Talking Talmud

2 mishnayot! The first one includes the details about a non-believing Jew who participates in shechitah, and whether that shechitah would be kosher. And the mishnah is preceded by Gemara that includes a discussion of a Jewish apostate. The mishnah includes what manner of disposing of the blood of kosher shechitah are acceptable and which are problematic because they smack of idolatry. The second mishnah lists ways of dedicating one's shechitah in ways that make it invalid. Plus other key variations on intent and the way one's actions might be misinterpreted.

A new mishnah! One who slaughters an animal in the name of worship of natural bodies (mountains, rivers, seas, etc.), then the slaughtering is not kosher shechitah. Even if two people are doing the slaughtering together and one of them has correct "kosher" intent, the shechitah is still not valid. But it's also not fully idolatry either - except for a beraita that presents comparable cases as being idolatry (with slight differences that make room to say they are different). Also, if one's animal is lying in front of idolatry, then the moment one cuts that animal, it's prohibited - because it smacks of idolatry, even if it was not intended as such (live, the animal isn't a concern of idolatry, or not until a physical act is done to it). But does that really work? To make another person's animal problematic? The distinction is drawn between a "zevach" (or a shelamim/peace-offering) and a "chatat" - sin-offering.

If one slaughters an animal with intent to use the blood for idolatrous purposes, is the rest of the animal forbidden for any benefit or not? Yes, it's a machloket. With hypothetical parallels to pigul. Unless you think nothing in the Temple can be used to infer halakhic details for that which does not pertain to the Temple service. Also, a husband who writes a bill of divorce that was written when he is healthy as a safeguard against the future, and then he dies -- but if he had no knowledge of that risk to his life, then his intent in writing the divorce is absent and the divorce is not a divorce. Conversely, one who inherits a contract of slaves cannot free them by protesting the ownership.

An animal that is close to death demonstrates its vitality by some form of movement. Of course, the degree and nature of movement is subject to dispute. Also, a new mishnah - if/when one slaughters an animal for a non-Jew, that shechitah should be kosher, depending on the idolatry factor.

A new mishnah! Establishing the category of an animal that is close to death (misukenet) -- in contrast to a treyfa, where it becomes clear that the animal had something wrong internally and would likely have died within the year. This case is an animal that is weak, not damaged internally. Thus, signs of vitality during shechitah become essential, to be certain that the animal didn't die of its own accord just prior to the shechitah. Also, how the Gemara ensures the distinction between a treyfa and an animal that is close to death already, with the prohibited fat (cheilev) as a key point.

Another baraita on the impact of blood on - in this case, a gourd of terumah - in terms of making it susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and Rabbi Hiyya have a debate about that. Of course, if there is blood and shechitah on the gourd throughout the process, that would render the gourd susceptible to impurity. But perhaps not if the process itself were interrupted. Also, Resh Lakish poses a question regarding a dry portion of a grain-offering - if/when would that become susceptible to impurity? Noting that it still would need to come in contact with water (or the other liquids) to achieve that. Note also the distinction between the impurity that comes from a dead body as compared to that from a creepy-crawly.

A case of a person who is eating non-sacred food at the level of purity of sacrificial food - which doesn't really give off that impurity to the next level. Plus, the hierarchy of impurity means that something that is pure in and of itself can be regarded as impure in comparison to something that is pure with a higher standard of purity. Also, on the susceptibility of impurity - will shechitah itself render the meat susceptible to impurity? Plus, the impact of how an animal dies, including whether at the hands of the Angel of Death. That is, the blood of the animal should establish susceptibility to impurity -- regardless of how the animal died.

More on how to understand the mishnah -- and whether the level of sanctity raised there is potentially really that of terumah, or perhaps that of sacrificial offerings (and how that would be determined). Note that terumah is only ever a gift from one's produce - that which grows from the ground, and it would not be confused with meat (in contrast to the sacrificial meat as compared to regular non-sacred meat, which makes more sense in the context of the mishnah). [Who's Who: Ullah] Also, what happens if a person eats impure food? Well, first, how impure is the food?

