Strategic Simplicity Podcast

The gang got together this weekend to talk about a new Stimson Center report, “Why Strategic Superiority (Still) Doesn’t Matter: Nuclear Crises and the Failure of Theory.“ The new report by Chris Preble, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, and Lucas Ruiz, a recent Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow in the same program, analyzes the role nuclear weapons played in four crises: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict of 1969, the 1973 Arab-Israeli (Yom Kippur) War, and the Kargil Crisis. Based on our read, the report functions as a rebuttal to a 2018 book by Georgetown professor Matthew Kroenig, titled "The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters."The report advocates for “sufficiency” as a north star for U.S. nuclear force planning - a secure second strike capability - rather than “superiority” is suggests has dominated U.S. nuclear thinking to date. The authors note that superiority “does not enhance security; it signals offensive intent, invites countermeasures, and erodes the stability that deterrence is supposed to protect.”We talk about the report's analysis of a few of these crises, the consequences of a "sufficiency" approach, especially for extended deterrence and nonproliferation, how non-nuclear weapons states may react to these obscure nuclear strategy debates in Washington, and discuss the connection between nuclear posture and arms control. Take a listen, and read the report below:https://www.stimson.org/2026/why-strategic-superiority-still-doesnt-matter/#elementor-toc__heading-anchor-0and here's a link to Kroenig's book too:https://academic.oup.com/book/5898 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

NTI’s Eric Brewer joins us to unpack how Iran’s nuclear program has transformed since the JCPOA era — and what that means for any future nuclear agreement, which we acknowledge may be quite far off. We talk about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, the lack of IAEA access, new underground facilities, and years of experience with advanced centrifuges, and how these changes create a fundamentally different technical baseline than negotiators faced a decade ago.The three of us also talk about Iran’s intentions moving forward, summarizing recent public reporting and the disappearance of the IC’s long‑standing assessment that Iran was not pursuing key weaponization activities. We also discuss the ongoing conflict, starting with Operation Midnight Hammer, and how these events may have shifted Tehran’s strategic calculus with the old deterrence architecture weakened—its proxy network and missile forces have been degraded—whether Iran’s leadership might now view a nuclear weapon as the only reliable insurance policy.Finally, we talk about what a future deal (and additional policy measures) would actually entail. We cover building blocks on the topics of weaponization bottlenecks, regional missile transfers, and a more muscular counterproliferation posture, as well as what may be an exponentially more difficult verification mission, with new mechanisms for access, dispute resolution, and monitoring of military‑linked sites.Show notes and a few publicly available resources we referenced: We started out hoping to go into slightly more technical detail on JCPOA and future JCPOA provisions, but kept the conversation at a higher level for the sake of greater appeal to a wider array of listeners. However, if you would like to see more text…* JCPOA Full Text (U.S. State Department archive)* IAEA Additional Protocol (verification baseline):Reporting on Iran’s Program (2024–2025)* Wall Street Journal reporting on Iran “closing knowledge gaps” in weaponization* ODNI “Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act,” assessment regarding Iran’s nuclear activities report (Nov 2024)Press on negotiations:* NYT, “United States Said to Have Sent Iran a Plan to End the Middle East War” * The Guardian, “UK security adviser ‘attended’ US-Iran talks and judged deal was within reach“Foreign Affairs articles* Vaddi & Narang, “The North Korean Way of Proliferation”* Nicole Grajewski and Ankit Panda “The Stunning Failure of Iranian Deterrence“Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm.Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of USG jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for educational purposes, and reflects the personal views of contributors. Nothing on this Substack reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

The Strategic Simplicity crew was at full strength for the first time in a month, and joined by Astrid Chevreuil to discuss French President Emmanuel Macron’s highly anticipated speech on nuclear doctrine on March 2nd. Astrid is a Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. She is a career diplomat with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs with expertise on a range of nuclear policy and nonproliferation issues.Astrid’s analysis at CSIS:https://www.csis.org/analysis/macrons-ile-longue-speech-updating-frances-nuclear-doctrine-new-eraOfficial translation of Macron’s speech:https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/president-delivers-speech-frances-nuclear-deterrenceSelect Media Coverage:https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/05/-france-nuclear-deterrence-strategy-macron.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/france-nuclear-weapons-macron-deterrence-ccbcfb03ef4a1e3efe287fb744adb148https://www.france24.com/en/france/20260302-macron-unveils-france-nuclear-strategy-eu-counter-russian-aggression-wavering-us This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Matthew, Vipin, and I discuss New START expiration, new information revealed by the U.S. government regarding PRC nuclear test activities, and ideas for U.S. arms control policy efforts moving forward after the government’s rollout of post-New START priorities last Friday.Under Secretary of State Dinanno’s speech before the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (link)National Academies report on Technical Issues related to CTBT (including clandestine test activities) (link)Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. The written or podcast content is solely for education purposes, and in no way reflects the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

To close out (for now…) our three part series on New START and its pending expiration, Rebeccah Heinrichs and Frank Miller join Vipin, Austin, and I to explain why they think the United States should let the agreement expire without a continuation of the central numerical limits, as Russia has proposed. Our conversation touched upon Russia’s behavior in implementing the treaty, compliance record, the relevance of New START-like limits given the dilemmas facing the United States, the study of nuclear weapons policy and deterrence and the role arms control plays in this domain, and advice for new students and professionals looking to contribute to the field.As always, please feel free to leave us comments and questions and we’ll look to address them in an upcoming podcast.Background reading:Frank Miller and Eric Edelman, “No New START: Renewing the U.S.-Russian Deal Won’t Solve Today’s Nuclear Dilemmas.” Foreign Affairs.Frank Miller and Eric Edelman, “Time to End the Last U.S.-Russia Nuclear Treaty.” The Bulwark.Rebeccah Heinrichs, “New Start and Trump’s Nuclear Test.” WSJ.Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. In no way does written or podcast content reflect the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Arms control diplomacy is, like many other areas of government policy-making, hard to understand without experiencing directly. How defense strategy, political science, technology, and area studies combine with personalities, time pressure, and interagency tensions is difficult to describe - but these elements collide together in a highly concentrated fashion during an arms control negotiation. Greg Dwyer and Mike Albertson both served on the New START delegation at different points in their careers, and shared their experiences in part II of our New START series. Both spent time early in their careers “backbenching” the treaty negotiations in Geneva, and then carried leadership responsibilities on behalf of their agencies as part of the regular New START delegation that would travel to Geneva to engage in implementation discussions with Russian counterparts in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, a body created by the Treaty to ensure both parties had a venue to raise and address implementation and compliance questions. We all worked together on New START, so there is a fair amount of reminiscing in this episode, but Greg and Mike also provide a detailed glimpse into the work that goes on behind the scenes in arms control negotiation and implementation. I hope young professionals wondering what it’s like to work in this field take particular interest in this episode. As always, please feel free to send comments or question our way here or in the subscriber chat.Background reading (stuff I haven’t shared in previous posts, but seem pertinent to New START expiration).* I really hope DoW doesn’t get rid of this resource - a searchable treaty text with can help you go down a few of the rabbit holes we referenced during the podcast.* a 2024 RAND report on post-New START options.* Erin Dumbacher’s recent CFR post on managing Putin’s offer to maintain New START limits.