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Podcast 36 - Brexit is done - or is it ? episode artwork

Apr 6, 2021 12 min

Podcast 36 - Brexit is done - or is it ?

from Socialist correspondent Hosted by Socialist Correspondent

Britain has left the European Union and exited from the year-long transition period on 31st December 2020. This is four and a half years after the vote to Leave and it is not over yet. The agreement between the UK and the EU leaves many issues unresolved and constructs a web of committees which will keep them in permanent negotiating mode. Although the UK has gained some formal autonomy from the EU in this agreement, nevertheless it is founded on neo-liberal assumptions and keeping both parties in alignment, precluding progressive intervention in the economy.

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Podcast 36 - Brexit is done - or is it ?

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The socialist correspondent is an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist journal. It supports all those fighting for peace and socialism. Podcast 36. Brexit is done.

Or is it? When Dominic Cummings was ejected from Downing Street, it represented a victory for the faction in the Tory party and the ruling class that wanted to avert a no-deal, and have an agreement in place between Britain and the EU when the transition period ended on 31 December 2020. This inevitably meant a softer Brexit than a no-deal, and they got their wish with the UK, EU trade and cooperation agreement, the TCA, being passed at the 11th hour. The TCA is designed to protect British and EU capital, and largely seeks to align the UK with the EU.

Statements of principles within it are familiar neoliberal territory. For example, in talking about competition policy it says, The parties recognise the importance of free and undistorted competition in their trade and investment relations. The parties acknowledge that anti-competitive business practices may distort the proper functioning of markets and undermine the benefits of trade liberalisation. While considering the limitations of the TCA, however, it is important to acknowledge that it is a big advance on the first deal proposed by Theresa May.

It does not keep Britain within or automatically tied to the single market or the customs union, although Northern Ireland remains in the single market and applying EU customs rules, creating border in the sea between Britain and Ireland. The EU will not have formal powers to direct the UK to follow its rules, and the European Court of Justice will have no lockers in policing the agreement. It is easier for the UK to withdraw from the agreement, to dispute interpretations of its provisions and have them reviewed. The agreement allows the UK some limited freedom to set its own rules.

All of this will be helpful to any future British government that wishes to implement progressive policies against EU neoliberal hegemony. Ironically, this deal was facilitated by the obstructive tactics of the Remainers' impollement, who blocked May's much softer deal. So the Arch-Remainer, Kierstammer, ended up whipping Labour MPs to support the deal in the interests of British capital, when he could have had from his point of view a better outcome months before. The most lurid claims of Remainers about economic collapse, shortages and wars in Ireland or over Gibraltar have not come to pass.

But there are major constraints within the agreement. Although the rhetoric has been about Britain regaining its sovereignty, it will be bound by the terms of the agreement, and limited by its continuing economic and political relationship with the EU, so it is not free to act just as it wishes without consequences. The agreement on fishing is a prime example of this. Britain may have regained nominal control over fishing rights, but in practice gave a huge amount of ground to the EU.

While the TCA nods in the direction of being able to implement different state aid policies and EU public procurement rules will not be binding, in effect these are negated by the other provisions of the agreement. The actions by the UK is not, as noted earlier, be anti-competitive nor distort markets, trade and investment. In reality, this gives little leeway for radical state intervention through investment and public procurement policies. This also applies to workers' rights, but as others have noted, rights are so diminished anyway that this will likely have little impact.

Environmental and other standards might be more of an issue. The agreement is based on a neo-liberal consensus that neither side will depart from, but rather both will continue with privatization and free market economics. The global state aid interventions appear to be quite localised, small-scale, or applicable to public services. But small-scale subsidies were always possible under EU rules.

They just did not allow the kind of action that would enable progressive planning in the economy. So it is not clear that the agreement substantially departs from these EU norms. For example, under the TCA, it would surely be impossible for Britain to nationalise rail operators, which currently have a number of EU-based companies running the services. The EU could clearly argue that in the terms of the agreement, nationalisation was anti-competitive.

The only services are required by the TCA to act like private companies. If a future government were to go down a route of intervention through investment and procurement policies that could be interpreted as against the agreement's provisions, then dispute resolution mechanisms would kick in. Joint arbitration bodies will rule on these matters. There are also provisions to ensure rebalancing, where EU-UK legislation diverges on things like environmental standards.

Ultimately, the EU or the UK can take countermeasures in reprisal for breaches of the agreement's provisions. There are also issues like fisheries, which are subject to transitional arrangements. But there are five yearly reviews of the deal. The status of financial and other services remains unclear.

