Case Explained: United States v. Milliron

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Filed: 2026-06-23 Docket: 1:22-CR-00012-WJM-2) The Tenth Circuit affirmed Lori Milliron’s convictions for accessory after the fact to foreign murder and obstruction of justice, but vacated her conviction on one count of perjury (Count Six) while affirming her conviction on a second perjury count (Count Nine). Regarding Count Six, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Milliron’s testimony was knowingly false. The prosecutor asked Milliron why Larry Rudolph was “so generous” to her and specifically why he gave her $60,000 in 2015. Milliron responded that she did not know why. Applying the standard from *Bronston v. United States*, which requires precise questioning as a predicate for perjury, the court ruled that a witness cannot be convicted of perjury for stating they do not know another person’s internal motivations or reasons for giving money unless there is evidence the witness actually possesses that knowledge. Because no evidence showed Milliron knew Rudolph’s specific reasons for the 2015 and 2016 payments, her “I don’t know” answers were not knowingly false. Regarding Count Nine, the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction for perjury. The prosecutor asked if Rudolph had proclaimed his innocence during a conversation about the FBI investigation. Milliron answered, “He probably did.” The court determined that a reasonable jury could infer this statement was knowingly false based on the context: Milliron had been Rudolph’s confidante for over fifteen years, knew he planned and committed the murder, and had heard him explicitly admit to killing his wife (“I killed my fucking wife for you”). Under these circumstances, the court concluded it was reasonable for a jury to infer that Rudolph did not proclaim his innocence to Milliron during their subsequent conversation about the investigation. The court also rejected Milliron’s argument that her testimony was immaterial, noting that her status as an intimate confidante made Rudolph’s claimed innocence potentially influential to the grand jury. On the accessory-after-the-fact conviction, the court affirmed under 18 U.S.C. § 3, relying on *United States v. Day*. The court held that making false statements to a grand jury to hinder or prevent the apprehension of an offender constitutes “assisting” the offender within the meaning of the statute, even if the assistance consists solely of perjury. The court rejected Milliron’s argument that the accessory statute requires conduct beyond lying, distinguishing her case from prior dicta regarding unsworn statements. Regarding the obstruction of justice conviction, the court rejected Milliron’s Double Jeopardy challenge. Applying the *Blockburger* test, the court determined that obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) is not a lesser-included offense of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Obstruction requires proof of a specific intent to subvert or undermine the administration of justice, whereas perjury only requires the intent to make a knowingly false statement. Because obstruction requires an additional element of intent that perjury does not, separate convictions for both crimes do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The practical consequence is that Milliron’s conviction on Count Six is vacated, while her convictions on Counts Three (accessory), Four (obstruction), and Nine (perjury) remain in effect. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.