* Frank Jones’ book “Obama on the Bomb,” covering New START and arms control efforts during the Obama administration.Strategic Simplicity is a collection of content provided for free by experts, many of whom worked with one another in a variety of jobs. In no way does written or podcast content reflect the views of the U.S. government, MIT, or other entities.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Rose and I covered the landscape related to New START and more: * Her experience as chief negotiator - managing Russian interlocutors, an interagency delegation in Geneva as well as the one back home, * the role of the President and other very senior officials in arms control negotiations, * New START and “reset” politics, * why “drive by” negotiations stink, * Putin’s offer to keep New START limits for one more year, * missile defense, * the recent Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report and bipartisanship in nuclear policy and arms control,* and much more.Recent and Upcoming work by Rose:* Dec. 10, 2025, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Arms Race 2.0.“* Dec. 2025, Arms Control Association. “Getting the Most Out of New START Before It Expires“ * July 30, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “Nuclear arms control enters uncharted territory. It needs tools—both old and new.“ * May 2021, “Negotiating the New START Treaty.” * Coming April 2026, “Security through Cooperation: Space, Nuclear Weapons, and US-Russia Relations after the Cold War.”Also, this isn’t a new topic for Strategic Simplicity - we’ve devoted some time to New START on the podcast, in various posts and articles covering President Putin’s offer, U.S. nuclear force posture after New START, and U.S. arms control policy. Take a look:* Pods:* Posts:Pranay Vaddi, “Beware Russia Bearing Arms Control Gifts,’ RUSI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Before the holiday break, Vipin contributed a new post to the Strategic Stability Substack (I know, two in one year, how can he keep up this lightning pace) titled “Four Shibboleths of Nuclear Strategy.” In the post, Vipin asks whether we should take for granted four strong, consistent ideas that appear in nuclear policy debates: (1) strategic stability is “good,” (2) arms races are “bad,” (3) escalation is uncontrollable, and (4) deterrence is the threat that leaves something to chance (trying to surmise what Schelling really meant). This post highlighted some important questions about how we discuss nuclear policy: do the terms we use still hold the same relevance today as they did when they were first created, do we even operate from the same definitions as one another, and how have changes in the world changed how we think about policy underlying these principles?And to demonstrate how good of a sport he truly is, Vipin not only brought a new senior fellow on board at MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy, but one who immediately wrote a substack post in response to Vipin’s “Four Shibboleths.” Matthew Sharp joins the group following a long career in government, with stops at the Department of State, NSC, and U.S. Mission to Vienna where he worked on IAEA issues. Matthew described the journey his brain took as he thought about Vipin’s post, elaborating on how he thinks about the risk of increased numbers via either horizontal or vertical proliferation, and shares his own view of the importance of strategic stability as a goal, and valuable if thought of as reaching a stable equilibrium. We saved a little time to talk about South Korea’s interest in nuclear submarines - what operational value nuclear-powered submarines can provide, and what kinds of activities South Korea may need to begin in cooperation with the IAEA, drawing upon Matthew’s past experience working on AUKUS implementation. We spent our last few minutes tackling a mailbag/chat question regarding the science behind nuclear winter and its place in nuclear policy discussions and international debate.Things to read:Sharon Squassoni in The Bulletin: “How nuclear submarines could pave the way for nuclear weapons in South Korea“Brent Sadler for Heritage: “The Optimum Pathway for Building Nuclear Submarines With South Korea and Japan”James Scouras, Lauren Ice, Megan Proper at JHU/APL: “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter?”Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Charlie Glaser joins the podcast to discuss his new book, “Retrench, Defend, Compete: Securing America’s Future Against a Rising China.” We talked about his recommendations for U.S.-China policy, including his case for ending U.S. security commitments to Taiwan (though not ending peacetime security assistance) to reduce the potential for a destructive war with China, while strengthening it’s relationships with South Korean and Japan to deter Chinese aggression against the formal U.S. allies. Naturally, we discuss nuclear strategy, the balance of U.S. and PRC interests in the region, and Charlie’s motivations for writing this book (and advice for others thinking about how to contribute to ongoing debates over China security policy).See the Cornell Press summary for Charlie’s book here. Strategic Simplicity is an independent publication. The views expressed in articles and podcasts belong to the participants only, and do not represent the United States government, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or any other institution. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Heather and I discussed the 2025 CSIS PONI Project Atom Report, entitled “Escalation Management in Acute and Protracted Conflicts in the Indo-Pacific.“ Project Atom brings several authors together to propose alternative strategies for managing escalation with China. Authors provided submissions examining diplomatic risk management, conventional deterrence, regional nuclear deterrence, allies perspectives, and political stakes in a U.S.-China conflict.We veered into a wider discussion of nuclear dynamics between the United States and China, where the report submissions touched on regional nuclear capabilities which may be important for U.S. escalation management approaches, and how this could all play in NPT diplomacy. The entire report is well worth your time. Take a look here:* 2025 Project Atom report.You can also watch the launch event from this past week on the CSIS website.We’ll be back next week with an episode introducing Charlie Glaser’s new book, “Retrench, Defend, Compete.“Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

I was really lucky to have Tong Zhao, a Senior Fellow with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, spend his late Friday afternoon with me to walk through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs new white paper on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. Our discussion spanned nuclear doctrine, posture shifts, multilateral arms control, and advice for early career professionals interested in U.S.-China nuclear dynamics.We discuss some of the key terms of art that appear in the document and what they may mean in the contexts of China’s transforming nuclear arsenal: ‘strike only after being struck first,’ ‘rapid response,’ ‘lean and effective,’ and ‘strategic early warning.’ Tong also helps explain the difference between ‘no first use’ and no ‘threat’ of first use - the latter being absent from China’s NFU policy and relevant to the future attempts to deter non-nuclear attacks (or, depending on your perspective in a conflict, coerce adversaries). We discuss the permanence, or lack thereof, of NFU in the midst of a crisis. Tong lists several questions experts and policy makers should make to gain greater clarification from Chinese interlocutors on China’s nuclear policies.Tong describes China’s confidence in a more “ideal” deterrence strategy, buoyed by confidence in its conventional military advantage in theater as well as broader, favorable shifts in the geopolitical balance of power including a reduced U.S. prioritization of ideological confrontation, and why that may mean China doesn’t feel much pressure to reach nuclear parity with the United States, which does and will maintain a stronger nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, a dynamic where PRC leadership feels they’re achieving military advantage aims also alleviates any pressure to engage in constructive arms control discussions with the United States.Finally, we touch on China’s behavior and priorities in multilateral arms control fora and Tong provides advice for new professionals interested in building expertise as a practitioner or researcher in U.S.-China strategic relations and arms control. There is a lot left to cover in this white paper, but hopefully this episode serves as a primer on the core nuclear policy elements.Show notes:Here are a few documents, projects, or topics we discussed during the podcast.* Brookings Analysis of the CCP Fourth Party Plenum, 15th Five Year Plan* Arms Control Association “The Potential of the P5 Process.” Former Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tom Countryman. * Carnegie Endowment “Miniaturization and Modernization: The Untold Story of China’s Nuclear Weapons.” Tong is hosting Dr. Hui Zhang to discuss his new book on China’s nuclear warhead development at an event on Tuesday, December 9 at 10:00 AM EST. Register here.* Foreign Policy. “Is China Changing its Nuclear Launch Strategy?” Tong Zhao.