Case Explained: Weston Merriott Plaintiff— v. City of Bossier City; Jeffrey Free, In his official & individual capacities; David A. Montgomery, In his official & individual capacities; Jeffery Darby; Charles Jacobs

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Filed: 2026-06-25 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Weston Merriott’s complaint challenging a Bossier City Council policy regulating public speech at meetings. The court held that Merriott plausibly alleged that the policy was facially overbroad, void for vagueness, and constituted unconstitutional viewpoint and content-based discrimination under the First Amendment as applied to him under *Monell*. The court applied the standard of review de novo for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting all factual allegations as true. Regarding the overbreadth claim, the court reasoned that the policy’s prohibitions on “personal,” “impertinent,” “slanderous,” and “boisterous” remarks were not coterminous with Merriott’s own conduct but reached a substantial number of unconstitutional applications relative to their legitimate sweep. The court interpreted these terms by their ordinary meaning, concluding they prohibited core First Amendment activities such as bold criticism of council members and that the “boisterous” prohibition turned entirely on the subjective annoyance of council members, citing *Coates v. City of Cincinnati*. On the vagueness claim, the court found the policy failed to provide reasonable notice of prohibited conduct and invited arbitrary enforcement because terms like “personal” and “impertinent” depended on a listener’s sensitivity without explicit standards, rendering them unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Regarding viewpoint discrimination, the court held that prohibiting speech that is “personal,” “impertinent,” or “slanderous” effectively banned expression merely because it offended council members, which constitutes an impermissible restriction in a limited public forum. The court distinguished the “boisterous” prohibition as viewpoint-neutral and reasonably tailored for decorum. The court also affirmed Merriott’s *Monell* claim against the City, finding that the policy itself constituted official municipal policy and was the moving force behind the constitutional violations. However, the court reversed the dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim, finding he plausibly alleged self-censorship due to fear of removal. Conversely, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Louisiana Open Meetings Law (OML) claim against Councilmember Free, as Merriott did not allege Free attended the secret meeting, and affirmed the dismissal of the OML civil penalties claim because Merriott failed to allege that the defendants acted “knowingly and willfully.” The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The district court’s judgment is reversed regarding the facial overbreadth, vagueness, viewpoint discrimination, content-based discrimination (excluding the “boisterous” provision), *Monell*, and retaliation claims. The dismissal of the OML claim against Free and the OML civil penalties claim remains in effect. Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.