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Acast helps creators launch, grow and monetize their podcast everywhere. Acast.com. Welcome to Deconstructed Criticism. I'm Aaron Flam, and today we navigate the complexities of military strategy and international diplomacy with Professor Ephraim Imbar.
Our discussion spans the intricacies of Israel's engagements in Gaza, the rationale behind preemptive strikes on Hezbollah, and strategies for resilience in volatile geopolitical climates. Our deepest thanks are extended to the remarkable individuals whose financial support has facilitated this series. Should you feel moved by our content and wish to contribute, please consider joining our community of patrons at patreon.com slash Aaron Flam. For listeners in Sweden, contributions can be made via SWISH at 076894, 037377.
We are honored to have Professor Ephraim Imbar, esteemed president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security with us today. Professor Imbar, a renowned academic figure, brings a wealth of experience from his tenure at Shalem College, as well as his foundational role at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. His scholarly journey has included roles at preeminent institutions worldwide, and participation in pivotal security and educational committees within Israel. With an impressive bibliography and a profound understanding of security policy, Israeli-Palestinian relations and the dynamics of the Middle East, Professor Imbar offers us invaluable insights today, with credentials grounded in rigorous academic pursuit, including an MA and PhD from the University of Chicago, and a foundation in political science and English literature at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Professor Imbar's perspectives are rooted in a deep analysis and a dedication to factual accuracy.
Enjoy. So Professor Imbar, president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, founder of the Begin Sadat Center. You've written several books, five if I'm not mistaken, hundreds of scholarly articles. Welcome to Deconstructive Criticism.
My pleasure. So may I start with, well, I hope your family is safe. I'd like to say that in the beginning. My son returned last week from Gaza after a long service, so we are feeling much better.
I'm grateful and for his service, even as a Jew in the diaspora, it's quite important that Israel keeps existing. What I wanted to know as a start of question is I watched a lecture of yours from nine years ago after the 2014 Gaza War, a protective edge. Have your perspective on the situation changed since October 7? I don't remember what I said at the time, I must say.
But generally, I didn't change my views radically over time. So probably I still hold on to the same position. Well Israel at that time had a mow the lawn sort of strategy where you cut down the grass as it grows, so to speak. And you said it was unrealistic to leave to eradicate Hamas, even maybe it did demilitarize Hamas.
And now you have changed your mind? No, I did not. I think that we still have no possibility to eradicate Hamas. Hamas is a radical Islamist movement with deep roots in Palestinian society, many Palestinians support Hamas.
And now after October 7, we see even greater support for Hamas. There are heroes that were successful in attacking Israel, occupying part of its territory, torturing Israelis, raping Israelis. So they look well in the eyes of the Palestinians, and therefore I don't think we can eradicate them. But what we can do, and this is what we are trying to do, basically to terminate to their military capabilities.
And probably after a while, they'll grow the grass a little bit again, and then we'll have to mow the grass again. I think our mistake was that we didn't mow the grass short enough in the past years. You didn't do enough? That's the problem.
Right. We're not doing enough in terms of destroying infrastructure, destroying the units, inflicting pain on Hamas. We gave them time for tremendous buildup, military buildup. And also, by not exercising our military muscle enough, we eroded our editor.
The torrent is a very important word. Can you explain why it is so important? I come from Shaddia. We used to be a neutral country.
We're just applying to NATO now. I think there's a change in Sweden, a drastic change to give up neutrality, because they also believe that they are bad guys in the neighborhood and they might be attacked. In our case, we don't need the Russian invasion of Ukraine to realize that our neighborhood is a tough neighborhood in which our existence depends on deterring our enemies. Otherwise, there will be a total of the time.
And we have actually some times in which they do not attack us, and this is because of our deterrence. And that was a road in October 7th. Definitely. And that only Hamas, in fact, that Fizballah joined the fray is clear proof that Fizballah was also not detailed.
They started the war. Even the Houthis joined in. Yeah, as I found ways. So they are less afraid of Israel, but Fizballah is just beyond the border.
It is interesting that you bring up this Bolan, because as it stands now, only Rafah exists in the south of Gaza. I'm guessing the Israeli army will take care of Rafah in the den. Is Bolan next? Hopefully, we'll have the time the political clock will allow us to deal Hamas in Gaza, defeat as we've done in other places in Gaza.