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We finally pulled our thoughts together on the President’s recent comments regarding nuclear testing, in light of a steady drip of additional information from congress, other U.S. officials, as well as the media. After analyzing what this testing discussion is all about, we opened the mailbag to try and get through a few listener questions.In lieu of a longer summary of the podcast, I’m sharing some background information on the testing topic as it’s unfortunately very weedy on policy, legal, and technical ground… hope you enjoy:I mentioned two recent articles during our testing discussion, one from Washington Post on China’s activities around the Lop Nur test site, and another from CNN regarding DOE/NNSA officials heading to the White House to “tamp down” on the testing urge:* Cate Cadell. “China rapidly expands nuclear test site as Trump revives Cold War tension.“ Washington Post. November 17, 2025.* Ella Neilsen, Rene Marsh, Alayna Treene. “Exclusive: Department of Energy officials to meet with White House to tamp down Trump’s idea of explosive nuclear testing.“ CNN. November 14, 2025.Here are a few documents we reference directly or indirectly during the conversation.State Department Article-by-Article Analysis of the Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyLanguage to the 2020 State Department Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Compliance Report, starting with a brief history on the U.S. “zero-yield” standard during CTBT negotiations, followed by assessments regarding PRC and Russian compliance.And similar information from the more recent 2022 Compliance Report (the Department stopped repeating unchanged information in later reports, so I’m sharing 2022 as the first full compliance report of the Biden administration, providing the updated take on testing, including the zero-yield standard, China, and Russia) This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

During our last conversation on U.S. nuclear strategy (about two weeks ago, primarily led by Austin Long and Charlie Glaser who have spent quite a bit of time debating damage limitation), we uncovered a few questions we just didn’t have time to address. We chose three specific questions to discuss on today’s pod, and of course, we uncovered enough interesting material to start planning a Part 3:* Is retention of a damage limitation necessary for U.S. extended deterrence strategy, and if so, how important is it for extended deterrence allies?* How comprehensive or successful does the U.S. need to be for damage limitation to be considered “meaningful”?* How important is damage limitation as a nuclear strategy objective, considering other traditional objectives (restoring deterrence, escalation management, threatening unacceptable damage, etc.)?Before we dive into these questions, however, we tried to address some recent listener feedback: What does damage limitation actually entail from an operational perspective?As we mention several times throughout the discussion, conversations on the hypothetical, though never realized, end results of U.S. nuclear strategy and objectives gets Strangelovian very quickly. We’re talking about end-of-the-world extremities in international politics, with the shared goal of ensuring U.S. strategy is designed to ensure that day never comes. You’ll hear several important themes come up—the relative political stakes of belligerents in a conflict over a third country, like a U.S. ally or partner; the importance of saving lives vs. saving the functioning state; why geography matters, etc. While we’re nuclear folks discussing much grander ideas, you will hopefully see the connections between these wonky nuclear strategy topics and broader U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy. On a lighter note, Charlie reveals the new MIT swag - the CNSP branded “nuclear umbrella” that will now form the core of the new Center’s public diplomacy efforts.Enjoy this podcast, and as always, we appreciate your feedback and questions to further our own study of and reflections on this important set of topics.Stay tuned for Part 3, where we hope to spend some time talking about current and potential adversary reactions to current U.S. nuclear strategy, among other issues.If you missed it, catch part one of this podcast series here.Suggested readings (referenced during the pod):Austin’s chapter, “Damage Limitation in the 21st Century” (p. 66), in the LLNL CGSR volume “Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.”Charlie’s article in The Washington Quarterly, which he co-authored with Steve Fetter, “Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy.”Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

For those of you who haven’t met Charlie Glaser, he’s truly a great contributor to nuclear policy discussions and a wonderful colleague. And we were happy to host Charlie for a discussion on damage limitation. Charlie is a prolific author on U.S. nuclear strategy and broader international security topics, having written on the infeasibility of counterforce as China’s arsenal grows, U.S. commitments to East Asia, and many many other topics. Charlie and Austin recently debated nuclear strategy at MIT for the Center for Nuclear Security Policy community, and we thought reprising and continuing this discussion on our podcast would be a great way to get their arguments out to a broader audience. Our discussion covers the relevance of either proposed approach—discarding damage limitation as an objective or maintaining and enhancing it to pace the changing security environment—to longstanding U.S. grand strategy goals, such as nonproliferation, extended deterrence, and reducing the risk of nuclear war. We also discuss conventional and theater nuclear capabilities, the possible harm to population centers, and the link between theater and strategic nuclear forces to manage escalation under either strategy approach. Charlie and Austin debate whether damage limitation capabilities create escalatory pressures, or discourage adversaries from escalating. And like good academics, we include a range of interesting research questions that would help elucidate an important debate happening in U.S. nuclear policy circles today.Much more to follow on the topic of the pros and cons of damage limitation from a regional nuclear deterrence perspective—stay tuned for Part II. Any questions? Hit us up in the comments below.EDIT: Sharing a few links to Charlie’s publications, for those interested in a deeper dive. Charles L Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security (2016).Charles L. Glaser, James M. Acton, and Steve Fetter, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China and Russia: Why America Doesn’t Need More Missiles,” Foreign Affairs (October 5, 2023).I’m also sharing a link which I’ve shared before; LLNL CGSR’s compendium of articles entitled “Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy,” which contains a chapter written by Austin Long titled “Damage Limitation in the 21st Century” starting on page 66.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Vipin, and I sat down to share our reviews of Kathryn Bigelow’s new Netflix thriller, “A House of Dynamite.” We share our analysis of the film’s plot; where the film seemed accurate in its portrayal of the nuclear war scenario, deterrence logic, basic facts of government operations; and, some of the more confusing assertions made by characters in the film. Lot’s of feelings! But we also try to highlight what seemed right and what seemed wrong based on our own experiences in government. We also share our own favorite nuclear war movies and try to answer a few listener questions and share what others said about the movie.Hope you enjoy, and please send us your own questions or comments regarding the movie in the replies below, or via email.Edit: I failed to link to Al Mouroni's Substack, which we mentioned during the pod. You can find it here:https://open.substack.com/pub/almauroni?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=998hwIntro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Vipin and I welcome friends from the MIT Security Studies Program, Taylor Fravel and Caitlin Talmadge, to discuss China once again. This time, we focus on two oft-cited rationales for China’s nuclear build-up—the desire to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces, and the potential to use a larger nuclear forces as a fullback for regional coercion/aggression. Our guests help explain China’s motivations, the looming Taiwan scenarios, what is happening in China’s non-nuclear forces, and Taiwan’s own capabilities and attitudes regarding a conflict. Our conversation moves beyond just nuclear weapons and into the political relationship, China’s historical approach to Taiwan, competition outside of the nuclear arena, and the relevance of the broader U.S. strategy toward China to these nuclear questions.We also talk about the ability for the United States to compete in military domains that help set back the most concerning military scenarios with China, and keep the threshold for nuclear use high if a conflict was to begin. The group also discusses the limitations China may face in improving and modernizing its nuclear weapons capabilities to support a possible sea change in its approach to nuclear strategy, and whether China could become more transparent about its nuclear forces as the buildup continues, or if we’re going to hear about more new and modern windmills instead.Please feel free to send us your thoughts, comments, and questions on this topic in the replies or via email, as we’re definitely going to record a Part III in the near future and are open to suggested topics. Until then, enjoy the pod.