A new mishnah! What happens if the animal doesn't bleed at the time of shechitah? Apparently, that's a kosher shechitah. And one's impure hands won't render the meat impure (unless the slaughtering itself made it susceptible to impurity, and not just the liquid of the blood). The Gemara reexplains the mishnah to explain that the mishnah could not be talking about sacrificial foods, with several follow-up points to make the case that much stronger. Also, the Gemara delves into the impure hands, and what degree of impurity they may carry. Plus, the case of someone who purifies his hands and then exposes them to impure hands again - depending on how much exposure his whole body received, it may make a difference for what degree of impurity do his hand carry.

2 mishnayot! 1 - A person is slaughtering an animal and the knife falls and he picks it up to complete the slaughtering... as long as the shechitah is completed in the time that it would take to slaughter the animal to begin with, that's kosher. If it takes more time, then it's not a valid shechitah. But different animals - and fowl - take different amounts of time to do the shechitah. Does the statement of "shechting the animal" apply to every animal/bird, or does the time fluctuate depending on the animal/bird at hand? 2 - What if only one of the simanim/pipes were severed correctly, of the esophagus and trachea? If the animal is unfit, it is presented as a treyfa - but then the Gemara addresses such cases as a neveilah.

A new mishnah! In the case of a knife fell and slaughtered the animal officially correctly, the shechitah is not actually kosher because a person must be involved doing the slaughtering. But if a person dropped the knife, even without intent, then the person is there as an agent, and the shechitah may well be kosher. The question is whether intent is required for shechitah to be valid. Also, the case of produce that falls into a channel of water, and the produce is removed by a person who has impure hands - but the process itself will purify his hands. The water is one of 7 liquids that, when in contact with produce, makes the produce susceptible to impurity. Plus, the levels of purity and impurity - and how immersion in the mikveh to be purified requires intent for the required level of purity to follow - for example, to eat ma'aser sheni food. Which seems to require more planning than we might have thought.

If there's more than one incision in the pipe, can that be kosher shechitah? It's a machloket. What about 2 people holding the knife for one animal's slaughter? That's one incision, but 2 people with 2 knives, which means 2 incisions, and it has all kinds of insecurities associated with it - and could result in non-kosher shechitah, but we really don't worry about that, and allow it. Note the many cases of shechitah that are left without conclusions. Also, a new mishnah: 1 person who slaughters 2 animals simultaneously; likewise, the 2 people holding one knife (as presented in the Gemara on the daf right before the mishnah), even with 2 cuts -- all of those cases are kosher shechitah. But decapitation in one motion is not considered valid. With the possibility of it being kosher if the length of the knife is the breadth of the animal's neck.

More on the question of when a siman is cut precisely halfway across - is that 50/50 considered the majority or not? (it's still a machloket). With the parallel to the requirement that at least half of the population of the Jews need to be pure to be able to participate in the Pesach sacrifice. That 50/50 seems to be acceptable, rather than leaving a full half of the people to make up the sacrifice on Pesach Sheni (14th of Iyar). But as much as this example is brought in parallel to the shechitah case, they're also quite different. Also, when is the action of slaughtering actually considered to be an act of shechitah? From the beginning of the process or only once it has been concluded? The practical implication being for incomplete draws of the knife and so on.

On the bird's "one siman" being severed, does it make a difference which of the esophagus or the trachea is cut? It's a machloket, whether "either one" is enough or one specific one needs to be cut. The Gemara provides a mnemonic to support 5 different arguments, half of which support the one view above and the other half the other view. Plus, the order of when the simanim themselves are examined in the context of shechitah, and then the order of cutting. Also, what if one of the simanim were cut to be 50/50 cut/not cut -- does that count as the majority being cut or not at all cut? But how can anyone be certain, to that degree of precision?

Chapter 2! A new mishnah... On slaughtering a "bird," where cutting one "siman" (windpipe or gullet) is sufficient for kosher shechitah, or an "animal" - that requires both simanim for kosher shechitah. Which leads to a discussion of partial completion of cutting, and how much must be cut to be considered as if it were cut in full for a kosher shechitah. Plus, sourcing "shechitah" in the Torah and the fact that it's done at the neck of the animal. Also, a "drasha" on how an animal's shechitah is kosher, how fish are killed, without a requirement for shechitah, why fowl only require the severing of one pipe, and more. Plus, the interpretations that shed light on the domesticated animals as compared to the non-domesticated animals, which seem to have lesser requirements.