And then hopefully, we'll be able to take Hizballah. Hizballah will probably be more difficult because of greater international constraints. The Hamas attack was a clear regulation of good taste and everything. And Fizballah, in this respect, is more cautious, it's a limited war.
And the Americans, which are an important player, they question, do not want an escalation. Why don't they want an escalation? Wouldn't it be good for them if Israel was allowed to eliminate another Iranian proxy? It would be very good, in my opinion, probably in your opinion, but it's not the opinion of the Biden administration.
They basically are fearful of an escalation that might bring them into a situation which they may have a conflict with Iran. They are dreadful of such a situation. And this is why they sent immediately after the war started in Gaza, their ships to the region. They said quite clearly, we don't want an escalation.
Yes, but it doesn't seem to matter to Iran. Iran's proxies are still attacking American ships and American bases with casualties. And Biden administration's response so far has been quite weak, wouldn't you say? I agree.
Iranian's are smart. They are playing the game very well. How so? They were very successful in establishing in several countries, Iranian proxies, which do their dirty job, allowing some space of denial.
It's not me, it's the other guy. And they understand that, particularly this administration is happy to play along and not to get involved with Iran. To some extent, I understand the Americans. The plate is full.
They have a war in Ukraine. They need to prepare for the Chinese challenge in the Pacific. So they read the political map very well and poke in the eye of the Americans all the time. It's an interesting terminology to call the Chinese threat a challenge.
But do you see a connection between Iran and China and Russia that really threatens the world order as it stands now? I think you must be blind not to see it. As they are together, the Iranians provide answers to the Russians. The Russians are happy with the Iranian world.
The host just, I think yesterday, a summit of the proxies in Moscow. The Chinese signed agreements with Iran. They hold never exercises together. It is clear anti-American axis.
And the Americans for some reason prefer not to see it. Do you think it's lack of confidence on the United States part? I think first of all, they realize that the American public is tired with wars, far away. They had two green setbacks, defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So they prefer not to engage in additional military adventures. But it's a very myopic view, of course, because if you don't react strongly to provocations from your enemies, you seem weak. And I think this is a perception of the Middle East. The Middle East is a very real political world.
And all leaders think in such terms. And they say, we're America. And it's a pity because we need a strong America. So what would happen if Pakistan and Iraq fell personally?
I think it might have fallen. But the Americans still have a lot of clout in this region. And they need to some extent this region, because they want the allies to be supplied with energy, which comes from the Middle East. And the allies in Europe, the allies in Asia, in Korea, Japan, of course.
Taiwan. So it is a situation in which the liberal lens of this administration are leading them into wrong, into very wrong policies. I think you're right. Turning back to Israel, you think you didn't apply the, well, let's not call it, no the long.
Let's call it a strategy of attrition, because that's what it is, right? A long war of attrition against Israel's enemies. Is that supposed to continue the day after Gaza is defeated? Did the Palestinians change?
I don't know. Once I heard you say that some things are learned just through long processes of suffering. I agree. I agree.
I think that we have to inflict much more pain upon the Palestinian society in order to change. But I must say, and I say to even with the appreciation that the ability of the Palestinian body politic and people to sustain pain is great and unbelievably great. They were beaten once more and still. They believed that eventually will not survive.
You have the clock stay, have the time. It's going to be a long conflict. And I think anybody that thinks that peace is around the corner is mistaken and is nourishing dangerous illusions. I want to tell you a story.
I was, gave a talk at a Greek think tank. And one of the audience, an academic woman, told me, listen, you fight already, Palestinians 100 years. Enough is enough. How much?
So I asked her, how many years did you fight the Turks? I knew the answer. And she said 400 years. So I said, no, if this is too warm and I knew it was true, we are a young conflict.
We're only 100 years. Okay. So that's how you see it. I think this is a prism you should take in order to understand the dynamics of the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
You should take the long view. A very long view. And if you want to look at it comparatively, if we take a look at what society has really changed dramatically in the 20th century, it's Germany and Japan. Germany lost two world wars and many millions of people.
Japan suffered an atomic attack. And two actually. Yeah, okay. One atomic attack was two bombs.
But this was not enough. They changed their education system. And they changed their education system because there were leaders within those countries that were willing to initiate and legitimize this educational change. With the Palestinian case, maybe we see a lot of suffering, but we don't see any leaders that are really ready to say what we have taught our children.