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Is Putin’s offer to continue adherence to New START central limits for one more year a “cost free virtue signal,” a sincere desire to manage nuclear competition, an opening to a broader conversation on strategic issues, or maybe a combination of all of these things. Additionally, what U.S. interests are at play in considering this offer? Austin and I had a great conversation with two of the top experts in the arms control policy discourse, Mike Albertson and John Warden, to try and answer these questions among others.We debate the various responses the United States could craft, the relevance of future U.S. nuclear posture adjustments to the question of maintaining New START limits for one more year, the state of New START today without verification activities, data exchanges or regular notifications, and China and trilateral arms control.Mike and John help us dig into how the U.S. government usually organizes itself to analyze an arms control, the questions senior officials and experts are probably asking, and hopefully trying to answer, and how the United States may respond. We discuss the importance of ending New START on a “good note” to preserve arms control between the two countries and pave the way to future agreements, including ones that manage competition between the two countries and help shape future force posture decisions on each side. The Ukraine war looms large still today, and we talk about how that may play into considerations of Russia’s offer as well as other sources of leverage in arms control negotiations.Throughout the conversation, the one area of agreement that surfaces is that all four of us think the United States needs to make a counter proposal to Putin’s offer, using the next four months to engage in a serious arms control policy process to establish U.S. priorities and consider how to engage Russian counterparts. We’ll have to see whether U.S. officials feel the same way and Russia is willing to use this offer as a starting point for that conversation, as opposed to accepting a fait accompli.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Toby Dalton, Francesca Giovannini, and Eric Brewer, experts and leaders with the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Harvard University Belfer Center Initiative on Managing the Atom, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, staffed the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. National Security for the past 10 months. They recently drafted and published a final task force report entitled “Preventing an Era of Nuclear Anarchy: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security.”The Task Force, chaired by Ernie Moniz, Tino Cuellar, and Meghan O’Sullivan, is comprised of an impressive array of former officials across the national security bureaucracy and branches of government, and examined the foundations of U.S. national security policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In many ways, the Task Force is spiritual sequel to the 1964 Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, often called the “Gilpatric Committee” or “Gilpatric Task Force” after Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, the chair of the committee. (you can find the original Gilpatric report in its declassified glory at the Department of State’s Office of the Historian, here).Our discussion examined several fundamental questions relevant to nuclear policy, counterproliferation, nonproliferation, extended deterrence, arms control, and other issues, including:* Why and how U.S. national security approaches to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons need to change in an era of changing politics, technology, and military capabilities;* How to spotlight the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as a core, and once-again emerging challenge to U.S. national interests;* The necessity of U.S. leadership and international engagement to maintaining the track record of success in preventing nuclear proliferation, both to assure U.S. allies who benefit from extended deterrence guarantees, reduce risks with major power competitors, and to discourage proliferation; * What a strong U.S. nuclear industry can offer to the nonproliferation toolkit;* Why the United States needs to manage tensions between nonproliferation objectives and nuclear deterrence, such that the two worlds do not become mutually exclusive;* How the security environment today is different from that of the 1960s in terms of the competition among major powers, availability nuclear technology, and state of political relationships; and,* The importance of domestic and international institutions and expertise in meeting increased risks of nuclear proliferation… among many other issues.We also discuss some inside baseball: how the task force meetings were organized on various topics, how task force members stayed focus on the proliferation problem while taking into account the near-daily shifts in the contemporary domestic and international politics, and trying to drive the task force toward establishing enduring, high-level findings and recommendations rather than something with a short term focus. I hope you’ll enjoy this conversation, and use it as a primer for reading the report itself. The Task Force roster is incredibly impressive, and not surprisingly, the report is well worth your time.We’ll be back again next week with a new episode.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Ankit, Vipin, and I discussed U.S.-ROK-DPRK affairs after recent comments by President Lee at the U.N. General Assembly, the ROK’s “E.N.D.” policy rollout, U.S. immigration and trade actions, and DPRK activities. Ankit and Vipin recently traveled to Seoul and shared insights gained during their trip on the state of extended deterrence discussions between the United States and South Korea, as well as pending issues surrounding ROK STRATCOM, wartime OPCON transfer, the state of the ROK and DPRK militaries. In the context of E.N.D., we discuss what reasoning with North Korea may look like for the Trump administration—including the kinds of risk reduction asks the U.S. may make of KJU— as it finalizes the National Defense Strategy and considers North Korea policy. We also talk about the state of North Korea’s nuclear program, including the reliability of its ICBMs and reentry vehicles, after recent comments by ROK President Lee. Ankit describes how far the DPRK nuclear prograb has come in the past several years, particularly since the Trump administration’s last attempts at diplomacy in 2017 in partnership with Moon Jae-In. He describes how North Korea’s arsenal and strategy create different potential military scenarios today compared to the past, and how that influences U.S. extended deterrence diplomatic aims (extra credit to Ankit for recalling the “B61s as wedding rings” comparison made by a former defense official.).The three of us discuss the relationship between political succession in North Korea and the likelihood of conflict/military aggression. We end with a discussion about how stable the Korean peninsula is today compared to a few years ago, following strengthened extended deterrence, policy shifts in Seoul and Pyongyang away from unification, and military technology advancements in North Korea. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

One of the most rewarding aspects of government service is the opportunity to meet amazing, highly qualified and well-respected experts and leaders, and work alongside them in some of the most stressful circumstances. Celeste Wallander is one of those expert-leaders to these three nuclear musketeers (Team Title WIP, and no, this isn’t a new nuclear weapon idea that Austin came up with.). She is currently the Executive Director of Penn Washington, the University of Pennsylvania’s office in Washington D.C. Prior to that, she served in multiple roles in government at the Department of Defense and White House, including most recently as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and a stint as Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Security Council under President Obama.We tried to cover recent news on the Russia and Europe front in this episode, starting with drone/aircraft incursions into NATO member airspace, President Trump’s comments at the United Nations General Assembly this week regarding Ukraine’s ability to win…Trump, in major shift, suggests Ukraine can win back territory long held by Russia…and European leaders reaction to those remarks:Top EU diplomat warns Trump that Europe can’t shoulder Ukraine war burden aloneTusk issues stark reality check about Trump’s pro-Ukraine pivotWe close our planned discussion with a conversation about President Zelensky’s statement that “the world was living through the most destructive arms race in human history” and stakes of various parties in the Ukraine conflict.We save a few minutes at the end to talk about Putin’s recent offer regarding New START, which I wrote about here earlier this week. I also want to offer perspectives other than my own, provided by friends in the nuclear community, which you should also read:Jon Wolfsthal: “Why President Trump should put off the new nuclear arms race for one more year“ The Bulletin.Matt Bunn: “Putin just gave Trump the opportunity to maintain nuclear restraint. Will he seize it?“ The Bulletin.Austin Long: “No Zombie Nuclear Treaties.” Strategic Simplicity.Hope you enjoy the podcast and have a joyous weekend. We’ll be back next week with 2 episodes. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Tom Karako, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, shares his new paper on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), entitled “A Marie Kondo Moment for MTCR: Tidying Up the U.S. Approach to Missile Proliferation.