Another 2 mishnayot: 1 - In the case of a girl who's to be sold to be a servant, if she is sold, then her father would not receive a fine in the event of her being raped or seduced, because it's a full sale. And vice versa. 2 - In the case of refusal, there's no halitzah, and vice versa. But there is a case of refusal, where a non-minor girl can refuse, and also would be eligible for halitzah. Also, the horn blasts calling for the coming Shabbat or festival, the terms are different for each, with details regarding Havdalah, as well, in its respective proximity to the day of the festival (before or after). (Note the holiday preceding Shabbat, as we just experienced with Shavuot and Shabbat)

2 small mishnayot: 1. On vessels of wood and metal, how they each have that which is stringent and that which is lenient, as compared to the other. 2. On bitter almonds and sweet almonds, how they each have that which is obligated in the one and exempt in the other, and vice versa. Note the two different kinds of almond trees. And note that roasting almonds counteracts the cyanide at its core. Also, on "Temed" - an fermented ersatz grape juice that is not initially eligible for purchase with ma'aser sheni money -- and it would invalidate a mikveh -- until it's truly fermented. Plus, orphan brothers who are exempt from tithing their animals, but need to separate them nonetheless.

2 tiny mishnayot: 1 - There is that which is problematic for kohanim - to do the Temple service (namely blemishes) - that are not a problem for levi'im (Levites), and vice versa, where Levites can only serve at certain ages of majority and not for life. 2 - There is that which is impure for earthenware vessels that is pure for all other vessels, and vice versa. The Gemara goes on to explain the details of these cases.

One who takes an oath to offer a burnt offering of a ram -- that is, at least 13 months old -- or a lamb -- 12 months, and then offers a "palgeis" -- the animal during that month from age 12 to 13 months. Has he fulfilled his oath? Given that he also brings the accompanying elements, like the grain offering and libations, one might think yes, but he didn't fulfill his own word. Plus, one who takes an oath to bring bread or matzah, and instead brings "si'ur," that which is not yet bread, but too leavened for matzah. Both of these cases are not concluded, but left as questions for which the decisions are held in abeyance: "Teiku." Also, a new mishnah: On the red heifer and the eglah arufah -- where there are details that are valid for the one and invalid for the other, and vice versa.

A new mishnah! On bird offerings - and at what age they are suitable for offerings, depending on whether they are "doves" or "pigeons." What about the transition age? Note that both ages need to be stipulated because logic might steer us astray otherwise. Also, the Torah is specific to prevent us to think that all doves and/or all young pigeons would be acceptable. With key yellowing of plumage making the difference.

If a neckbone of person were person - in parallel to the bird's neck the other day - the question arises as to whether or when the status of impurity kicks in. With the example of Eli the high priest of the Book of Samuel (I), who fell, whose neckbone broke, and who died, "because he was old." Also, a beraita on the melikah of a bird burnt-offering. And how it's different from a burnt-offering bird's melikah. With physical directions, in its intricacy.

Diving into the details of melikah -- specifically the process, and the debated points of that process. Also, some ways in which melikah is different from shechitah, the slaughtering of the animals that are not birds. Also, on what happens if the bird's neckbone breaks in such a way that it cuts the flesh as well, then there's no shechitah - and the animal is a "neveilah" - with death that didn't happen via shechitah. As compared to a tereifah.

A descriptive daf... of details of slaughtering. That is, cutting the trachea in ways that are not obviously kosher, but may be so, and that leads to disputes over how and when which cutting took priority to determine the kashrut of the shechitah. Plus, a description of the sages sitting in rows and learning, considering different permutations where the shechitah is kosher or not. Also, what if the person doing the slaughtering is not Jewish? When is there leeway to see that shechitah as kosher? And all the implications for melikah...

