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Apr 24, 2019 30 min

The Innovation Economy

from Azeem Azhar's Exponential View Hosted by EPIIPLUS 1 Ltd / Azeem Azhar

“We haven’t really understood the power of the state,” argues economist Mariana Mazzucato, warning that this has impacted the rising inequality in wealth creation and distribution. Mariana and Azeem Azhar discuss the role of government in innovation and business growth, risk-taking as the new mentality of bureaucracy, and how the benefits of entrepreneurial innovation have been misread. Above all, the case is made for a new theory of value in today’s economy. In this conversation, Mariana and Azeem also discuss: The role of the entrepreneurial state: moving away from the concept of the state as a facilitator and towards the state as an actor in the future of public-serving innovation. Why the GDP model is flawed — but why we should retain it as one of several economic indicators. Creeping privatization of the ‘data economy.’ Further Reading: “Yes, Government Creates Wealth” (September 2018) “Let’s make private data into a public good” (June 27, 2018) “Rethinking the Smart City” (January 2018) “The unlikely tech giant empowering citizens through data” (March 12, 2019) “Strategic design for public purpose” (March 8, 2019) Mariana Mazzucato @MazzucatoM Azeem Azhar @azeem www.exponentialview.co About Exponential View: Welcome to Exponential View, where Azeem Azhar examines how exponential technologies such as AI are reshaping the future. Each week, Azeem shares his analysis or speaks with an expert guest to shed light on frontier shifts across technology, business and society. To keep up with the Exponential transition, subscribe to this channel or the newsletter: https://www.exponentialview.co/ To keep up with our AI economy research, subscribe to https://www.investmentbrief.ai/ Where to find me: Exponential View newsletter: https://www.exponentialview.co/ Website: https://www.azeemazhar.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/azeem/ Twitter/X: https://x.com/azeem Production by EPIIPLUS1. Production and research: Baba Films, Marija Gavrilov.

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World-renowned economist Mariana Mazzucato discusses the role of the state as a value creator and how we can apply mission-oriented models of innovation to solve today’s burning challenges.

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The Innovation Economy

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Hello, I'm Azim Azhar and you're listening to the Exponential View podcast, part of the Harvard Business Review's HBR Presents Network. Exponential View is a series of interdisciplinary conversations with the world's leading thinkers on technology and the near future. This season is all about the emerging paradigms that will govern every aspect of our lives in the near future. It's clear that the current rules, both explicit and assumed, of today's world are being destroyed by the onslaught of the tech revolution. So these conversations have been curated to offer both an insight into the forces that will underpin our new world and a sense of just how rapid and profound these changes will be.

If you enjoy this show, please take 30 seconds to give us a five-star rating on your podcast app of choice. It really does help other listeners find us. Today I'm in London with one of the most sought-after economists of the day, Professor Mariana Mazzucato. Mariana is the founder and director of the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose at the University College of London. She also teaches the economics of innovation and public purpose. She's been named as one of the three most important thinkers about innovation by the magazine New Republic, and she's leading the thinking about value and wealth in this new world. Her recent book, The Value of Everything, has been shortlisted for the Financial Times McKinsey Business Book of the Year Award. Mariana, it's great to be talking to you. Thank you. I'm very happy to be here.

We first met a decade ago during the financial crisis and quite a strange dinner. And a few years after that, you published a book called The Entrepreneurial State, which has had quite a profound effect on my thinking. So I'm very excited to have this conversation with you. But let's kick off by asking you, Mariana, to reflect on the shifts that you're observing that have been motivating your work and the novel ideas you've been bringing forward to us. So I guess the main points I tried to get across in the entrepreneurial state were we actually don't even understand what the state is in the evolution of technology. If we only see the state as facilitator, de-risker, administrator, enabler.

then it's hard for us to even understand the history of Silicon Valley. And for me, it was very important to just historically even just show the breadth and depth of the public investments that got us basically all the things that currently make our smartphones and smart products smart and not stupid. So that includes the internet, GPS, Siri, touchscreen display, for example. And I would argue that because we haven't really understood the power of the state, we also haven't understood why that power needs to be constantly contested and debated. You know, what are we actually creating? What value is being created? And in The Value of Everything, I kind of also link that to rise of inequality, because if we don't have a real concept of wealth creation and risk-taking as a collective effort, and even markets as understood as outcomes of the investments in the public sector, the private sector, the third sector, then it's also hard to really share that wealth. We end up just socializing risks, but privatizing rewards by not really...