It's terrible. We have to change our curriculum. I heard the same argument of the radicalization when I interviewed Mr. Edel Levin the other he said that has to change and it worked in Germany and it worked in Japan.
And I didn't counter argue, but my counter argument would have been that Germany was a very civilized country before Hitler to power and they were highly developed. They had democratic institutions. There was there was an inheritance of democracy within the German populace and Japan might not have been democratic, but it was a highly developed society. So there's a difference, no, between the Gazans and the Japanese and the Germans.
I agree. This is why I think that the Palestinians have a much longer way to go than the Germans and the Japanese. Indeed, we are completely right. The level of political development within the Palestinian society is much lower than it was in Germany or in Japan, which actually protects the conflict.
So what will happen the day after you defeat Hamas? Not much different. Basically, we'll see a situation like in Judea and Samaria where there may be some performer in the government, be it Palestinian. I don't know what happens there.
Palestinian authority or some kind of international regime and Hamas will try to reestablish it. And the Israeli reaction will be military. It will simply conduct raids in order to debilitate the military capabilities like we do in the West Bank. You think the Palestinians might have the taste for a prolonged struggle a few more hundred years, 300 more years?
But what about the Israeli society? How long do you think a comfortable, highly developed, high technological society can stand sending their kids into war? This is obviously a key question. But actually I'm quite encouraged by what happened during this war.
How so? On October 6, one day before the attack, Israeli society was very divided. And the level of hatred was extremely high. It was a very difficult period then Israel for people that tried to say things in a more moderate way, to have a civilized argument to the other side.
We don't have to agree on everything but we are not the enemy of the nation. They are not the enemy of the nation. And they changed. The world started.
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And there is great social cohesion. The level of volunteering by the civil society is incredible. We do things without the government. For many things, we don't need the government.
Just stay away and do the job. You turned out to won't be libertarians. In many ways, despite socialist traditions we had. So this is good news.
Of course, the people that went to to fight. Over 100% of the units reported to duty, which means the people that were already released from duty decided to join their former units. And it's not easy to be in Gaza as a soldier. The experience of my son.
You can't change even the socks in your shoes for a long period of time. I doubt that's the most horrible. You don't have any place to shower. So it's hard life as a soldier.
I was a combat soldier once. I know it's not only the danger of getting killed. The conditions of the battle are very difficult. And we see, they go.
Not only that, when they leave they get in order to report in a few months again. I'm sure they will. So all it took for a very fragmented Israeli society to come together was a huge crisis and over a thousand dead and the most horrific ways. It's wrong to see the Israeli society as divided or fragmented.
Why? I think there is much more consensus than people think. I'll give you an example of several issues. Obviously, the Swargh De Ashkenazi divide is no longer relevant.
You know, maybe it's a hardy without the community. But my students at the university couldn't care less, you know, who was who? What kind of family you came from. So this is also what we call intermarriage.
European sense or American sense of intermarriage. Every one in the South Marriages between Ashkenazi and Swargh De. If we take a look at economic issues, once we were, there were great divisions of opinion between capitalists and socialists. By now, we all are good capitalists.
You know, as I hear and say some remnants of socialist ideology and people that didn't grow up, but most of the society is happy with a capitalist system, a benign capitalist system. And I think there's no longer issue of this being. Even about the territories. Do you mean what you would call Judeo-Someria?
I'm talking about the Golan Heights, for example, Orgaza or Sinai. On Golanza, there is a huge amount of support for staying there. That's it. In Gaza, there was a great disagreement about whether we should only let her leave Gaza or not.
But now most people, the instinct of most Israelis, stay out of Gaza. And this is what this government said from the very beginning. We have no intention of staying in Gaza. And despite the voices that say, no, we should settle in Gaza, but this is not part of the government and this is the right-wing government.
Not part of the right-wing government platform. And in Judeo-Dian Samaria, I think most Israelis are ready for a territorial compromise. Meaning that in case there would be a partner, we are ready to make territorial concessions. Not in Jerusalem, not in the Jordan Valley, but in other areas, that's fine.
But there is also a great consensus, there is no partner. Yes. So what are we fighting for? We fought over basically the power of the Supreme Court of Justice, which is not, in my view, not such a very important issue.