In the case of a person who doesn't send his knife to be approved by a Torah scholar, the shochet should be ostracized or, alternatively, removed from his position, depending on whose opinion or the specific circumstances. And "removing from his position" doesn't stop there - he can't sell his meat as kosher, and it is to be wiped with feces so that it can't be sold to non-Jews either. Also: 2 new mishnayot - 1: On attempting shechitah with a rounded sickle with rounded serration - it's a machloket whether that's permitted. 2. On where precisely to slaughter on the trachea. Plus, if the slaughtering were done in a lower piece of cartilage, then it's not kosher according to Rav or Shmuel, but then someone who should be their follower (or either) ate from that shechitah. Note the distinction between the leniency in the land of Israel compared to the stringency in Babylonia, and how one needed to navigate the various practices.

On the phrasing of everyone can slaughter, everywhere and when, and with anything that can do proper slaughter (for example, a shard of glass). The Gemara shifts the focus from the animal to the person during the slaughtering - to include the Samaritan and a sinner, for example. Plus, Shmuel's father sent a knife and a question about it to the sages in the land of Israel to determine the permissibility of using it for shechitah. Also, the concerns about notched knives and how we know to check such a knife from the Torah. Plus, the different ways of checking the knife, including the sage who tested it on his own tongue.

What if one accomplishes shechitah by means of a mechanism that slaughters the animal - is that shechitah kosher? The answer lies in how much human involvement there is to activate that mechanism. Also, parsing the statements that "all are slaughtered" -- namely, every animal needs proper slaughtering. Plus, how eating meat in the wilderness was not allowed because shechitah wasn't possible, but then, when the Israelites came to the land of Israel, they were able to slaughter and eat the meat of animals. And now (in the time of the Gemara), after exile, shechitah continues instead of returning to the practice of the wilderness. Plus, the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with regard to how meat could be made acceptable in the wilderness.

More on Hilkhot Shabbat - with a baraita that connects between Hullin and Shabbat. One who cooks on Shabbat without intent, one can eat that food (though the person who cooked it may have to wait until after Shabbat, depending on whom you ask) - even before the end of Shabbat. If it was intentional, then the food can't be eaten, even after Shabbat, by anyone. Also, what about doing shechitah for someone who is ill on Shabbat, in the event that such a person would need that meat on Shabbat? The ill person is eligible to eat this meat, of course, but can a healthy person eat from that same shechitah that was done on Shabbat? Note the rabbinic decree to prevent the temptation of increasing the cooking on Shabbat. Plus, all tools that are sharp enough and smooth enough will yield a kosher shechitah.

A new mishnah (a tiny one)! One who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or Yom Kippur is liable for a death sentence, but the shechitah itself is kosher. But that would only hold true in the case where nothing could have been done to prepare the same shechitah before Shabbat (at the latest, some time on Friday) -- otherwise, it has to be prepared in advance. Especially if meat were to be given to dogs, for example. But can an animal really be "prepared" in advance? Are they really in the world to serve human beings? The Gemara says that their primary purpose is to live in the world, reproduce, and so on. Also, the rest of the Gemara addresses many different concepts of Shabbat - the first being "nolad" -- that which comes into existence on Shabbat. With application to the juices that emerge from the fruit over Shabbat (grapes, olives, and more). Plus, the concern regarding when animals are in the service of human beings - after shechitah is clear, but when in the decision to slaughter the animal to begin with?

A case where one brings produce to the roof of a building to keep it away from insects, but it gets wet from dew, which makes the produce eligible to become impure. Plus, the ways in which intent (or lack thereof) has impact on the kashrut of one's shechitah (or one's sacrifice). Also, two very brief mishnayot: 1. If a non-Jew slaughters an animal in a way that would be kosher if it were done by a Jew, the animal is considered a "neveilah" and it imparts ritual impurity. 2. If one slaughters at night - or if a blind person slaughters - the shechitah is kosher, with some apparent difference of opinion whether that is considered kosher even in an ideal situation or only after the fact.

Do you need to see the entire process of shechitah to be able to trust that it was done properly? The Gemara has a case that does require one to see the entirety of the process, but we know that that isn't usually how it works (so often, we do not see any of the process of shechitah!), so the sages delve into the particulars of the case. Perhaps it's a question of whether you know the shochet's level of knowledge and expertise. Also, if one chooses an agent to go slaughter an animal and the agent discovers that the animal was already slaughtered - can it be trusted to be a kosher shechitah? What about terumah that was set aside? Would it have been set aside properly?