“ Tom recommends that the U.S. government find a way to overcome the “strong presumption of denial” at the core of MTCR in order to better develop allied and partner capabilities in an age of proliferated missile and drone systems, particularly among adversarial nations. He authoritatively covers the strategic environment of 1987, when the G7 first developed MTCR, compared to the world of today. Ola, Austin and I share our perspectives on MTCR, nonproliferation trends, and where strategic dynamics may require changed thinking in U.S. defense trade.If you’re interested in why the Marie Kondo reference makes so much sense, maybe you need to binge Netflix reality shows more frequently. We also cover recent actions by the Trump administration to treat unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as aircraft, not missiles, for the purposes of U.S. export controls, and what that could mean for U.S industry and allies seeking new UAS capabilities. As part of the discussion, we also recap actions taken by the Biden administration in January 2025 to preserve MTCR but unilateral adapt U.S. implementation to create more opportunities for U.S. missile technology exports to close allies and where AUKUS lessons may provide a model for a future MTCR that works for the U.S. and its alliance system, not against it.Please take a moment to read Tom’s paper, which can be found at the hyperlink below:* “A Marie Kondo Moment for MTCR: Tidying Up the U.S. Approach to Missile Proliferation.“Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Vipin and I welcomed Taylor Fravel and Caitlin Talmadge to the Strategic Simplicity Podcast to talk about China. While I was hoping we would could make this THE definitive China episode, we realized as the conversation began just how much more we have to unpack and explore on this topic. Stay tuned for a Part II (and maybe a Part III!) in the coming weeks.Our podcast covered some of the higher order motivations in China for a large nuclear arsenal, how those motivations may have changed over time as the recent buildup began in earnest, whether Chinese explanations of seeking a secure second strike capability credibly explain certain capability developments, and we also talk about China’s nuclear posture changes in the context of broader trends in the U.S.-China relationship, political changes in Beijing, economic growth, its foreign policy objectives, and increases in its relative military power in the U.S.-China competition. Throughout the conversation we reference China’s recent military parade, including the development of theater nuclear weapons, intermediate-range dual-capable missiles, and silo-based ICBMs. We also touch on the ebbs and flows in U.S.-China relations over the past several years, and how China viewed and perhaps reacted to changing (and more transparency in) policies in the United States and Taiwan in developing its nuclear and other military capabilities. If you’re interested in doing your own deep dive….some suggested reading below. Taylor and Caitlin are prolific writers in addition to being amazing scholars and professors, and I can’t recommend their publications strongly enough for listeners who are interested in learning more (and there are of course many more than i’ve chosen to post below). I’ve also thrown a few recent works by Austin, Vipin and I which many of you may have already read.* “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure.” Journal of International Security. Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel (open access link).* “The Meaning of China’s Nuclear Modernization.” Journal of Strategic Studies. Caitlin Talmadge and Josh Rovner.* “Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.” Center for GLobal Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Edited by Brad Roberts. Austin’s article “Damage Limitation in the 21st Century” is located on page 66.* “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age.“ Foreign Affairs. Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi. Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Austin, Vipin, and I suspended our unilateralist approach to choosing podcast topics for one recording session, instead taking on questions and comments that you listeners/readers sent to us. Thank you for being willing to engage, on pretty short notice, on a wide array of topics. We will definitely do this again, so please keep sending in your thoughts!I’m not going to list every question we received, but they ran the gamut of nuclear policy topics. We discussed China’s military parade, Pakistan’s long-range missile program, counterforce and negotiating war termination, advice for new/early-career participants in the nuclear field, and reflected on “surprises” we experienced during our careers in government.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

I really enjoyed this conversation with Lowell Schwartz, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Policy, who joined the podcast to talk about the role Congress plays in overseeing arms control and nuclear policy. I’m glad we were able to get Lowell’s perspective on the opaque world of executive-legislative branch relations, particularly on national security issues, and who better to offer insights on this topic than a former senior professional staff member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who managed the WMD portfolio.We talked about the New START and nuclear modernization compromise, how a staffer approaches oversight of the executive branch on these issues, and Lowell’s experience on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to New START, we talked about the politics surrounding JCPOA negotiations on Capitol Hill, how to ask nicely for briefings from the Department of State, and the comparative advantages the executive branch has over Capitol Hill on the foreign policy, military and technical topics involved in arms control policy.We also talk about the relevance of public support for arms control and defense spending decisions, Golden Dome, SDI, and missile defense politics historically, and the prospects for arms control with Russia and China today. Lowell and I also spent some time talking about the rationale for arms control, what aspects of arms control policy members of Congress and Senators may find important, and how historical arms control oversight on Capitol Hill—and deal-making involving defense spending and arms control limits—may relate to any contemporary effort to approve a new treaty. Finally, we end with a discussion about how far Congress can go with spending to modernize and possibly grow the arsenal in future without an arms control path to control costs down the road (and how hard that looks right now given relations with potential arms control partners).Read Lowell’s writing on domestic and international politics at his Substack, “A New Sense of Freedom.“Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We had a long, detailed conversation across a host of policy issues that impact arms control policy, diving into his long career as a DoD and NSC official from the late 80s into the early 2000s, overseeing the policy process that supported negotiated reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces for two decades. Here’s a quick list of the topics we covered:* The relationship between parity as a policy objective vs. deterrence requirements;* The potential for an “interim restraint” in continuing New START limits constraining modernization, force posture adjustments, breaking comity among the various USG entities involved in nuclear modernization, and/or diminish negotiating leverage; * How deterrence requirements can and should inform an arms control position;* His experience leading a SIOP review starting in the late 1980s, how U.S. officials began prioritizing targets in furtherance of U.S. nuclear strategy, and how these efforts helped lay groundwork for the START process;* what an “all-warheads” agreement could look like between the US and Russia that takes into account deterrence requirements AND politics;* the concerns expressed regarding a lapse of New START without replacement (or perhaps replacement with an agreement that permits a larger deployed arsenal) and good arguments and goals for future arms control; * the impact of national interests and personalistic leadership in arms control diplomacy; * strategies to try and bring China into arms control discussions;* the direction of travel on U.S.-Russia relations, the Russia/Ukraine conflict, security guarantees and NATO, and the impact of these issues on U.S. nuclear policy-making in the USG right now; and, * Where Golden Dome may fit into all of these arms control policy considerations.We end with a little bonhomie in calling for experts across national security disciplines to come together and integrate their perspectives to tackle these important deterrence and arms control questions moving forward.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We have a wide-ranging episode to cover the current events wavefront, touching on Vipin’s recent trip to Australia and the state of extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the self-determined end of Russia’s self-imposed purported “moratorium” on INF-range missiles, and how tomorrow’s US-Russia head of state meeting may influence arms control and nuclear deterrence topics—including the dynamics around New START and a potential successor. In our New START/summit discussion, we discuss the relevance of U.S. nuclear modernization (not just the substance, but the schedule), the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russia’s recent arms control record, deterrence requirements with China, and the interagency back-and-forth involved in arms control policy-making, to frame what a new “deal” after New START could look like between the U.S. and Russia. We even end up agreeing(?) on the possible outlines of a future agreement, while all reserving the option of changing our views on a whim. (Note: our discussion regarding the Anchorage Summit may be dated, as we recorded this conversation on Friday, 8/8).The only thing better than AI experts talking about nuclear deterrence are three nuclear experts trying to talk about AI. To this end, Austin, Vipin, and I close with a brief discussion of a recent Foreign Affairs article that touches on both worlds, called “The End of Mutual Assured Destruction.” We talk about whether and how AI advancements are different from past technology-focused research that declared the end of MAD, technological developments that stressed concepts of stable deterrence during the Cold War and how they relate to future pressures AI may create on strategic stability, and whether the U.S. government is well-structured to meet issues that arise at the AI and nuclear policy nexus.Finally, we preview some forthcoming work on proliferation latency versus breakout strategies—drawing Iran, Libya, and North Korea lessons—and summarize some of the work ahead as the three of us prepare for the launch of the MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy this fall.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