After all, and I'm favor of contelling the powers of the Supreme Court of Justice. After all, the government gave up the reform. For all particular reasons, they may say, for all particular reasons, the story that some people in the country, maybe they don't understand the issue. It doesn't matter why, they are very much opposed to how the reform was proposed.
And basically in the Tanya, we gave it up. This is also not part of his real concern, his concern to the other thing. Actually, the crisis was a result of his neglected issue. He allowed other people to deal with it and it was mismanaged.
So I don't think that there are many issues that are of great dispute. Of course, there is one important issue, it's religion. We divide it into religious and non-religious, but this is not a real dichotomy. It's a continuum.
We have the real religious secularists, we have the religious and the moderate religious designers, and we have the ultra-orthodox in the middle. We have a lot of what we call traditionalists, which go in the shut-back mornings, they go to the synagogue, and in the afternoon they go and see a soccer match, a football match. And even among the ultra-orthodox, we see now what we call a new phenomenon, or light ultra-orthodox. People that go and work and send their kids to ultra-orthodox schools, but in some of the ultra-orthodox schools, there is already secular studies.
So we have this phenomenon, it's not one split, but I think it's the beginning of a slow, very slow, too slow in my view, change in the ultra-orthodox community. So I think it's this view of divided Israeli society, different tribes, as the president said, it's a wrong view. Hellenistic Jews against Barcoza. No?
Barcoza was not a Hellenistic. No, he wasn't, they were fighting each other. No, Barcoza was fighting for the Romans. He was a Maccabees for the Hellenistic Jews.
We have a Hellenistic Jew, maybe reform movement, we can see it, too. But the reform is not in power, nothing. Like the Hellenists, the Hellenists are right to shove their beliefs through the sort of the others. So Israel is more solidified than it has been in a long time now.
Oh, definitely. Do you think after Gaza is a time to deal with Hezbollah now? Is this a right time? I advocated a preemptive strike against Hezbollah some time ago.
Yes, I know you did. So you were still on that position? Of course, now it's not a preemptive strike. They started the world, they should pay for it.
We have to bring back over 100,000 settlers along the northern border. If we don't win the war against Hezbollah, they will not go back. We cannot allow the situation that is currently, you know, a status quo of today to continue. We have to take care of the Hezbollah.
And how will this be done? By force. Air raids, ground forces. You have to include a ground force, a ground invasion.
And I think one thing that became clear during this war, the notions that the big war will not come, will not be in this region again, at home. There are some people in the IDF, that's all, that's right. Also, the notions that, which was America important, that so good intelligence and air power, you can win the war. It ain't so.
You have to fight the world all the way. America and Britain has now said that they might unilaterally acknowledge the Palestinian state. Do you think that will change the situation? No.
So many countries recognize the Palestinian state? Swissians, one of them. No, already in 1988. Who?
I don't remember, but their countries, you know, particularly third world countries, recognize this, they declare the state. So they declare again what counts its facts on the ground. They can call themselves whatever they want. But they cannot establish a state.
And I'll tell you why. The main criteria for a state, for political unity, to be called the state, according to political scientists, political sociologists, Max Weber, for example, is monopoly over use of force. A country in Sweden, there are no militias, right? That used to be true.
Now we have gangster wars in the streets. Yeah, but this is a problem for the state, so it can be overcome. The Palestinians were given a state basically by Rabin and Zawaslouan. Don't forget.
His requirements from the Palestinians was no Supreme Court. And no human rights organization. If you got that, you can fight terrorism. This was Rabin's explicit world.
And they failed. You know, one finisher, Hamas took over Gaza. And not even in Gaza, there is monopoly over use of force, because they have another militia, the Palestinian Jihad. And in the West Bank, basically the PA lost control.
And you have militias in several refugee camps, which don't listen to what said in Ramallah. And I must say that this is not only a Palestinian problem. If we take a look at the Arab world, we have similar situations in Iraq, in Syria, and militias in Sudan, in Yemen, they have a problem. Yes, and a lot of these militias are funded by Iran.
It doesn't matter. The state should control its territory and have monopoly over use of force. I was just thinking that Hamas is an Iranian proxy, Hezbollah is a Iranian proxy, and why attack those and not go for the head of the snake? Oh, I'm ready.