thinking about value as collectively co-created, we also end up confusing rents with profits. So value extraction with value creation. And it's not that value extraction is new, but for example, the landlords of the 17th century didn't pretend to be value creators or innovators or great dynamic beings. They just said, give me your money. Well, I have to confess, I really enjoyed both of your books. A great deal of the media discourse around innovation is connected to the entrepreneur. And the entrepreneur often looks like a Tony Stark-like character in their shiny suit and being brilliant in their solo work in their cave. We even see this with Thomas Edison, who talks about failing 10,000 times before he succeeded. How do you think that narrative has failed us?

Just think of Steve Jobs when he talked to the Stanford graduating class back in 2005, and he very inspiringly told them if they wanted to innovate, they had to be hungry and foolish. If we can't talk about the risk-taking role also of the bureaucrats, so the kind of risk-taking that occurred, for example, in DARPA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Defense, which was mainly responsible for the Internet, the kind of risk-taking that today is also occurring in some public banks around the world, from the Chinese Development Bank to the European Investment Bank. the kind of thinking out of the box that's also required within the civil service to constantly question whether they have the right structures and capabilities. If instead you understand that this is actually an outcome of systems of innovation, and those systems and ecosystems being critical in order to get entrepreneurial ecosystems more than obsessing about individual entrepreneurs, then the kind of questions one asked, the kind of systems that are required in order to have innovative nations, like startup nations, say in Israel, or the Silicon Valley kind of dynamic, or today, if you look at China, Germany, and Denmark, and how they're thinking about green as a real transition, a radical transition for the whole economy, then again, we get a self-fulfilling prophecy. It seems like private institutions do something.

difference to states. And if you think about what states did in the space of innovation, they created the internet through DARPA, as you said, they innovated around GPS, which came through, I guess, the US military. That feels quite different to the types of innovation you get out of the... the private sector. If we look at the largest amounts of value creation in the last decade, it's been with firms like Facebook or Tencent or Google. And those things look and feel different, do they? So there are, say, public labs, including CERN, where there was actual publicly paid civil servants who were from an international organization like CERN coming up with HTML. Tim Berners-Lee was paid by tax money when he did that. But also public funds that were behind Google's algorithm. So both Compaq and Intel got SBIR funding in the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Funding allows small, medium enterprises that actually can service.

something that the state needs. And when you have that, there's this real scaling up potential because the state ends up forming your market. But that's public money, right? Okay. And just to clarify that, that type of funding is much more active than a simple providing a tax break to people investing in innovation. Exactly. So that's direct. Tax breaks are indirect. And many countries, I think, over-utilize tax breaks thinking.

that the private sector already wants to invest. And by giving them a tax incentive, by reducing the cost of innovation, somehow they're going to innovate more. But the truth is most private organizations have no desire to innovate, are perfectly happy with the status quo, and are quite inertial. Those that do, those that do want to innovate, first of all, they need patient long-term finance. And unfortunately, lots of the finance out there, very short-termists, including most venture capital funds, want to exit in three or five years for an IPO or buyout. And that's caused lots of troubles in the private sector. So also understanding that finance isn't neutral, that the innovative enterprises that you mentioned have actually benefited also from patient long-term public finance. That's another sort of important part of the equation.

I think there is a system at work in the private sector. There are many venture capital firms. There are many thousands of founders. Founders give it a shot. They succeed or they fail. If they fail, they go back around again.

That dynamic is the thing that should theoretically keep that part of the innovation economy honest. What are the systems you have to put in place to keep state-led innovation honest? In other words, not chase white elephants and finally say, look, this is a route that is not worth pursuing. We're going to cut it off without it becoming politicized or a game of backsheesh. So that's a really interesting question also because it's something we're working on in a very practical way here at the Institute. So part of what we try to do is also think about changes in the curriculum for how we train bureaucrats. But what we've been working with is this concept of the mission.