I was happy to host a one-on-one conversation with Alexandra Bell, President and CEO of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a couple of weeks ago. She offered a glimpse into what a career in nuclear risk reduction and arms control really looks like in and out of government. Hopefully this offers some insights to early career professionals thinking about their next steps.Alex and I talked about her recent experience in government, leading the State Department’s arms control bureau in the early days of the Biden Administration to kick start diplomatic processes to extend the New START Treaty, begin a strategic stability dialogue with Russia, and revitalize the P5 Strategic Stability process. We also discussed the first U.S.-China arms control and nonproliferation consultation in November 2023, and the prospects for bilateral risk reduction. Alex helps highlight the nitty gritty nature of setting up successful diplomatic processes, and how persistence may be the most important attribute for a diplomat trying to advance risk reduction dialogue with major power adversaries. We also talk about arms control as a profession, and how practitioners slowly build expertise and accomplishments over time, learning lessons from in and out of government. Alex also describes the slightly different (and challenging) nature of multilateral diplomacy, compared to New START and other areas of arms control policy work, and the importance of being an optimist in the field of managing nuclear risk. We also touch on current events, including President Trump’s interest in nuclear arms control, the value of unorthodox approaches to arms control, and prospects (and painful environment) for arms control with Russia as New START’s expiration and the rest of the world’s expectations for U.S.-Russia arms control.Finally, we talk about the Bulletin’s origins and role as a media organization in the nuclear discourse and debates taking place among experts and the public, particularly in an information environment characterized more by tribes, and the need to overcome political differences to find solutions to the most urgent nuclear risks. Alex and I also discuss the importance of the next generation of nuclear professionals, the value of development programs like those at CSIS PONI, and the need for resilience and creativity in new entrants to the field along with some other advice for young pros. We spend a little time talking about the influence of social media on nuclear debates and education, and how to measure “success” in nuclear policy these days. Alex describes a new short story fiction contest at the Bulletin that listeners should check out here.Somehow, we slide a Battlestar Galactica quote into the conversation and the importance of pop culture to increasing interest in reducing existential risks in the world. So say we all.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Vipin and I welcome Austin Long, a former deputy director for strategic stability on the U.S. Joint Staff (J5) to the pod, and as a new Senior Fellow with MIT’s Center for Nuclear Security Policy. We had a wide-ranging discussion on* the recent UK-France joint statement on nuclear deterrence and the possible areas for the two allies to cooperate and implement the “Northwood Declaration” moving forward, * reactions to our Foreign Affairs article “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age”—including critiques of the U.S. retaining a damage limitation objective in its nuclear strategy,* the kinds of modest changes to future U.S. nuclear posture that may be prudent given China’s breakout and also in support of a new arms control deal with Russia,* The Washington Naval Conference (???) and pursuing strategic arms control in a period of global rearmament, * potential shifts to U.S. extended deterrence and allied assurance approaches,* how Austin hopes to spend his time as a new former government official (explaining damage limitation), and* . nuclear modernization “stretch goals.”A few items we referenced during the show:“Northwood Declaration.” July 10, 2025 Press release on UK-France joint nuclear statement.“How to Survive the New Nuclear Age.” Foreign Affairs.“Optimal Deterrence” by James Acton. CFR. “Counterforce in Contemporary U.S. Nuclear Strategy.” CGSR Occasional Paper. Brad Roberts, et al.“A New Nuclear Age: The Sum of All Fears.” Net Assessment podcast at Stimson.org.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Ola and I talk about the Biden administration’s National Security Memorandum on Missile Technology Exports, the new Trump administration executive order, MTCR implementation and defense trade streamlining more generally. We summarize our recent article (link below at CSIS), and discuss the balance between protecting missile technologies and discouraging allies from pursuing nuclear weapons or other defense trade partners, how allies and industry engage the U.S. government to discuss defense technology cooperation and the barriers they face, and how the deteriorating security environment, technological advancement, and USG’s desire for allies to bolster their own defense capabilities created an interesting moment for reviewing export control approaches during our stint in the Biden NSC.We also discuss the impacts MTCR policy reforms will have on commercial space cooperation. Missiles for military purposes and space launch vehicles (e.g., missiles are missiles) were treated in exactly the same way under the USG’s implementation of MTCR; the Biden NSM sought to separate the review of space launch vehicles and related technologies from missiles used for a defense end-use. Finally, we try to forecast the defense trade streamlining priorities of the Trump administration, including FMS reform efforts that may begin under the President’s new E.O. and “pie in the sky” ideas.In lieu of a more detailed summary of the podcast, I’m sharing a longer-than-usual reading list (below the image and subscribe button below) for anyone interested in further background on MTCR and related export control issues. Reading List:MTCR Basics* Department of State factsheet: “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked Questions“* FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Introduces New Guidance for Missile Technology Exports to Advance Nonproliferation Goals and Bolster Allied Defense Capabilities (Biden Administration, January 7, 2025).* Executive Order: Reforming Defense Sales to Improve Speed and Accountability (Trump Administration, April 9, 2025).* Trump Administration 2020 UAS Policy: “Trump Administration Approves Updated Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Export Policy“CSIS* Ola Craft and Pranay Vaddi. “Revising Missile Controls Is Necessary to Help Allies and Prevent New Nuclear States” (2025)* Audio version* Sean Wilson. “Missile Technology Control Regime Reform: Key Changes and Next Steps“ (2025)* Audio version Arms Control Association* “U.S. Reinterprets MTCR Rules” (2020)* Van Vann Diepen. “Missile Technology Decontrol Proposals Are Counterproductive“ (2024)* Van Vann Diepen. “Biden Loosens Missile Technology Export Controls” (2025)* “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance“Congress* Huizenga/McCaul: “Huizenga, McCaul Introduce Legislation to Modernize Missile Technology Export Controls“ (2025)USSC * William Greenwalt and Tom Corben. “AUKUS enablers? Assessing defence trade control reforms in Australia and the United States“ Press* Allyson Park. “U.S., U.K., Australia Still Ironing Out Tech, Info Sharing Kinks.“ National Defense Magazine.I also encourage you to follow the work of Fabian Hoffman, who is spending a lot of time and effort analyzing European defense industrial base issues, including conventional missile production and conventional deterrence. [ Fabian Hoffmann ]See his work at Missile Matters: Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Following an earlier conversation with Bob Peters and John Warden on a possible U.S. force posture after New START expires on February 5, 2026, we look at the arms control side of the coin to brainstorm what a New START successor agreement may look like Mallory Stewart and Mike Albertson, two former U.S. government officials with decades of experience in implementing strategic arms control agreements, join us for the discussion. Mallory was most recently the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, whereas Mike has held a number of national security positions across the U.S. Government, working at DoD, State, and the NSC.Vipin and I talk to Mallory and Mike about how China may factor into a new U.S.