A quantifiable majority determines the outcome of an unknown, as per the biblical verse: "Follow the majority." But with an unquantifiable majority - what is the source for the principle to apply in those cases as well? Note that the Gemara supports this principle with 9 examples -- that is, 9 sources as possibilities from which it is understood or derived. Note also that checking the reality of the situation isn't the issue; the sages are intent on establishing the sources and using the majority to establish "truth," rather than looking for the truth in other ways.

Given that the knife for shechitah cannot be notched, there was an event when a knife was discovered to be notched after it was used to slaughter 13 animals. But if he only discovered that to be the case after the last animal's shechitah, then maybe it became notched along the process and the first animal(s) were not a problem. The big - and perhaps indeterminable - question is when did the knife received its notch? All of which leads to the conclusion that the knife must be checked (for notches and whatnot) before each and every act of shechitah. Also, investigating the source of "chazakah" (the given status of a thing unless or until proven otherwise). Beginning with the example of tzara'at, in the case of a house. But what if that tzara'at is behind the door? Or in a dark house? The question of whether there's a tzara'at lesion to find does not require spotlighting the whole house in the search! Note that the source of establishing a given is in the context of tzara'at, and not kashrut, but it's not the first time they are linked.

A Torah scholar must learn 3 skills: writing, kosher slaughtering, and circumcision. And 3 additional things are subject to dispute - whether they are skills that are required or commonplace: tying the knot of tefillin, the blessing for the wedding, and tying tzitzit. Also, standards of presumption regarding an animal: while it's alive, the presumption is that it's not going to be kosher. Once it's slaughtered correctly, then the presumption is that the animal IS kosher, unless a blemish is discovered. Also, what if a wolf bite is clear on the innards of an animal - but perhaps it's a puncture after the shechitah? Or might the bite have obscured a hole that would have made the animal a treyfa? What about a snake's poison? But the wolf/intestine is a concern of a prohibition! And the snake concern is about danger, which requires greater stringency!

If you heat a knife to white-hot, the shechitah done with that knife is kosher, because it was already sharp enough before it was hot. The concern is whether the slaughtering was done with the knife's blade or if it was done via the heat and a burn. The Gemara contrasts the issues that pertain here to the details of tzara'at, which has a long-standing tradition "halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai" regarding the measure of impurity. Plus the details of shechitah as applied to a case of tzara'at. Also, the 3 knives that the butcher needs to cut the meat and the forbidden fats, and to keep the forbidden from contaminating the permitted. Plus, distinctive indications regarding which knife was which.

Does produce from Beit She'an need tithing? How is this even a question - Beit She'an is clearly part of the land of Israel. Note the Gemara's initial focus on how a sage isn't going to change his mind -- with various interpretations of the Hebrew term used here to note that he won't be dissuaded. Back to Beit She'an - it all goes to the human consecration (and re-consecration) of the land as essential to the holiness that results in land-based mitzvot, and the decisions made for the sake of the local poor. [Who's Who: Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair] Also, a story of the animals of the righteous. With a story of R. Pinchas ben Yair being able to split the river (for easier passage) - and with allusions to the splitting of the Red Sea -because of his own stance that it should - and God granted the miracle. Which rolls into a story about a stubborn donkey who wouldn't eat non-tithed barley. Plus, the concerns about preventing the suffering of animals and the righteous who take up their cause. Plus, Rabbi Hanina's statement that any injury or suffering in this world was decreed on high - with all the accompanying theological conundrum.

A story involving R. Asi and R. Zeira about eggs that were cooked on wine - did that combination carry a risk of "demai" (possibly untithed produce)? Where even R. Asi wasn't thinking about this concern - and how God prevents error by those who are righteous. Which leads us into the ongoing discussion of mixtures or combinations. Also, what about the concern of the population of those unschooled (am ha-aretz) in the halakhic arena of tithing? What if the person who is ignorant switches out that food, perhaps out of concern that it goes bad, or one's personal status of being impure/pure to be protective. That is, one's intent could be entirely on target, but the action is still problematic for a potentially demai mixture.