Right. So when I said before that everything in our smart products was funded by the public sector, from the Internet to GPS, et cetera, you need to ask yourself, well, what actually what fueled that? And the answer is problems. It wasn't that they obsessed about the Internet in and of itself. It wasn't that they obsessed about GPS as a technology. The question was, how can we get the satellites to communicate? Big problem. Internet ended up solving that one. How can we know where the ships are in the seas? GPS solved that one. So the real question today, not so much to keep governments honest, but to fuel relevant.

technology and also to fuel an interesting debate about that is what are the modern day missions that can be solving not just technological challenges but societal ones what we often call wicked problems that have to do just as much about behavioral change political social regulatory changes and here it's really interesting to start with the sustainable development goals because they've actually been agreed on by over 100 countries those are challenges right in the same way that the space race was the challenge that sputnik moment was a challenge that the moonshot kind of tried to answer innovation really thrives when you have lots of serendipity when there's again bottom-up interactions and multiple solutions but without a dare I say, top-down direction, a wide enough direction that's wide enough in order to allow lots of these multiple bottom-up solutions, lots of this stuff just gets dispersed. So we have the missions at the top that are sort of helping to direct and foster the overall direction. Within the private sector, the process of innovating, certainly within the technology startup community, is that the market acts to provide signals of whether a particular direction is

becoming effective. And as a founder, what happens is that you raise a certain amount of money. It's certainly not enough to get you to break even. It's enough to get to a certain milestone. Once you approach that milestone, you go back out to the market and there are any number of venture capitalists who are looking at that milestone and they're judging whether they think you've got enough momentum, whether you've got the wherewithal to go on this very, very difficult innovator's journey, and whether you, given all the other firms in the space, have really got that sort of je ne sais quoi that will take you on. There's something that happens in that process that winnows out dead ends, that doubles down on approaches that seem to be working.

more. And it's a micro or maybe a meso structure in the process. So if you think about making states more innovative and getting them involved in innovation more frequently, what performs that type of role, that winnowing and chaffing role? Well, that's a really good question. In fact, if you take the entrepreneurial state point seriously, it shows that actually without those public funds, they wouldn't have been able to reach scale. Now, the real answer to your question is that because the question is so relevant...

That's why we need to really look at the organizational structure. So for me, the whole DARPA thing is not just to say, oh, look at this public money that was important behind the internet. It was, hey, what was occurring in DARPA? How did they actually organize themselves? How did they take the risk? How did they know when to turn the tap off, which is just as important as when to turn it on? So yes, turn it on, be patient, look over the kind of three to five year VC cycle. But if something's not working, shift, pivot, be flexible, adapt. And that's just as important as being ambitious around a mission. Well, if I think about that challenge, I mean, even within the private sector and the venture capital and startup world, which I know reasonably well as a former founder and as an investor, there was definitely a...

it's definitely a difficult game because even the very best investors get it wrong four, five, six times out of 10. And they're proud of it. The thing that seems to be quite difficult for the state is how do we create an environment that allows public servants to make those mistakes? Because they don't make those mistakes through malfeasance or incompetence. They make the mistakes because the problem was unknowable and we were trying to figure it out. And sometimes it just doesn't work out.

Well, I think you're not seen as a value creator and just a facilitator, redistributor, a value that's created in the private sector. And that is how we talk about it. Just open The Economist magazine and the editorial every single week kind of puts this across that at best the state redistributes and facilitates. And once you've done that, you know, get out of the way. Then that level of ambition and risk taking isn't something that we use to also attract civil servants to enter the public sector in the first place. It's no problem that Elon Musk is coming into the space area like Richard Branson. But when we start to mythologize about them.

to act as if they're the real innovators and NASA is just this bulky dinosaur-ish kind of organization that at best does International Space Station and that it should just be there to fuel the success of this great kind of creative spirit of Elon Musk, then we actually, A, don't understand what NASA actually did, which is not only having fueled a lot of the investments inside SpaceX, but the actual capabilities, the people that went into SpaceX very early on were direct results of internal NASA capacity. Is there something about this moment in time, the turn of the second decade of the 21st century, that makes these ideas particularly important? I think so. And it comes back to the SDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals. It's not very common in history to have had a global agreement on such a challenging set of targets. They were signed up to globally. And if we want to not just talk the talk, but walk it, we need to think, well, what's the innovation road mapping in order to get there? If we want to do it, we should really apply to those problems the kind of lessons that we've learned around the other big problems, like, you know, again, going to the moon and back again.