-Russia agreement or trilateral discussion. We also consider whether the future accord should focus on numbers or something else, the relationship between quantitative arrangements and strategic risk today, and dive into how negotiators may handle inspections, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and other specific provisions. We also raise the possible format for a multilateral negotiation that brings in other P5 states. The group discusses why flexibility is going to be important for U.S. arms control policy moving forward, as future measure may (and perhaps should) stray quite a bit from the formal, bilateral treaty-based approach of the past.Finally, we discuss how the U.S. Government should prepare for a new round of talks—how do you get arms control on the agenda?—as well as the international community’s expectations for a U.S.-Russia negotiation before the NPT Review Conference in 2026, and how other states can raise the profile on arms control to help get some forward progress.Bios for our guests:https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/experts/mallory-stewart/https://cgsr.llnl.gov/experts/fellows/mike_albertsonIntro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Heather takes the mic to interview Vipin and I. We covered as much ground as we could in discussing our article, but spent most of our time discussing Iran, U.S. nuclear strategy (including why the United States retains a damage limitation objective and how that is complicated by China’s nuclear modernization and expansion), extended deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and what we hope people are taking away from this writing.We end with some virtual hugs and talk about our recent experience in government.Follow Heather:* @heatherwilly* ‪@heatherwilly.bsky.social‬* Heather Williams And her team:https://www.csis.org/programs/project-nuclear-issuesHopefully most of you were able to read the gift link; here it is on the FA website:https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-survive-new-nuclear-age-narang-vaddiIntro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Today, I’m joined by Eric Brewer, a Deputy Vice President for the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Program and former National Security Council Director for Counterproliferation, and Corey Hinderstein, a vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, overseeing the Technology and International Affairs Program, the Nuclear Policy Program, and the Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program, and recently she was the acting principal deputy administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In addition to leading two leading D.C.-based organizations on nuclear policy and nonproliferation, both Eric and Corey spent a lot of time thinking about Iran’s nuclear program in their government careers.We recap our understanding of Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. air and missile strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan; how “complete” the success may or may not have been with regard to Iran’s centrifuges, enriched uranium stockpiles, and other important aspects of the program (as well as the way U.S. intelligence is being discussed publicly, including by U.S. officials); and, what Iran may do next with its nuclear program. We spend a little time talking about Esfahan specifically, as this site is the subject of intense scrutiny in press and open-source analysis circles as it may be the location of Iran’s 60% uranium stockpile and any surviving aspects of the nuclear program in hard-to-get-to tunnels. We also try to analyze the prospects for renewed diplomacy, the bad options available for Iran and how Iran may shift its nuclear strategy moving forward, and the potential for Iran to accept zero enrichment.The conversation shifts to considering the broader impacts the U.S. and Israeli attacks may have on the NPT, nonproliferation regime, its participants and proliferation-curious states. Finally, we end by listing our priorities for any potential diplomacy - resuming verification and monitoring - and I easily convince Eric and Corey to come back onto the pod to talk about Section T for 2 or 3 hours.Follow Corey:* @CoreyAH* ‪@coreyah.bsky.social‬Follow Eric:* @BrewerEricM* @ebrewer.bsky.social‬Recent work:Corey, @ Carnegie’s “Emissary” blog: “Cutting Nuclear Nonproliferation Funding Will Undermine U.S. National Security“Eric in Foreign Policy last week: “Israel’s Attacks Make an Iranian Bomb More Likely”Note: we recorded this podcast just before Iran’s missile retaliation against Al Udeid air base in Qatar, and before President Trump’s announcement of a “complete and total ceasefire.”Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We went far and wide into the world of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In addition to talking about the relevance of the NPT in an era of major power disagreement and nuclear proliferation risks, we discussed hot topics among NPT parties, such as the U.S. nuclear umbrella and (the lack of) progress on nuclear disarmament, what non-nuclear weapons states expect from the United States and nuclear allies like the United Kingdom, and how Russia and China use NPT venues to advance narratives that harm tenets of U.S. nuclear strategy, like extended deterrence.Heather outlines what she’s heard from NPT participants regarding recent meetings, including how effective influence campaigns targeting non-nuclear weapons states impacts the U.S. and U.K. reputations, despite nuclear transparency efforts, and Vipin describes the great power “collusive origins” of the NPT, with credit to friends of the pod (disclaimer: We haven’t asked them whether they’re friends of the pod) Jane Vaynman and Andrew Coe: see here.After talking about the NPT, we spend a little time thinking through what U.S. arms control policy could be, and should be, taking into account the threat environment and continued expectations of the non-nuclear NPT states parties. The conversation gets a bit wonky as we think about numbers, limits, and foci of future potential arms control agreements with Russia, and whether we should set aside the “old way” of quantitative arms control or think about behavior, norms, and other standards in future agreements.We end with a strong plug for supporting the next generation of nuclear deterrence and arms control experts - the nuclear “yutes” for My Cousin Vinny fans - a focus for MIT CNSP and of course a huge part of the work Heather is doing at the CSIS Project On Nuclear Issues. Thank you for listening.Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema.Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Shashank Joshi is the Defence Editor with The Economist, where he covers intelligence, military affairs, and a wide range of other security issues. He has been following the Russia-Ukraine conflict closely since day one, contributing high quality, deep analysis that’s digestible for casual observers and experts alike (kind of what we’re trying to do with our Substack, but better). We take advantage of Shashank’s patience to cover a whole lot of topics: * the intent behind and focus of the U.K. Strategic Defence Review,* the nuclear elements of the SDR, including whether its time for the RAF to purchase F-35A, join the NATO DCA mission, and re-establish a British dyad;* Ukraine’s daring, Guns of Navarone style raid on Russian bombers and other aircraft and what lessons to take away regarding red-lines, non-nuclear weapons states risk-taking in wars with nuclear-armed states vs. how nuclear-armed states fight with one another, including in the recent India and Pakistan dust-up; and,* prognosticating Axios’ reporting on the latest U.S. proposal to Iran, and the likelihood a deal actually happens before the mid-October deadline to trigger a reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran pursuant to a 2015 Security Council resolution.* (we also set up a future podcast to talk about the Wild West in Outer Space).Reading (and listening) list:* “Five important ideas from Britain’s defence review“ * The Strategist at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute* “Can Europe Re-arm, and Might This be in Time?”* The Global Security Briefing podcast at the Royal United Services Institute.Follow Shashank’s day-to-day coverage and analysis:* Twitter (@shashj)* Bluesky (@shashj.bsky.social)Intro/outro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Two pods in one week, we’re really overworking ourselves (MIT’s semester ended and we are in between trips in writing limbo, so why not). In this episode, Vipin and I talk to Bob Peters, a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence at the Heritage Foundation, and John Warden, a former NSC Director for Strategic Stability and Arms Control in the Biden Administration, about a future U.S. nuclear force. After baselining on:* anticipated modernization program costs (including a recent adjustment by the Congressional Budget Office on the ten-year outlook for the nuclear modernization “program of record”— $946 billion over the 2025–2034 period, or an average of about $95 billion a year); and, * the likely continuity in U.S. nuclear strategy (I annoy Vipin with another long quote from a declassified 1960s DoD draft memorandum regarding the risk of not having limited attack options to direct at adversary military capabilities)…We discuss priorities, timeframes, strategy, and costs through asking the following questions: * What is the current state of U.S. nuclear modernization, attempts to analyze and buttress it in the last administration, where is there room to make tweaks, if at all, and why should we?