On the way Yehoshafat stuck by Achav, even when it came to the reliability of his shechitah, despite Achav being guilty of worshipping idols. Note the relationship between the king of Yehudah and the king of Yisrael, despite the divine among the tribes. Plus, the ravens who brought Eliyahu (Elijah) the Prophet his daily bread and meat... ostensibly from Achav's slaughterhouse (so how can Eliyahu have eaten that shechitah if it weren't acceptable? But he's really in a different reality). Plus, what if these ravens were people, not ravens? Also, a return to the Kutim/Samaritans - how it was determined to reject their shechitah after all. Plus, God protects righteous people from inadvertent sinning - or, in this case, not eating meat that wasn't slaughtered properly.

If one finds a string of birds in the possession of a Kuti, there are various ways of increasing rigor to test whether the Kuti had done the slaughtering properly, each of which concludes with determining whether the Kuti himself would eat from his shechitah. That is, where they accepted the halakhic requirements, they were incredibly careful -- and if they didn't accept the requirement to begin with, then they weren't trustworthy. Also, investigating Rava's view on one who intentionally eats non-kosher food - and yet that person can be relied upon for his assessment of kashrut, and even if that person does idolatry. Plus, the human enticement of food and drink just won't work for the Divine.

More on the contradiction in the first mishnah of the tractate, with attempts to determine what caveat works for the distinction between the ideal circumstances for kosher slaughtering as compared to after the fact. With a spotlight on the case of the "Kutim" (Samaritans) whose shechitah was accepted if overseen by an observant Jew. [Who's Who: Kutim/Samaritans] The question is what degree of supervision is required. And the test for kashrut is whether the Samaritan himself would eat his own shechitah. Plus, rounding up all 6 opinions regarding careful reading of the mishnah to draw that ideal/after the fact (lekhathilah/ bedi'avad) distinction.

An introduction to Hullin, including the meaning of the term and the likely original title of the tractate. Also, details of how to manage ritual slaughter (for any kind of slaughter, including non-consecrated meat). And the first mishnah! Everyone is eligible to do this slaughtering -- except for the usual 3 (deaf-mute, cognitively impaired, or a minor). Though, if they did it, and under supervision, and the slaughtering is done correctly, then it would be kosher too, at least after the fact. But does "everybody" always mean this distinction between the ideal situation and after the fact? With parallels to elsewhere in the halakhah that disprove that idea.

The Gemara picks up on yesterday's mention of King Hizkiyahu, one of the few truly righteous kings of Israel, and how he not only was a good example among Israel, but also for the neighboring nations. Plus, the Mediterranean region from Tyre to Carthage (likely) were said to have known God, though the rest of the world may not have. Also, the recognition of Torah study as of supreme value, especially once the Jewish people were in exile, beginning in Babylonia. Also, a final mishnah! With a profound understanding that one's pure intent is what determines the value of the offering, and whether its "aroma is pleasing to God," and not how large or expensive it is. Plus, the hunt for the source of this idea.

A new mishnah! One who makes a vow to bring an offering must do so in the Temple in Jerusalem (as compared to local personal offerings)... and also as compared to the replica of the Temple in Egypt: Beit Honio (or the Temple of Onias). And Honio was the descendent of Simon HaTzadik. [Who's Who: Simon HaTzadik] [What's What: The Temple of Onias] The historical context is essential here, in the era on the path to the downfall of the Second Temple... Note that the phrasing of one's vow will make the difference as to whether one could bring the offering in Beit Honio at all, though it obviously ought to be offered in Jerusalem. Plus, a baraita that delves into the question of where the Temple of Onias went wrong - namely, was it really a seat of idol worship? And who was "Honio"? Why did he agree to dress like a woman? And what was the state of the Jewish people in this era?

More on the collection horns - and why there were 6 of them. Plus, the case of an animal that has been dedicated as an offering and then it becomes blemished before it is sacrificed - perhaps he could replace the 1 animal with 2 others (and what if then those 2 are blemished too?). Could a different kind of animal be swapped? Of course, each unusual case is a matter of dispute. With a deep dive into the possibility of replacing the blemished offering with something that might have been perceived as lesser than the original - to the extent that Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi did not accept those replacement possibilities to begin with. And another mishnah: what happens when there is confusion regarding which offering has already been consecrated. Starting with the larger one (of two). Or the middle one (of three). And defaulting to the most generous option.