And so this is a period in history where we need, you know, just to really tackle climate change. And the IPCC report tells us we better do it in the next 12 years or it'll be too late. There are definitely huge inequality problems in health systems really kind of being very, very stressed. But instead of just thinking that it's about, again, you know, bringing in some renewable energy and really seeing this as a massive transition that's required across the planet, let's use our understanding of innovation and really throw it at that problem. So one thing that you look at in your second book.

is about how we think about value. And how we think about value seems to be the way in which the incentives get created that drive innovation in the private sector. Why do we think about value in the wrong way? What's very interesting about modern day economists is that the concept of value has gone from being objective. So tied to real understandings of the division of labor, productivity, production to a subjective category. So basically the causation reversed. Instead of having a theory of value that determined a theory of price, we today have a theory of price, which comes about through subjective decision-making processes across the economy. And that determines our theory of value.

And literally at the macroeconomic level, how we do our accounting. So how we measure national output through gross domestic product, GDP, is only through things that have a price. We actually make no value judgment on it, which is really interesting because it means if you marry your cleaner, GDP will fall because maybe that cleaner man or woman was doing something, you were paying them, now they're doing it, you're married to them, you're just not paying them. So this is kind of the... Or Exxon Valdez is a favorite example of mine. After the Exxon Valdez spill, the GDP or the gross product of Alaska increased because it was all the money spent on cleaning it up. So we don't have any value measurement of the effects that pollution have in a negative way. But what's even more interesting is finance. So finance up until the 1970s wasn't even included in GDP because it really was seen as just a transfer. It was seen as a transfer just in the same way.

the social security benefits are. You wouldn't include that in GDP. It's just moving money around. And then when the level of financial intermediation started just to really grow and outpace the rest of the economy, literally the people doing the accounting at the UN, the Systems of National Accounting people, SNA, were like, uh-oh, we better start including this thing. And the net interest payments, which up until then had not been included, so the difference between what banks earn and interest, the loans they give out and the interest they pay for deposits, that difference had not been counted. Whereas, say, the fee that you pay a mortgage provider was being counted because there was an obvious price to it. If we don't have a clear definition of the term, and yet we're trying to build

policies that might increase value and increase the creation of value across an economy. How can you bridge that gap? Because we've had a number recently, it was called GDP, that every... Treasury Minister tried to maximize. And that was their scorecard. At the end of the year, they'd go home and tell their parents, say, mom and dad, I increased the country's GDP by X. They're going to contest that definition. What should we be getting our economies to think about? Well, first of all, I wouldn't throw out GDP. And I would also worry when we focus too much on what to add to it. So well-being and happiness indicators. My view is that first, make sure you clean it up and take out the rent before you start adding other things. But it's really also that we've been allowing GDP.

to have too much power. So what we could use it for, we're actually not using it for. So for example, to differentiate how an economy is growing, whether it's growing more through consumption-led factors or investment-led factors, the UK, and you can see that with GDP. You can just look at which source of GDP is rising the highest. So the UK has been actually rising mainly through private consumption fueled by private debt. So the ratio of private debt to disposable income is back to what it was.

just before the financial crisis. And that's what caused the financial crisis to a large extent. And it shouldn't be used instead for like the 0.01% increase and you're getting nations to really worry about why it's fallen by this kind of decimal point. So the people who actually set up, if you came up with the GDP accounting scheme, including people like Simon Kuznets, they warned against that. They said, this is not, this shouldn't be used to literally steer economies at that level. But it sounds like you need to have a much more nuanced and complex public discussion on all of this as well, because as you're describing this, I'm starting to think, well, there's a whole set of things that are...

