UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSHUA SCHATZ

Background Joshua Schatz pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B), while preserving his right to appeal the application of the enhanced mandatory minimum in Section 2252A(b)(2). At sentencing, he had a prior Indiana conviction under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-3(b) for child molesting based on fondling a two-year-old child. He argued that the Indiana statute was broader than comparable federal sex-abuse statutes because it covered victims under fourteen and lacked certain federal age-line and age-difference limits. The district court applied the enhancement and imposed a ten-year sentence, which matched the statutory minimum. The court’s reasoning The court applied the categorical approach and, following its en banc decision in United States v. Liestman, first interpreted the phrase "relating to" in Section 2252A(b)(2) broadly rather than as requiring strict element-by-element congruence with federal sex-abuse offenses. The panel explained that identical language in Section 2252(b)(1) had already been read expansively in Liestman, and that this reading controlled here. Under that framework, the question was whether the least serious conduct covered by Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-3(b) bore the necessary connection to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward. The court concluded that all violations of the Indiana statute, which criminalizes sexualized fondling or touching with a child under fourteen, relate to the federal benchmark even if the state statute is somewhat broader than federal analogs on victim age or age-difference requirements. Those differences did not defeat the required connection because the statute still addressed the same kind of child sexual abuse conduct. Liestman requires a similarly broad reading of § 2252A(b)(2), and under that broad reading all violations of § 3(b) “relat[e] to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Slip op. at 2 What it means going forward In the Seventh Circuit, prior state convictions for child-sex offenses may trigger Section 2252A(b)(2)’s mandatory minimum even when the state statute is not perfectly matched to federal sex-abuse statutes, so long as the offense bears the required connection under the court’s broad reading of "relating to."