2 mishnayot! 1 - A wine libation may be brought on its own, but what about oil? And what if one makes a vow to do so in an unspecified amount? Or if one isn't sure what the vow was? What are the minimum amounts that would cover the vow? Also, consideration is paid to which days have the most required offerings brought. And what really happened -- in contrast to a boundary-pushing question? 2 - On fulfilling the vows for a certain kind of offering, rather than the animal itself, such as an "olah," burnt-offering. The mishnah stipulates that that means one should bring a sheep. Of course, if one isn't sure what one vowed, the list of what must be brought gets long and complicated, to cover the bases. Plus, all kinds of misspeaking or misremembering what the vow might have been, and how to fulfill it. Also, the 6 collection horns for donated funds in the Temple - and why those 6 specifically.

A debate between Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi and the Rabbis - based on how many offerings must be brought to cover all bases to fulfill a vow when the details of that vow have been forgotten. What is the status of all the offerings that aren't fulfilling that vow? Also, one who takes a vow to bring wood for the altar - is that to burn the other offerings or is it an offering itself? The Gemara seems to understand it as an offering in and of itself. With a limitation that bringing an offering of wood must bring 2 logs (at least). Plus, 5 cases of fistfuls - primarily around the frankincense. Plus, the shock value measuring stick of determining how much one's donation of gold or silver or copper might have been.

Chapter 13! With the new mishnah, and a focus on oaths regarding grain-offerings. What happens when one takes an oath, but isn't sure what amount he'd specified in his oath. That is, how to cover the oath by a "maximum" of the grain-offering (or all of them, as the case may be). Also, who taught that one might need to bring all of them? The Gemara approaches this question by a process of elimination, almost, establishing first who did not subscribe to this view, before concluding whose view it was. With parallels drawn from the Nazir and the person recovering from tzara'at. Is Rabbi Shimon's view dependent on his allowing sacrifices to be brought conditionally?

Another 2 mishnayot! 1 - Making donations of libations to the Temple must be made in the specific amount of the offerings themselves, rather than being too much or too little for the one given libation. Which gives rise to the question whether libations need to be in fixed amounts or not. And that answer is elusive. 2 - With regard to bringing oil as its own offering - that doesn't really work, according to Rabbi Akiva, but Rabbi Tarfon says it does work. Why would oil be different from wine in this regard? But they are. Also, some restrictions on one who vows to donate grain-offerings, depending on what he has or has not specified. Plus, the significance of the grain-offering.

2 mishnayot! 1 - If one makes a vow to bring a voluntary grain-offering, but the phrasing makes it an invalid vow in some way or other, then the vow is incumbent upon the person who misphrased it. Which seems stringent, rather than looking for an opening to let the oath-taker out of the oath. With a dispute as to how this works between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai - namely, why the oath is still incumbent upon the person who misspoke. 2 - If one makes a vow to bring a grain-offering of 60-tenths of an ephah of fine flour, he can bring it in one vessel. But if one takes a vow to bring 61-tenths of an ephah, that would entail one vessel of 60-tenths and another of one-tenth. The day that would require 61-tenths is the first day of Sukkot if it falls out on Shabbat. With the clarification that, yes, that degree of precision with the measurements is necessary for compliance with halakhah.

On consecrated items and ritually impure items -- and how they are not treated the same in halakhah with regard to their prohibited use and their respective liabilities. Plus, the specific properties of food in its capacity to be rendered impure. Plus, the timing of the sprinkling of the blood of an animal sacrifice. Also, the wording of a vow to bring a grain-offering will have significant impact on what the obligation becomes. With examples of how a vow can go unfulfilled when the oath and the offering do not match.

Chapter 12! With a new mishnah - redeeming the sanctity of grain offerings and libations, especially when the item has become impure. But what happens if the item is pure? Plus, complex Gemara on the impurity and redemption of these items, with various opinions on when precisely the redemption can be implemented, with a focus on the monetary sanctity.