This set up ensures a continuing close relationship between the EU and Britain. While the government held out against the UK automatically adopting EU rules and standards, nevertheless the purpose of the agreement is clearly to keep these similar through the review and rebalancing processes. In essence, we are talking about Britain aligning with the EU, as it already has EU standards built in due to its past membership of the union. The EU therefore starts from a position of power, with the assumption that its standards are the default, and the impetus will be to keep the UK aligned with changes in the union, rather than the other way round.

There is a possibility that we end up in endless rounds of negotiations and disputes with the EU in the arbitration system and the courts. The EU is bigger and stronger, which gives it an advantage especially since the Liberal Establishment in Britain is biased in its favour. Where state-aid provisions, for example, are disputed by the EU, the British courts may find against the UK government. British capital, having managed a reasonable alignment with the EU in this trade agreement, may also seek to avoid disputes by going along with the EU and trying to keep relations with it hidden from public view.

A softly, softly approach will help the cause of those who still see Britain rejoining the EU at some point. In this scenario, the UK will in effect become a passive ruletaker. The implementation of the TCA will be overseen by a joint EU, UK partnership council, with 16 subcommittees and four working groups under it. These are no doubt designed to try to head off any overt conflict, but these structures mean that Britain and the EU will be permanently tied together in negotiating mode.

Yet some disputes will undoubtedly emerge, and conflict between the pro and anti-EU fractions of the Tory party and British capital will continue. But there will be a new dynamic post-Brexit. Will the interests of British capital increasingly shift away from the EU? Will that raise the possibility of a second Brexit from this agreement?

How will your rescriptic Tories respond? Services, which account for 80% of the British economy, are omitted from the agreement. Within that, financial services are of critical importance to the UK, given their dominant position, and that the city of London is the EU's main financial centre. Clearly, the EU would not accept city firms being able to continue operating as they Brexit had not happened.

On the basis that any deal would have disadvantaged the city, the UK ducked the issue. It will, however, have to be dealt with. On the first two days of dealing after the end of the transition period, almost half the value of euro-denominated shares, normally traded in London, went instead to Amsterdam and Paris, 16 billion euros daily. Prior to the end of the transition period, British financial companies had transferred well over £1 trillion worth of assets, 7,500 jobs and parts of their operations to EU countries.

The crunch will come at the end of March, when an EU-UK memorandum of understanding on financial services is due to be agreed. However, by then a lot of damage will have been done to the city, and the EU will be in a relatively stronger position as business moves away from London. A shift over this period will enable EU financial centres to adjust, preventing the disruption of a sudden break with London. France and Germany look set to take a big chunk out of the British financial sector.

The EU, of course, is not without its problems due to the economic and political diversity of its member states, and it would have preferred to have kept Britain in the club. It too will have to deal with economic and political fallout from Brexit. Managing all this and maintaining its dominance in the EU will be a complicated and time-consuming problem for Germany. Britain's departure will lead to tussles between it and the second biggest power in the EU, France.

France has become more assertive internationally, recently in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya against Turkey. There was also Macron's Napoleonic entrance into Beirut after the devastating explosion in the city. This is on the back of other French interventions in Africa and the Middle East, where it has historic rivalries with Britain. With Britain gone, France will be the EU's only nuclear-armed power and is positioning itself as the EU's leading military force.

A lot of ink has been spilled regarding the TCA as commentators have picked over the contents and tried to discern the precise implications of its terms. Much of this misses the political and economic context of the agreement, which will be very important in how it is implemented, especially since some of it remains unsettled. With its drive to align EU and UK interests, the number of issues that still need clarifying, the many joint bodies, reviews, extended timetables as with fishing, and the unclear future of financial services requiring further negotiation, Brexit remains a work in progress. Despite the positives in the TCA that will make it more possible to diverge from the EU, nevertheless the EU will not accept any actions which threaten its interests, or the freedoms for capital that it cherishes.

If the UK were to attempt to implement progressive state intervention in the economy, that would mean a big battle, ultimately requiring a second Brexit from this agreement. In reality, only a radical left government can fulfil the potential of Brexit by breaking out of the straitjacket of neoliberalism domestically and internationally, and by building alliances and agreements with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect. For now, however, we remain in continuing negotiations with, and closely tied to, the European Union. If you'd like to read more, or to subscribe to the journal, you can do this via our website at www.thesocialistcorrespondent.org.uk

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