* What is more important to focus on in the near-term, the risk of regional deterrence failure or central deterrence failure?* How does China’s nuclear expansion change how we think about our current nuclear force and posture? Day to day vs. generated, peacetime vs. crisis?* How does conventional and nuclear force posture and our nuclear strategy relate to extended deterrence, crisis management, and escalation management within conflict?* Can we make the math work for a New START follow-on taking into account the possible demands of a larger nuclear force, if one is required? What could that new agreement look like?* Where can arms control more generally help solve some of the problems that drive consideration of a larger or different nuclear force?* How will Golden Dome, and developing a capability to defeat limited adversary attacks against the homeland, impact extended deterrence, arms racing and arms control prospects?Over the course of this conversation, we realized there is so much more to unpack. We will definitely follow up with additional pods and posts to dig further into the nuclear posture topic. In the meantime, we hope you enjoy this episode. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We were happy to host Ankit Panda, the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to discuss his new book: “The New Nuclear Age: At the Precipice of Armageddon.” Ankit lays out the features of the new era, including:* allied proliferation and other risks to the nonproliferation regime and norms;* deterrence and strategic stability in a world of endemic technological change; and,* the centrality of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy to foreign policy and statecraft, among other things.The three of us then discuss the recent military operations by India and Pakistan following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, whether the recent exchange of air and missile strikes and eventual climb-down from hostilities represent the first “real crisis of the third nuclear age” in South Asia, and concern that a new, higher “floor” has been set for future crises, as the fundamentals—hard to deter terrorist acts and strong domestic political urges to respond as strongly as possible—can lead to a more nuclear-tinged crisis in the future.Finally, we discuss Ankit’s recent paper with Frank Aum outlining a new approach to North Korea policy, titled: “Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” where the authors argue that status quo U.S. policy toward North Korea, focused on denuclearization and extended deterrence, has led to a state of dangerous co-existence, typified by an unconstrained growth in North Korea’s nuclear force, Pyonyang’s adoption of a more offensively-focused nuclear doctrine, and exacerbating crisis escalation risks. Instead, they argue, the United States should tolerate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in the near term, recognize that managing threats exclusively through deterrence is presenting unacceptable risks to U.S. and allied interests, and bring South Korea into this strategy as a means by which to reduce overall tensions and the risk of nuclear war on the peninsula. Over time, with this approach, the authors feel U.S. deterrence requirements for the Korean Peninsula may wane and allow for a prioritization of other Indo-Pacific challenges in line with the current Administration’s thinking.Later this week, Vipin and I will host John Warden, a former NSC director for strategic stability and arms control, and Bob Peters, the Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence at the Heritage Foundation (following a long career in government), to have a “blue sky” conversation about future U.S. nuclear force posture.Stay tuned. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

We welcome Mira Rapp-Hooper, a partner at The Asia Group, political scientist, and the former Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania on President Biden’s NSC, as well as Zack Cooper, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on American strategy in the Indo-Pacific and U.S.-China competition, with earlier stops in a his career in At DoD and the NSC, academia, and think tankery. On today’s pod, the four of us discuss the evolving nuclear landscape in the Indo-Pacific, stresses on U.S. nuclear strategy including extended deterrence in the region, particularly in light of China's nuclear modernization, and the implications for U.S. allies. We spend most of our time talking about what allies may want from the United States these days in terms of a reinvigorated nuclear assurance and more broadly, predictability in U.S. foreign policy. We talk about what U.S. nuclear posture could or should look like in the region as well, and dive into the NATO extended deterrence history to compare past lessons to today’s Indo-Pacific dynamics.Finally, we touch on North Korea, past work by the Biden Administration (and preceding administrations) to shore up extended deterrence in the region, and the importance of mini-lateral mechanisms (bi, tri, quad coordination) to enhance regional security. While focusing for the most part on how to enhance extended deterrence software, we also discuss the necessity of adapting alliance posture to address multiple peer threats.Bios for our guests:MiraZack Reading list:* Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances.” * Zack Cooper, “Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries,” and “Trump’s Strategic Choice: Prioritization or Retrenchment.” * DoD’s 2024 China Military Power Report.* Federation of American Scientists’ 2025 China “Nuclear Notebook,” co-authored by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight and published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.Intro music licensed by Soundstripe: “The Iron Curtain” by Wicked Cinema. Recording and edits through Riverside.fm. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com

A brief outline of the various topics we cover, as we really went all over the map, with timestamps:3m 30s: A little history on the UK and French nuclear strategies dating back to the Cold War, and interactions with U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.6m 00s: The absence of limited nuclear options among our nuclear allies in Europe, and the “religion” of escalation management.14m 00s: The varied challenges of Central Deterrence, Extended Deterrence, and Assurance; the importance of extended nuclear deterrence software and transparency in nuclear strategy for the holder of a nuclear umbrella.20m 45s: Regional deterrence is hard. Bolstering deterrence in Europe is not just a nuclear problem. The challenge is much harder without credible guarantees, and ideally, the United States works with allies to guide the development of their conventional capabilities to enhance extended deterrence strategy. 26m 05s: The “overmatch problem” - Russian force generation, force posture, and force size.28m 50s: Our attempt to come up with a constructive idea - develop enough capability to limit damage from Russian intermediate-range capabilities against Europe (what I jokingly referred to as “KMPR for France”).32m 30s: Vipin links damage limitation to allied assurance and we recap a smart thing Jeffrey and Aaron discussed on ACW (the political importance of INF deployments in the early 1980s).37m 01s: Reflecting on our experience in the USG dealing with a deteriorating nuclear security environment, this version of Russia, and how Russia could react to potential Euro Deterrent efforts (Vipin talks about damage limitation again, “no zealot like a convert”).45m 01s: All aboard to support the NPT, an America that is engaged in the world, and the importance of strengthening allied military capabilities to preserve the nonproliferation order (with a mostly self-effacing shout out for MTCR policy reform).49m 20s: The extremely high risks of deciding to go nuclear, and the “ideal world” of the U.S. and allies working together and paying into a shared extended deterrence concept.50m 30s: What is the conventional military balance in Europe without the United States?52m 00s: Plugging the MIT Center for Nuclear Security Policy, thank yous, and sign off.Recent publications by friends and fellow nuclear travelers we mentioned during our discussion, which listeners should review:* Ankit Panda, “France, UK must heed the call of Europe’s new nuclear age.”* Rebeccah Heinrichs and Yashar Parsie, “Nonproliferation in Great Power Competition.”* Jon Wolfsthal, “Don’t Let American Allies Go Nuclear.”* James Cameron, “Eurodeterrent: A Vision for an Anglo-French Nuclear Force.”* Jeffrey Lewis and Aaron Stein (Arms Control Wonk podcast), “Tusk Muses About France’s Force de Frappe.”* Ankit Panda, Vipin Narang, and Pranay Vaddi, “Nuclear Proliferation Will Haunt ‘America First’.”* Alexander Sorg, “Force De L’Europe: How Realistic is a French Nuclear Umbrella.”* Robert Peters, “Extended Deterrence: A Tool That Has Served American Interests Since 1945.”* Shashank Joshi, “The War Room newsletter: The fraying nuclear umbrella.”* Mark S. Bell and Fabian Hoffman, “Europe’s Nuclear Trilemma.” This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit strategicsimplicity.substack.com