delivered for free by the state and by the private sector. There's the fact that the $500 you spend on a phone today buys you much more of a phone than the $500 you spent five years ago or 10 years ago. And then there are also these questions about the shape and the nature of where that wealth and opportunity goes. I mean, you talked a little bit about share buybacks. And one of the things that's happened in the last 30 or 40 years is the share of corporate income that has gone back to the workers has been declining.

consistently across every major economy, apart from Russia, it's actually strange enough, but Russia is not going to be held out as an exemplar for economic policy. And I'm starting to speak to more and more economists who say that the issue is not one of growth. The issue is actually one of distribution and that the underlying structure of particularly modern, advanced digital capitalism is that it doesn't have a particular, any good answers to the questions of distribution. Is that a reasonable position? Well, the first part of what you said, I would definitely agree with.

And in fact, I often have to remind people that David Ricardo back in 1821 was already asking the problem that everyone thinks is new today, which is our robots going to take our jobs. He had a chapter of principles of political economy, which is chapter 31 called On Machinery, where he kind of noticed what was happening in the period of the Industrial Revolution, where all this mechanization was basically resulting in machines displacing labor. But as long as profits were being reinvested from, say, machinery A back into some other part of the economy, new jobs were actually forming. And I think that's what's new, that that lack of reinvestment, for example, due to the financialization of the corporate sector, but also financialization of finance itself, where finance is basically fueling other parts of the financial sector. So they call it FIRE, finance, insurance, and real estate. Those two trends, financialization of the financial sector and financialization of the real economy, have done more damage to skills and wages and jobs.

than any robot could do. But the real question is, if you do also reinvest those profits by also limiting the amount of financialization, and there's different ways to do that, we used to do that, the level of share buybacks we see today actually used to be illegal, then if you're not at the same time fueling growth in the real economy through, for example, much more ambitious fiscal programs that aren't just about counter-cyclality, but really forming, for example, helping to fuel a green transition, then just because you get a lot of money into the economy doesn't mean it's going to find its way. you know, into productive sources. If you just look at the amount of QE, quantitative easing, that's happened since the crisis, most of it ended up back in the banking sector because we didn't have the kind of ambitious, also fiscal policies that were required to create these new opportunities. So some people argue that just the application of learning curves and rights law will drive down the price of many green technologies so that a simple profit motive will drive the private sector to invest. And we've certainly seen that solar power and even battery storage or energy storage is now competitive on an unsubsidized basis with almost any form of fossil fuel.

And we've also seen companies, Maersk being a recent one, the Danish shipping company, saying that it would go carbon neutral in 20 or 30 years, as I recall. Given that sort of progress in the private sector, why do we need states to stand up, set up missions and act? In particular, given that they don't seem to be acting that much at the moment. What you need states to do is really to get that kind of cross-sectoral, cross-actor collaboration that I was mentioning before with this notion of mission-oriented innovation. And you've seen that in Germany, for example, where the steel sector has actually lowered its material content to repurpose, reuse and recycle so that manufacturing.

you know, has a lower carbon footprint. And they simply would not have done that had there not been that kind of end of the mission of the German state, which, again, as I mentioned before, wasn't a top down idea from the kind of Kennedy moment kind of style. It very much came from lots of pressure over decades from the green movement. So instead of just getting handouts like the coal sector is now asking the U.S. government or the steel sector asks many different governments, if you're going to support the steel sector, make sure it's conditional on that sector actually transforming in order to meet a public objective. But you also need to use your taxation system in order to reward certain kinds of behavior over others. And it's striking that.

After the financial crisis, we still haven't even managed to have financial transaction tax, which would actually reward long-term investments over short-term ones. One state that is certainly not lacking in confidence is the Chinese state. But we have to draw some boundaries around that, really. We don't want our states to look like the Chinese state necessarily, do we? Well, there's many states that don't look too good right now, including the states we have across the West. So I would say the answer is yes, you're right. We don't want states to kind of just become big blobs, also push things, say, just into one direction that gets captured, whether it's captured by a particular party or captured by industry or captured by something else. But what the Chinese state has done very well is I often call it...