Oh, really? You think Israel should preemptively attack Iran? I think it's very difficult. It's a strong state.
It's a large state. But we should take care again of the military capabilities, particularly the nuclear installations. And again, I'm on the record since 2005 that we should take out critical nuclear installations in Iran. And nobody else is going to do that for us.
It's an illusion that Americans will do something about it. But why? I mean, it should be in America's interest. It should be, shouldn't it?
To preserve Hassan Lee Khan now all over the world, and ensure the safety of the sea lanes. Freedom of the skies? No? I fully agree with you.
But what we think is common wisdom, it's not necessarily the common wisdom in a democratic administration. Do you think there will be a change of Trump wins the election? For example, I'm not sure. Because when Trump was president, the Iranians destroyed half of the Saudi capability to produce oil for quite a while, and Trump didn't do anything about it.
Trump, maybe one exception, killing Soleimani, didn't touch the Iranians. But killing Soleimani is sort of a signal, isn't it? It's more than Biden has done. Well, Biden has done a few things also, but signals are not enough.
You have to follow the signals if the signals are not convincing enough. And I don't think that the Iranians took seriously those signals, and they think that America is a paper tiger. And to some extent, they're right. Their political analysis seems to be more correct than the American one.
I just don't understand how that can be. It's still the greatest military in the world. The biggest? Yes, but you need political leadership.
America is a democracy, and the military is there and it's an order to do something by the political leadership. So what happens after Israel preemptively? No, not preemptively because Hezbollah started the war, but let's say that defeat Hezbollah. Will you stay in will Israel have to stay in southern Lebanon?
Not necessarily. We learned that staying there is costly, and also very problematic politically at home. So we should adopt strategic rates and go in, kill a few bad guys, destroy as much as we can, go home. And after a while, do it again.
This is our destiny here. For another 300 years apparently. So that's what we have to do. Why don't the world like the Jews?
It's a very difficult question, but it is quite clear that at least for the last 2000 years, we are not a very liked nation. I suffered antisemitism on other challenges in Europe. You were born in Gucharist Romania. Right, I was called Deltiju.
I beat them back. And it's a question I'm not sure I have an authoritative answer. Now it's we are not popular. I think that people now when they face a new wave of antisemitism, how can they be?
But we were lucky to have a short period in our history after the Holocaust when there was some time of the P.T. does, which was a lot of this element. But it's all Holocaust impact is evaporating. And people are back at the cultural thing.
We killed God. We killed the God. And I remember I was in the United States in the South ones. I came out of the supermarket and the small black boy.
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I wore a yarmulke obviously and the stuff I was doing. And they asked me, why did you kill that? And I looked at him. I said, do I look like a killer?
I said, no. So we went to each one or went to each one. But obviously heard it at home somewhere in his chair. Well, you should have told them it wasn't big, it was Italians.
And they just let me choose. I don't think he would be convinced. It is so ingrained in the European culture. And to some extent, it's different, of course, in non-biblical cultures.
And India, China. Although we see signs of antisemitism in China nowadays. Yes, which is probably politically more. Political motivated others than culture.
I was in China many years ago, many years ago, over a decade. And my local guide pointed out books in the bookstore and said, these are about Jews. And I asked, so what do they say? Well, their self-help books.
This is how the Jews took over the world. You can do it too. Baron Rochael, this is how he conquered everything. So they still had some antisemitic notions, but they saw them as positive things.
And now it has changed. In those areas, I think there is great admiration of the Jewish people. In China, in India, in Japan. Maybe it was a grain of envy.
But of course, in India, obviously, not many know how many we are. So... They are quite numerous themselves. Yeah, but when we tell them, we are 8 million here.
We make so much noise. They don't believe it. They don't believe it. We have to adjust to it.
That's part of our life. And I think the health cell was wrong, to establish a Jewish state, to normalize the state of the Jews. In some ways, they did. But we did not get rid of antisemitism.
This is too much anger. Maybe so. Maybe so. I mean, to tell if it was wrong.
It was 2000 years. It was a long period. Maybe it will change. My institute doesn't deal with antisemitism.
I know, but I wanted to ask you, because from lectures, I've seen you tend to mention it. Because I think that antisemitism is a disease of the gentle world. It's not our job to kill the gentle world. We are too small, too weak, to heal the whole world.
