorized reentry. The practical consequence is that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida is affirmed, and Lazaro must serve the imposed sentence. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.