Case Explained: TONY A. MESSER; KEVIN N. MUMPOWER; JANICE L. BOOHER; PATRICIA C. EADS; PHILIP E. BARBROW; BENJIE G. HICKS; KENDALL W. LUTTRELL; DARRELL G. MURRAY; DAVID A. STOVALL; DENNIS J. STILTNER; TIMOTHY M. WAMPLER; MICHAEL L. PARKER; CHARLES E. VESTAL; JIMMY AMBERGEY; DAVE S. BOOHER; LARRY RICHARDS v. GARRISON INVESTMENT GROUP, LP; JOSEPH B. TANSEY; STEVEN SCOTT STUART; GIG GP LLC; JTSS BORROWER LLC; JOSHUA BRANDT; JULIAN WELDON; BRIAN STEVEN CHASE; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES GP LLC; GARRISON COMMERCIAL FUNDING VIII LLC; GARRISON FINANCIAL ASSETS MM LLC; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES HOLDINGS GP LLC; BCPI ACQUISITIONS, INC; GARRISON BRISTOL LLC; GARRISON BRISTOL HOLDINGS LLC

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Filed: 2026-06-23 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the former employees’ lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that federal courts cannot exercise ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a prior federal money judgment against new parties who were not found liable in the original action, nor can plaintiffs establish independent federal question jurisdiction under the WARN Act or ERISA by merely attempting to pierce the corporate veil to satisfy an existing judgment. The court applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Peacock v. Thomas*, 516 U.S. 349 (1996), which establishes that a subsequent lawsuit seeking to impose liability for a federal money judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment lacks ancillary jurisdiction unless there is an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court found no such independent basis because the plaintiffs did not allege any new or additional violations of ERISA or the WARN Act against the Appellees; rather, the suit was solely an effort to collect the judgment previously entered against Bristol Compressors International, LLC (“BCI”) from Garrison Investment Group and other parties who had been voluntarily dismissed in the original litigation (*Messer I*). The court further noted that under ERISA, piercing the corporate veil is not an independent cause of action, and under the WARN Act, the Department of Labor’s “single employer” regulations provide the exclusive framework for holding related entities liable, rendering veil-piercing theories redundant and insufficient to create jurisdiction in a new suit. As a result of this decision, the dismissal of the complaint stands, and the plaintiffs are barred from pursuing their claims against the Appellees in federal court under these theories. The judgment remains enforceable only against BCI, which is insolvent, leaving the plaintiffs without a federal forum to attempt to collect the judgment from the previously dismissed parties or other related entities via veil-piercing arguments. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.