It's our job to do it. It's the one to heal themselves of this terrible disease. They should invest money into their education system. And Jews should not put even one penny into this.
I know I'm not very popular by saying it, but... You were talking to a Jew who was actually written a book about antisemitism for junkies. But I did make some money from it too. Okay.
Then it's okay. So yeah. So, but what if America and the West force? What happens then?
Can Israel stand alone? I mean, Israel defines itself in its national character as a Western country, believes in democracy, freedom of women, freedom of LGBT, QIA people. First of all, we have a small state. And it's always possible that Jews will make enough mistakes to destroy their state.
We have, obviously, we've seen particularly pre-October 7, destructive feelings, destructive deeds by Jews and Israel. This is a possibility. But there are not too many nations that were able to survive the destruction of the state, go into exile and survive. We are the best example of surviving without the state.
I think one of the few, if not the only who got their state back. I'll stay here. You'll stay here. I'm staying here, but if anybody goes into exile, I think there is enough Jewish ammunition, cultural, religious.
To continue the peoplehood. Not without difficulties. Actually, we lost the state twice in our history and we are back. Yes, for the time being.
But so, disregarding Jewish mistakes, let's say every Jew in Israel does everything right, as well as every Israeli Arab, Jews, Baha'i, whomever, Bedwin, without a patron like the United States, which is a patron of Israel. After all, you can't deny that. Will Israel stand alone? Because coming from Western Europe, I'll tell you, they don't seem to be waking up and finding their national spirit anytime soon.
I don't know how the international system will develop. No, but you are the best, the most qualified person in this room to ask. But I don't know the future. I live in the land of the prophets, but I'm not the prophet.
So, if you are smart enough, you can maneuver into a world that some people will see with allies, some people will see with an enemy. Obviously, not everybody in our agency is an enemy. Actually, now I think most Arab countries, I don't know if most, but in our immediate region, CRS as a savior against Iranian expansionism. With America going away, this is basically the perception.
So, actually, in a world in which America is maybe, you know, further away than it was, we are managing. Look at the agreements that were signed during Trump times, Abraham and God, they survived. And Saudi Arabia. You think the peaceful process or the normalization process will continue?
So far, it was not damaged. The Saudis are saying they want to continue with normalization, with some conditions or whatever, you know, we don't have to take seriously everything. leaders are saying, you know, that's... One of the conditions is the Palestinian state.
So, you know, they have lived without the Palestinian state for so many years. Maybe they can live a few years more. So, you see, as Israel will survive, it will continue to integrate into the region. It will get to know its neighbors better, some of them at least.
I mean, I don't see Syria, Lebanon, queuing up to become friends of Israel soon. Yeah, but the question is, will those sides survive? Good question. What do you think?
Syria and Lebanon are not a serious enemy. Israel can go on Syria to win without fear. What can they do to us? You know, the military capabilities are very limited.
You know, since my life is, of course, a large arsenal of missiles, which is very problematic. But we can deal with this situation. At what cost? What do you think would be the cost if there's more not a side that it is fighting for its own existence?
Nasser Allah wants to survive. Will he unleash one of them? That's plus 100,000. He may, and then the cost will be high.
But what alternative do we have? I wouldn't know, Professor. You are the expert. We have to, we learned that we cannot allow very strong military capabilities to be sustained over time.
This is what the war is all about. We have to promote the rest. And continue to know the rest. Right.
Until then, we'll be okay. This creates deterrence and respect. In this part of the world, the use of forces, part and parcel of the rules of the game, and it has great legitimacy. Yes, it seems to be the only currency they buy actually.
Right. So deterrence. Yeah, deterrence. Fear.
Deterrence is fear. Fear is the best political currency on the Middle East. So a horrible thing to hear from a smiling owner. Maybe experienced.
So with the right glasses, you know, it depends much on what kind of lens you have on the situation. Yes. Well, we should entertain no illusions. I have quite an unhistorical lens with a comedian's sort of the situation.
I think life is a comedy, if you have a very dark sense of humor. Well, sometimes it's a tragic comedy. Yes. Sometimes it is.
So thank you so much. You're welcome. It was a pleasure talking to you and an owner. And thank you.
And send me a link. Oh, I absolutely will. Okay. Thank you for tuning in to deconstructed criticism.
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