the adaptive state, they have actually learned the lessons from Silicon Valley, absolutely transforming its economy across the board. And that's because of this urgent problem of pollution. It's investing that in green, different types of green areas, including energy friendly, you know, IT. And so I think that's where the exciting thing is. How can you get different states across the world to see green as a transformation of its entire economy, get as much engagement?

with different groups in civil society to talk about that. So it's not purely top down, but actually it's not going to happen if you just kind of talk the talk without some strong incentives that reward companies that make those transformations. And what's interesting here is at the city level, and that's because cities have real concrete problems they have to solve. They do. Yeah, there's been some fantastic stuff going on with cities and changing the relationship, for example, they have with mobility and ride-hailing companies. I think in Barcelona and other cities, they've insisted that if you're going to operate a ride-hailing service, you have to share your...

some of your usage data back to the city for better public planning. I think that's really interesting because instead of just trying to pick up the mess afterwards where the data, you know, goes into companies and we worry about taxation, we worry about privacy, we worry about our public infrastructure falling apart, you know, the idea is how can you make sure you fundamentally change that relationship? So as the data is generated, by the way, using publicly funded technology, so, you know, what would Google be without the internet? What would Uber be without GPS? So as the data is generated, it actually comes back to some sort of public repository that's used to improve public services. Do you think there needs to be some time limit applied to...

these public innovations. I mean, you described GPS being essential to Uber's business, which it is, but GPS was built and developed 40 years ago. I mean, isn't it now time for us to just say, look, it's there, it's available, and we shouldn't assume that Uber owes... No, no, no, but that's not what I'm saying at all. In fact, I'm very happy for the state to think of its role as, you know, producing public goods, but then make sure that you also shape those systems so it really does produce public good. And by public good, I mean a good that's owned by the public sector. I mean, that's actually serving citizens. So we know, and there's plenty of documentation about this, that the Uberization of the economy, for example, is not exactly serving citizens. So, and there's no easy solution, but making sure that we recognize, and this comes back to the value proposition, that the Ubers of this world have benefited from a massive, not just collective investment, but from systems. There's a trend that I've observed that has made me uncomfortable, which has been that a lot of the technology companies have.

successfully migrated their businesses from actually selling stuff, selling package software or selling computers to making money off their data. And they didn't start there, but they ended up there. And they've managed to take something that isn't a traditional good, a kind of rivalrous exclusionary good. And they've been able to apply both technology and law to make it just that and make it a sort of enclose it. Things that could have been digital commons are now the domain of private assets held by private firms. Is that something that you recognize? Yeah, definitely. But in order to change that, it's not enough to say these digital companies are benefiting from our data. I think this is where the very interesting question becomes.

not just blaming the companies and saying, oh, look, you're bad, you're extracting a huge amount of value, but how can we form new types of relationships in the same way that we govern, you know. the UN or how Wikipedia brings different people together, how we all accept that human rights are something very important that we think about collectively, we should start recognizing that the data question is as ambitious as the human rights question. And yes, it benefits from different types of technologies, but the issues it raises up should almost come to the level of rights. And then do we have an economics of human rights? The answer is no. We have the economics of public goods, but the data question, I think, poses questions that we haven't even understood. Mariana, we could keep talking. I know, and we're going to run short of time. Thank you so much for making the time today. Really helpful for listeners to know.

First of all, which of your books, if not both, they should buy? Tell us what they are and how they might find you on the internet. Right. Okay. Definitely buy both. The Entrepreneurial State and the Value of Everything. They tackle the question in two different ways on the internet. Well, I'm on Twitter, at Matsukato M. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you for listening to Exponential View. If you're new to my podcast, I encourage you to explore the archives. You'll find my previous conversations with many of the world's leading thinkers on the tech revolution. And remember to give us a five-star rating on your podcast platform of choice. To stay in touch, follow me on Twitter. I'm at Azeem. That is A-Z-E-E-M. And subscribe to my newsletter, Exponential View.

at www.exponentialview.co. I'm your host, Azim Azhar. This podcast was produced by Maria Gavrilov and Fred Casella. Boyan Savicello is the sound editor. Exponential View is a production of E to the Pi I Plus One Limited, and Exponential View is part of the HBR Presents Network.

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